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Zusammenfassung 
 
 Wie von jedem anderen menschlichen Merkmal lässt sich auch von der Moral 
sagen sie habe eine adaptive Funktion, nämlich den sozialen Zusammenhalt und die 
Kooperation zu fördern, und damit eine evolutionäre Geschichte. Genauer gesagt wurde 
vorgeschlagen, dass die menschliche Moral aus sogenannten “Bausteinen” bestehe, d.h. 
emotionale oder kognitive Mechanismen die auch bei anderen Arten vorhanden sein 
könnten, insbesondere bei nicht-menschlichen Primaten. Einer der wichtigsten Kontexte 
in denen solche Bausteine evoluieren können ist der reziproke Altruismus, der 
Austausch von Gütern oder Dienstleistungen unter Gruppenmitgliedern. Das Hauptziel 
dieser Studie war daher diese Idee vom reziproken Altruismus als ein Baustein der 
Moral zu prüfen. Zu diesem Zweck konzentrierte sich dieses Projekt auf den 
Futterteilenkontext, in dem ein Grossteil der Forschung über reziproken Altruismus 
sowohl bei menschlichen als auch nicht-menschlichen Primaten durchgeführt wurde. In 
einer ersten Studie wurden die grundlegenden Bedingungen unter denen Futterteilen bei 
Primaten evoluieren kann untersucht, mit dem Resultat dass dies der Fall ist wannimmer 
die grundlegenden Bedingungen für reziproken Altruismus erfüllt sind, was zu erhöhter 
sozialer Toleranz führt, die sich auch im Futterteilen niederschlägt. Der Hauptteil der 
empirischen Forschung wurde zum Futterteilen bei Schimpansen und Bonobos, unseren 
nächsten Verwandten, durchgeführt. Beide Arten teilen im Freiland Futter und dieses 
Verhalten kann auch in Zoos leicht ausgelöst werden, durch das Zugeben einer 
monopolisierbaren Ressource. Die Resultate bestätigen, dass eine relativ egalitäre 
Dominanzhierarchie eine wichtige Voraussetzung für reziproken Austausch ist, da in 
despotischeren Gruppen das Futter mit Gewalt genommen wird. Ist die Möglichkeit für 
 
Zusammenfassung  ix 
 
reziproken Austausch gegeben, steigt die Motivation zu Teilen und es wird toleranter 
geteilt. Was die proximate Regulierung angeht, so wird davon ausgegangen, dass Teilen 
und reziproker Austausch durch selektive soziale Toleranz reguliert werden, und nicht 
durch berechnende Formen des Austauschs, was hochentwickelte kognitive Fähigkeiten 
voraussetzen würde. Daher sind die Erwartungen an Futterbesitzer nicht sehr stark und 
Grosszügigkeit wird nicht belohnt, noch wird Geiz bestraft. Deshalb scheint es keine 
sozialen Normen zu geben, die dem Futterteilen bei diesen Arten zugrunde läge und die 
proximaten Mechanismen die es regulieren sind relativ einfach. Schliesslich wurde eine 
umfassende Literaturübersicht durchgeführt, in der inspiriert von diesen Resultaten 
untersucht wurde wie bereitwillig eigentlich geteilt oder sonstwie geholfen wird. Aus 
einer Kombination von Studien zum Futterteilen und künstlicheren Experimenten wurde 
geschlossen, dass Menschen eine höhere Motivation als andere Menschenaffen zeigen 
anderen zu helfen. Dies ist im Einklang mit der Naturgeschichte dieser Arten. 
Schliesslich wurden philosophische Ansichten des Altruismus, bei denen das Erkennen 
der Bedürfnisse anderer und die Absicht diese zu befriedigen wichtig sind, auf Tiere 
angewandt. Dies zeigte, dass wohl nur wenige Fälle von biologischem Altruismus auch 
solchem psychologischen Altruismus entsprechen, denn den Tieren fehlen oft die 
kognitiven oder motivationalen Voraussetzungen dazu. Zusammen ergeben diese 
Resultate ein umfassenderes Bild vom System des reziproken Altruismus bei unseren 
nächsten Verwandten. Trotz beständigen Unterschieden kann man unser eigenes 
Reziprozitätssystem durchaus als Erweiterung dessen der Menschenaffen sehen, 
getrieben von den Selektionsdrucken im Laufe der menschlichen Evolution. Auch wenn 
Futterteilen und andere soziale Interaktionen unter Menschenaffen keine Moral im 
menschlichen Sinne darstellen, so bilden sie doch die Bausteine aus denen unsere 
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eigene Moral besteht. Zum Schluss werden einige philosophische Implikationen eines 
solchen Verständnisses der Moral diskutiert, insbesondere die Unwahrscheinlichkeit 
objektiver ethischer Wahrheiten und die meta-ethischen Positionen die daraus folgen. 
Abstract  xi 
Abstract 
 
 Morality, like any other human trait, has been proposed to have an adaptive 
function, namely to promote social cohesion and cooperation, and thus has an 
evolutionary history. More precisely, it has been suggested that human morality consists 
of so-called “building blocks”, i.e. emotional or cognitive mechanisms that may be 
shared with other species, in particular non-human primates. One main context in which 
such building blocks may evolve is reciprocal altruism, the exchange of goods or 
services among members of a social group. Hence, the main aim of this study was to 
scrutinize the idea of reciprocal altruism as a building block of morality. To this end, the 
project focused on the context of food sharing, in which much of the research on 
reciprocal altruism among both human and non-human primates has been conducted. A 
first comparative study investigated the basic conditions under which food sharing may 
evolve among primates, concluding that it does so whenever individuals experience the 
basic conditions for reciprocal altruism, thus leading to an increased social tolerance, 
which translates into food sharing. The main empirical research was carried out on food 
sharing in captive chimpanzees and bonobos, our closest living relatives. Both of these 
species share food in the wild, and the behavior can easily be induced in captivity by 
providing monopolizable resources. The results confirmed that a relatively egalitarian 
dominance hierarchy is an important precondition for reciprocal exchange, because food 
is taken by force in more despotic groups. Given the possibility for reciprocal exchange, 
individuals may exhibit higher sharing motivation and share more tolerantly. In terms of 
the proximate regulation, sharing and reciprocal exchange are thought to be regulated 
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by selective social tolerance, rather than calculated forms of exchange, requiring 
advanced cognitive abilities. Hence, the social expectations towards food owners are not 
very strong and neither is generosity rewarded nor is stinginess punished. Thus, there do 
not seem to be social norms underlying food sharing among these species and the 
proximate mechanisms regulating it are relatively simple. Finally, a large amount of 
review work inspired by these results focused on the question of how voluntarily 
individuals actually engage in food sharing or other acts of help or assistance. 
Combining data from food sharing studies and more artificial experimental work, it was 
concluded that humans show an increased motivation to act on behalf of others relative 
to the apes, which is consistent with the natural history of the species. Finally, more 
philosophical views of altruism, including the recognition of another person’s needs or 
desires and the intention to actively satisfy these, were operationalized and applied to 
non-human animals. It was found that few instances of biological altruism may also 
represent psychological altruism in a philosophical sense because animals often lack 
either the cognitive or the motivational preconditions required. These results combine to 
yield a more complete picture of the reciprocal altruism system of our closest living 
relatives. Despite consistent differences, our own reciprocal altruism system can be 
understood as an extension of the apes’, expanded by the selective pressures 
experienced in the course of human evolution. While food sharing and other social 
interactions among apes thus may not represent morality in a human sense, they do 
likely constitute building blocks from which our own morality stems. Finally, some 
philosophical implications of such an understanding of morality as an adaptation with 
an evolutionary history are discussed, in particular with regard to the unlikelihood of 
objective truths and the meta-ethical positions that follow from this. 
General introduction and conclusions  1 
General introduction and conclusions 
 
 The core of this dissertation is made up of the five chapters representing original 
research, including broad comparative analyses using data from the literature (Chapter 
1), new empirical work (Chapters 2 & 3), an extensive review of the current literature 
(Chapter 4) as well as conceptual considerations at the interface of biology and 
philosophy (Chapter 5). Each chapter was written in a way that makes it stand on its 
own and has been or will be published individually in scientific journals. Hence, this 
section aims at placing the work captured in the five chapters in a broader context, 
introducing their general topics and summarizing their main results, linking the different 
chapters and drawing some general conclusions. Since this was an interdisciplinary 
project, the following glossary may be helpful in reading this section (Box 0-1). 
 
Box 0-1: Glossary for general introduction and conclusions 
 
Biological altruism: Behavior that is costly to the actor but beneficial to the 
recipient 
Reciprocal altruism: The exchange of biologically altruistic acts to the mutual 
benefit of the actors 
Psychological altruism: The desire to benefit others as an end in itself, brought 
about by a change of the actor’s preferences upon recognition of the recipients’ 
Ultimate explanations: Refer to the Darwinian benefits of a behavior, e.g. 
biological altruism can be beneficial if reciprocated 
Proximate explanations: Refer to the motivations of a behavior, e.g. a biologically 
altruistic act can be brought about by psychological altruism 
Prosocial motivation: Any kind of proximate mechanism that can bring about 
biological altruism 
Morality: The rules of conduct in a society, generally functioning to maintain 
social cohesion and cooperation 
Ethics: The philosophy of morality, in particular: 
Normative ethics: Is concerned with whether an act is right or wrong and 
general principles (ethical theories) underlying such considerations 
Meta-ethics: The philosophy of ethics. Is concerned with the nature of 
ethical discourse and -theories, moral judgments, etc. 
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The evolution of “morality” 
 
Ever since Charles Darwin’s famous words that “light will be thrown on the 
origin of man and his history” (Darwin 1859 [1985], p. 458), evolutionary biologists 
have been narrowing the gap between human beings and the rest of the animal kingdom. 
One by one, traits once believed to be uniquely human were shown to be exhibited too, 
at least some extent, by other animals. By dissecting apparently complex traits such as 
culture into simpler components and by identifying the relevant biological mechanisms 
underlying them, adaptive explanations for hitherto unexplainable traits could be found 
(e.g. Laland and Galef 2009). But surely, there must be some human characteristics 
where such a research program fails, finding no trace of homologies or analogies with 
other animals? 
 For a long time, morality was believed to be such a characteristic. Even 
evolutionary biologists such as Thomas Henry Huxley (1989 [1894]) were convinced 
that evolution by natural selection could not explain why humans should strive to be 
good and respected members of society, concluding that our culture had somehow 
allowed us to conquer our otherwise selfish nature. Others followed similar arguments, 
including Richard Dawkins (1976), who concluded that only we humans had managed 
to overcome the tyranny of our selfish genes. However, other researchers were soon to 
show that selfish genes do not necessarily produce selfish agents. 
 In two landmark papers, William Hamilton (1964) and Robert Trivers (1971) 
introduced the mechanisms of kin selection and reciprocal altruism to explain how 
genes coding for altruistic behavior may thrive in a population. The general principle is 
the same in both mechanisms: altruistic behavior has to be discriminately directed 
towards those who are likely to carry the same altruistic alleles, either because they are 
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close relatives, or because they have exhibited past behavior that is indicative of these 
altruistic alleles. 
While fundamentally based on the logic of natural selection and population 
genetics, both processes also make predictions about the proximate mechanisms of 
behavior. In particular, Trivers (1971) has elaborated greatly on the psychological 
regulation required to achieve the maximum return-benefits from reciprocal altruism 
among humans, including the building of friendships with other altruists, the feelings of 
sympathy to elicit help and gratitude to ensure reciprocation as well as their fine-tuning 
to the cost/benefit ratio of the act, the feeling of indignation when cheated upon and the 
use of “moralistic aggression” to counter and educate cheaters and finally the resulting 
feeling of guilt, reparative altruism and conscience in order to prevent or mitigate the 
costs of moralistic aggression. Thus, it can be seen that many of the sentiments and 
cognitive processes relevant for morality may in fact have their origin in such a simple 
biological mechanism as the reciprocation of acts of help or assistance. 
 Building on these ideas, Wilson (1975) in his book Sociobiology was soon to 
claim that the study of morality (and other topics) had to be taken away from the social 
scientists and philosophers. The latter’s response is outlined below, in the section on 
evolution and ethics. However, the first relevant question is, how do biologists actually 
define morality? Due to the sociobiologists’ inherent interest in natural selection and the 
cost/benefit ratios of behavior, a nearly exclusive focus on the ultimate level of 
explanation prevailed in the early discussion of morality. Indeed, many sociobiologists 
seemed to equate morality with (biological) altruism, taking for granted the 
sophisticated psychological mechanisms that may result from it, and that are usually the 
main interest of social scientists and philosophers. Some definitions expanded the 
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framework of reciprocal altruism, requiring that interactions go beyond the dyadic level 
and that third parties participate in the game of exchanging altruistic acts, accusations, 
punishment, etc. thus leading to group-level norms (Alexander 1987; DeScioli and 
Kurzban 2009). Here I will tentatively subscribe to such a functional definition of 
morality as a multiplayer game (Figure 0-1), in which group-wide norms make 
individuals incur short-term costs in order to maximize everyone’s long-term benefit. 
However, it is crucial that the proximate mechanisms necessary to uphold such a system 
are also well described and understood, as a contribution of biology to moral philosophy 
is otherwise very limited. 
 One important step in understanding this proximate regulation and the selective 
pressures that produce it was to take a comparative approach. In particular, the study of 
our closest living relatives, the primates, has contributed greatly to this, as described in 
the next section. 
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Figure 0-1: The dynamics of morality as a (at least) three-player game. Indicated along the arrows 
are the actions the players may take and in brackets are the proximate mechanisms that produce 
them. In a positive sense, actors may help others out of feelings of sympathy, thus receiving both 
gratitude and praise by second and third parties respectively, leading to the benefits of direct or 
indirect reciprocity. In a negative sense, actors develop a conscience in order to counter not only 
indignation by second parties but also condemnation by third parties, as a protection against 
punishment. These dynamics can lead to the establishment and maintenance of group-wide norms 
 
Building blocks of morality 
 
 As Darwin already noted in his book on the descent of man, evolution of 
morality by natural selection is not necessarily restricted to mankind. Indeed, „Any 
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animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts ... would inevitably acquire 
a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or 
nearly as well developed, as in man“ (Darwin 1982 [1871], pp. 71-72). Hence, a moral 
sense or conscience could potentially be found in other animals as well. This idea has 
been pursued most seriously and persistently by Frans de Waal who eloquently argued 
in several books and papers that human morality is made up of “building blocks” 
already present to some extent in other animals, in particular non-human primates (de 
Waal 1996; Flack and de Waal 2000; de Waal 2006; see Figure 0-2). Over the past 
decades, he and others have gathered a large amount of evidence for such building 
blocks (ibid.). While other researchers tend to emphasize human uniqueness (e.g. Fehr 
and Gachter 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis et al. 2008), de Waal argues that 
there are no discontinuities between humans and non-human primates in terms of 
morality. In his view, the only uniqueness of human morality is that it combines all the 
building blocks already present in some or other primate species (Figure 0-2). However, 
in emphasizing continuity, de Waal’s account lacks a clear definition of human morality 
and a proper discussion of how and why humans differ from their relatives in the extent 
of their morality (Kitcher 2006a). 
Hence, the main aim of this thesis was to scrutinize this idea of a continuum 
between “building blocks” of morality among primates and human morality, in 
particular with regard to reciprocity and altruism. To this end, these proposed building 
blocks were studied among our closest living relative, chimpanzees and bonobos. 
Comparisons with other species including humans in exhaustive review work as well as 
some philosophical considerations complete the study. The main results are summarized 
in the next section. 
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Figure 0-2: Morality as seen by de Waal (1996, 2006) consists of several “building blocks”, for 
which he has gathered a large amount of evidence in different primate species. In his view, the only 
difference between humans and other primates is that in humans all these building blocks are 
present, thus representing full morality. Figure adapted from a lecture by de Waal at the University 
of Zurich in 2008 
 
Reciprocal altruism and food sharing: main results of this study 
 
 Much of the empirical research concerned with the evolution of moral building 
blocks has focused on some form of reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987) and 
food sharing has been a main context in which reciprocity under natural conditions has 
been studied both among human and non-human primates (Feistner and McGrew 1989; 
de Waal 1996; Brown et al. 2004; Gurven 2004; de Waal 2006). Hence, this project 
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focused mainly on this context and tried to answer a variety of questions both on the 
ultimate and the proximate level of explanation.  
 In particular, Chapter 1 deals with the very basic question of why food sharing 
evolved in some primate taxa but not others. Using data from the literature, we applied 
comparative evolutionary analyses to test different underlying factors. We could show 
that food sharing evolved if the very basic conditions for reciprocal altruism were 
fulfilled (Box 0-2) and individuals thus experienced some need of negotiating the 
exchange of various services. Hence, we argue that species that encountered these 
conditions evolved higher levels of social tolerance that are then expressed in food 
sharing. 
 
 
Box 0-2: The basic conditions for reciprocal altruism (after Trivers 1971) 
 
• A can provide a service/resource to B, the costs of which are smaller than 
the benefits to B 
• B cannot acquire the service/resource by force 
• On other occasions, B can provide the same or another service/resource to A 
 
In Chapter 2, we further examine the basic conditions for reciprocal altruism by 
comparing reciprocity in food sharing and grooming across different groups of 
chimpanzees and bonobos. We found that reciprocity declined with increasing steepness 
of the hierarchy as dominants in more despotic groups could acquire resources by force, 
thus precluding reciprocal exchange (Box 0-2). Conversely, we found that in those 
groups in which reciprocity was more likely, food was also shared more tolerantly, thus 
leading over to more proximate mechanisms of reciprocal altruism. 
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 Using the same data for Chapter 3, we tested whether reciprocal exchange was 
contingent on previous interactions, thus indicating calculated reciprocity, and whether 
individuals that did not share food received punishment by others. We found no 
evidence for the latter and although there was some evidence for contingent exchanges 
as bonobos allowed more food transfers after having been groomed, we prefer a 
parsimonious emotional explanation over a highly cognitive one. Thus, we conclude 
that reciprocal exchange among chimpanzees and bonobos is mediated by tolerance, 
which may temporarily be increased through grooming, rather than by calculated 
exchange. We suggest that this grooming effect may explain most instances of 
contingent reciprocity among primates and that although not beyond the cognitive 
capacities of primates, calculated exchanges only became important recently in human 
evolution as the basis of trade between relatively unfamiliar individuals. 
 In Chapter 4 we asked the more general question of how readily humans and 
other primates engage in acts of help or assistance, what external factors make them do 
so and how psychological differences between species can be explained by their natural 
histories. Using a large amount of data from the literature, we quantified food sharing 
among primates into proactive, reactive and passive transfers, each representing a 
different psychological regulation. We found that the vast majority of food transfers 
were passive, thus indicating low prosocial motivation, some were reactive, indicating a 
response to the recipient’s need and only some primate taxa regularly engage in 
proactive sharing, indicating a high prosocial motivation. Together with an exhaustive 
review of recent experimental work, we use these data to argue that humans have 
acquired a different prosocial psychology relative to other apes, probably due to the 
adoption of cooperative breeding and indirect reciprocity. 
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 Finally, in Chapter 5 we note differences between biological and philosophical 
views of altruism and discuss difficulties in testing the latter ones. We examine the 
cognitive and motivational preconditions for psychological altruism and discuss 
whether animals could have it and how we could recognize it. We propose that if A is an 
intentional agent, as indicated by a well-developed theory of mind, and A changes its 
behavior, thus indicating a change in intentions, in order to satisfy B’s intentions, as 
perceived by A, and if other immediate reasons for this change in behavior such as 
harassment can be excluded, then A’s behavior is indicative of psychological altruism. 
Referring mainly to Chapter 4, we propose that only few instances of biological altruism 
may also represent psychological altruism, because species lack either the cognitive- 
and/or the motivational preconditions, and discuss whether and why humans differ in 
their expression of psychological altruism. 
 Some of these results are summarized in Figure 0-3. Basic conditions for 
reciprocal altruism can explain why food sharing should occur at all, whereas the 
average certainty of return benefits can explain the level of sharing motivation that has 
evolved in a particular species. Combined with advanced cognitive skills, high sharing 
motivation may reflect psychological altruism. Thus, we conclude that building on the 
cognitive and psychological predispositions already present in the last common ancestor 
with chimpanzees and bonobos, humans have substantially extended these building 
blocks of morality. This was probably due to an ever increasing interdependence and the 
resulting need for social cohesion and cooperation, from the loose communities of great 
apes to cooperatively breeding hunter-gatherer bands and modern global societies. Thus, 
human morality is characterized by a strong desire to adhere to social expectations and 
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norms and reward those that do likewise. On the negative side the conscience prevents 
transgression of norms lest one evoke indignation and punishment (cf. Figure 0-1). 
Figure 0-3: A flow diagram summarizing all possible ways in which food could be transferred from 
owner to recipient. In despotic species, dominants can take food by force, no reciprocal exchange 
should occur and consequently owners should have no motivation to share (Chapters 1 & 2). In 
egalitarian species, owners should have some prosocial motivations and tolerate transfers if the 
roles are frequently reversed or if there are other resources or commodities to be traded (Chapters 
1 & 2). Calculated exchanges however are not common in primates (Chapter 3). Proactive sharing 
reflects a high intrinsic prosocial motivation and is only regularly found among cooperative 
breeders (Chapter 4). Reactive sharing reflects a response to the recipient’s need and occurs 
occasionally among apes, in particular chimpanzee males (Chapter 4). Passive sharing indicates a 
lack of intention and thus reflects low prosocial motivation (Chapters 4 & 5). If owners share 
proactively or reactively and have a well-developed theory of mind (ToM), thus suggesting a change 
in intentions due to recognition of the recipients’ intentions, then psychological altruism may be 
inferred (Chapter 5). 
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Chimpanzees and bonobos as study species 
 
 Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) are our closest 
living relatives and many studies have shown amazing similarities between them and us 
in terms of social behavior, cognition, emotions, etc. (de Waal 1996; de Waal 2006), 
thus making them ideal and invaluable study species for understanding human evolution 
(Figure 0-4). Together they form our sister taxon as they split from their most recent 
common ancestor roughly 1.5-2 million years ago through the formation of the Congo 
river and are thus equally closely related to humans (Stumpf 2007). However, 
chimpanzees have been far better studied, both in the wild and in captivity (Stanford 
1998; Stumpf 2007). This is largely due to the fact that bonobos are relatively rare in 
captivity and have been difficult to study in the wild because of political instabilities in 
the only country they occur, the Democratic Republic of Congo (ibid.). As a 
consequence, early studies had a large impact on the public perception of bonobos 
(Stanford 1998), leading to the popular image of the “hippie primates” that make love 
and not war, in contrast to chimpanzees who are thought of as more violent and brutal 
(de Waal 2005). More recent research has proven such a dichotomous view wrong, 
showing that levels of aggression and affiliation are clearly affected by experienced 
levels of competition and thus probably lie on a continuum spanning both Pan species 
(Stumpf 2007; Stevens et al. 2008). Thus, although undoubtedly some differences exist 
in terms of socio-sexual behavior, female dominance and possibly cognitive 
development (Stumpf 2007; Wobber et al. 2010), the two species are treated as largely 
equal for the purpose of this thesis and differences found between them are explained in 
terms of general social factors rather than as species idiosyncrasies. 
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Figure 0-4: Chimpanzees (left) and bonobos (right) during the course of a food sharing experiment. 
The chimpanzees were observed at the Abenteuerland Walter Zoo in Gossau SG (Switzerland), the 
bonobos at the Dierenpark Planckendael (Belgium). The chimpanzee picture shows the alpha male, 
Digit, sharing with a young female, Elisha. The bonobo picture shows the young male Zamba and 
his mother Hortense investigating the bag with food as another female, Djanoa, watches and the 
alpha female, Hermien, approaches in the background 
 
Evolution and ethics 
 
An important question arising from a biological study of morality is whether 
such a research program can make any contributions to moral philosophy, in particular 
normative ethics or meta-ethics. Wilson’s (1975) and other sociobiologists’ proposals of 
naturalizing morality (let alone earlier attempts by social Darwinists) were initially met 
with little enthusiasm on the part of moral philosophers (Kitcher 1985; Ruse 1986; 
Kitcher 2005). Many philosophers rejected the very idea based on the objection of the 
naturalistic fallacy, i.e. that an is can never lead to an ought (Hume 2003 [1739-1740]). 
Thus, the biological sciences have to contain themselves with describing the world as it 
is, while only moral philosophy may deal with questions of how the world ought to be. 
Other common objections include that (i) altruism neither fully represents nor describes 
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morality, (ii) that morality cannot be functionalized in terms of costs and benefits, or 
(iii) that a knowledge of ultimate factors (costs and benefits) cannot advance moral 
discourse, -judgment, -reasoning, etc. (e.g. Peacock et al. 2005). 
More recently, an increased focus on proximate mechanisms drawing mainly 
from advances in primatology (de Waal 1996; de Waal 2006) and neuroscience (Haidt 
2001) has led to the general acceptance of the idea that human beings’ capacity for 
sympathy, which is at the basis of important schools of moral philosophy (Smith 2002 
[1759]; Hume 2003 [1739-1740]), may have evolved through natural selection (Sober 
and Wilson 1998; Kitcher 2006b). Furthermore, the novel fields of experimental 
philosophy and moral psychology have started to investigate empirically how humans 
respond to moral dilemmas, how they make moral judgments, etc. (Nichols 2004; 
Hauser 2006; Haidt 2007). Thus, the naturalization of morality is now well on its way. 
However, it is still not clear whether naturalizing morality has any implications for 
moral philosophy. 
Two philosophers in particular, Michael Ruse and Philip Kitcher, have taken the 
idea of morality as an adaptation with an evolutionary history seriously and have led the 
investigation of its philosophical implications (Ruse 1986; Kitcher 1998; Kitcher 2003; 
Kitcher 2006b; Ruse 2009). Both seem to agree on the fact that morality represents a 
kind of social contract that was not made by conscious agreement but set in place by our 
genes through natural selection. However, they do differ in their main conclusions. 
Ruse states somewhat provocatively that “ethics is an illusion put in place by 
natural selection to make us good cooperators” (2009, p. 297) and goes on to make the 
meta-ethical inference that there are no objective moral justifications, hence one is 
inevitably driven to skepticism about the foundations of ethics. Thus, the Darwinian 
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approach to ethics in Ruse’s view leads to a kind of “moral non-realism” (Ruse 1986). 
In this view, right is right and wrong is wrong just because that is the way we feel about 
it, there is no higher appeal. He adds that the fact that we feel not only compelled to do 
right and accuse wrong, but are also convinced that there are objective foundations for 
doing so, is itself a biological adaptation, because otherwise morality would collapse 
into futility: “morality stays in place as an effective illusion because we think that it is 
not an illusion but the real thing” (Ruse 2009, p. 310). He concludes by reassuring the 
reader that our belief in this illusion is so strong that seeing through it does not lead to 
its abandonment. 
Kitcher takes a slightly more cautious approach. He starts from the observation 
that “the ethical practices of contemporary human groups have a long history, one that involves 
the emergence under natural selection of various emotions and psychological capacities, as 
well as a sociocultural evolution.” (Kitcher 2006, p. 13). Understanding current ethical practices 
as a product of such a history then casts doubt on claims of there being one (or several) 
fundamentally true basic ethical principle(s), an idea inherent to most contemporary ethical 
theories. However, there remains, in Kitcher’s view, a sense of ethical progress throughout this 
history that is independent of such moral truth. Rather than by increasing moral truth, ethical 
progress occurs through fostering social cohesion and cooperation, which is the primary 
function of morality. In particular, this is achieved by the expansion of capacities for 
psychological altruism, including for example an ever growing circle of potential recipients. 
Kitcher concludes by suggesting that “armed with an account of ethical progress, the 
naturalistic ethics I envisage could take up the project of normative ethics in a distinctive way.” 
(Kitcher 2006, p. 28), namely by replacing the “blind lurchings of history” with a more 
methodological quest for ethical progress. However, he remains rather vague about how such a 
quest should be organized. 
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 In summary, taking a biological account of morality seriously can lead to highly 
interesting philosophical conclusions. Thus, an original aim of this thesis was to further 
explore the possible implications of biological views of morality on moral philosophy 
and in particular meta-ethics. However, given the complexity and diversity of the field 
and the difficulty of such an approach (Kitcher 2005), this ambitious project had to be 
abandoned for now. Instead, I could merely begin to understand the current debates in 
meta-ethics, with positions like Ruse’s and Kitcher’s and their critics, and let some of 
the work in this thesis be inspired by philosophical viewpoints (Chapter 5). Future work 
will have to advance the debate on naturalistic ethics. 
 
Conclusions: Continuity or discontinuity? 
 
 In almost all of the chapters, we have found some differences between humans 
and non-human primates. However, this is not necessarily to say that the human species 
is unique in any sense other than in the way every species is unique through its own 
evolutionary history. Rather, the fact that almost all unique human traits related to 
morality, or at least related to reciprocity and altruism as treated in this thesis, have 
some homologies or analogies in other species, and that the acquisition of derived 
human traits can be explained through processes of natural selection, places humans 
firmly amidst other animals. For instance, the fact that only humans may have a full-
blown belief-desire psychology and second order intentionality need not preclude the 
possibility that other animals can be psychological altruists (cf. Chapter 5). Indeed, it 
merely serves to challenge any definition of psychological altruism based on such 
narrow cognitive preconditions. Thus, I support the notion that human morality can be 
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understood as consisting of “building blocks”, i.e. emotional and cognitive processes 
with a specific function that have an evolutionary history and are partly shared with 
other species (de Waal 1996; de Waal 2006). 
 Having said this, I think that there are some important aspects of human morality 
that are probably not shared with other animals (but that are nonetheless understandable 
as an extension of animal precursors). As mentioned above, I tentatively subscribe to a 
(functional) definition of morality that goes beyond the dyadic level of interaction 
(Alexander 1987; DeScioli and Kurzban 2009; Figure 0-1). Importantly, multiplayer 
dynamics bring some changes in the proximate regulation of the reciprocity system, 
which are, I think, relevant to morality. For instance, while conscience may already 
develop in direct reciprocity systems, if there is punishment, the fact that a cheater may 
face condemnation by any individual of its community should certainly have made it 
stronger. Hence the extreme sensitivity of humans to cues of being watched and the 
feeling of guilt even in private (cf. Chapter 4), leading to a strong adherence to social 
norms. Conversely, expectations about others’ behavior, that were only based on an 
individual’s own past interactions in direct reciprocity systems, now become adjusted to 
those of others, thus leading to shared expectations and eventually group-wide norms. 
There is as yet no strong evidence that would suggest that chimpanzees (or other 
species) engage in such group-level dynamics (but see Rudolf von Rohr et al. in prep.). 
Thus, my tentative conclusion is that a full morality in the sense we know it requires 
such group-wide norms, and that its evolution can be understood by the multiplayer 
dynamics of fission-fusion foraging societies with high interdependence which led to 
the adoption of ever stronger expectations, rules of conduct, conscience, etc. (Alexander 
1987). 
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 Finally, in terms of philosophical implications of a naturalized view of morality, 
I agree with both Ruse and Kitcher that there is little room for objective moral truth. I 
am sympathetic to a Kitcherian kind of position that recognizes the general principles 
leading to the (biological and cultural) evolution of our current ethical practices and 
attempts to actively apply these in order to advance ethical progress in the sense of 
promoting social cohesion through an expansion of our capacities for psychological 
altruism. I am aware that this position is not invulnerable to the problems of naturalistic 
fallacy, since it turns a fact (ethical progress) into a purpose. However, seeing that 
abandoning it would leave no other option than to adopt a Rusean moral skepticism, and 
that we are clearly still in need of promoting social cohesion and cooperation in a global 
society, I do not think that many people would question this purpose. 
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Chapter 1: The evolution of food sharing among primates: 
Valuable relationships and reciprocal exchange 
 
Food sharing refers to the un-resisted transfer of food from one individual to 
another, thus reflecting high social tolerance. While sharing with infants is explained by 
nutritional or informational benefits to the offspring, sharing among adults is often 
explained by reciprocal exchange, such as food-for-sex or food-for-support. We group 
various hypotheses invoking reciprocity under the valuable-relationships hypothesis, 
which states that the necessity of exchanging social services led individuals to evolve 
strong bonds with high social tolerance, sometimes expressed in food sharing. We tested 
these hypotheses in a sample of 68 primate species with phylogenetic analyses using 
both maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches. We found only weak support for 
the informational hypothesis for sharing with infants and no support for the nutritional 
hypothesis. However, sharing with infants emerged as a necessary precondition for the 
evolutionary emergence of food sharing among adults. The evolution of sharing among 
adults, in turn, was strongly correlated with the presence of valuable relationships. In 
particular, sharing from males to females was explained by the opportunity for female 
mate choice (“food-for-sex”) and sharing among males and among females by the 
presence of male-male and female-female coalitions respectively (“food-for-support”). 
Thus the valuable relationships hypothesis was strongly supported. We discuss possible 
constraints on the evolution of sharing, such as despotism and attractiveness of the diet, 
and make predictions about other species not included in the sample. We conclude by 
drawing inferences to the evolution of sharing in humans. 
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Introduction 
 
Food sharing (henceforth: “sharing”) is universal among human foragers, and an 
expression of high social tolerance. This phenomenon is probably adaptive due to the 
combined benefits of kin selection, reciprocity and costly signaling (Gurven 2004). 
However, interactions over food among most animals are generally hostile, with 
stronger, more dominant individuals taking food from others by force. Such behavior is 
often termed klepto-parasitism (Hamilton 2002; Morand-Ferron et al. 2007) and 
explained by direct benefits to the dominant individual and the high costs of defending 
food for the subordinate. In some taxa however, sharing serves important social 
functions, mainly in the context of mating, such as in courtship feeding among birds 
(Lorenz 1965) or nuptial gifts in insects (Vahed 1998). Similarly, among many primate 
species sharing is thought to serve social functions and is relatively wide-spread, both 
from adults to infants and among adults (Feistner and McGrew 1989; Brown et al. 
2004). The aim of this paper is to trace the evolution of sharing among primates, by 
identifying necessary preconditions and functional benefits for this behavior.  
Following Feistner and McGrew (1989) we define sharing as un-resisted 
transfers from one individual holding food (owner) to another (beggar). Almost 
inevitably, this is an altruistic act, since the owner incurs a cost and the beggar gains a 
benefit. Similar to other altruistic acts such as grooming or agonistic support, most 
hypotheses explaining sharing among primates thus invoke either kin selection or some 
form of reciprocity as ultimate mechanisms. Proximately, relatives or non-relatives in 
species relying on such mechanisms form strong bonds or friendships characterized by 
high tolerance, one expression of which is the exchange of various altruistic acts (Silk 
2002; Silk 2006) and sharing is expected to follow the same pattern. Since food 
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ownership is often biased towards dominants, reciprocal exchange is thus expected 
when subordinates have leverage over dominants because of their value as social 
partners (Lewis 2002). Below we summarize the relevant hypotheses proposed for 
sharing among primates and derive predictions to be used in comparative analyses, 
based on scores of sharing in a large sample of species. 
As for courtship feeding among birds, which is highly correlated with the 
provisioning of juveniles (Moller and Cuervo 2000) and employs the same behavioral 
patterns (Lorenz 1965), it is likely that sharing among primates first emerged in the 
context of sharing with infants, before it could be recruited to serve social functions 
among adults. Hence, in order to trace the evolution of sharing among primates in 
general, we first have to explain why adults share with infants. We then have to 
establish whether the presence of this behavior could be a precondition for sharing 
among adults, or, in other words, whether sharing among adults was derived from 
sharing with infants (Tinbergen 1952). Finally, we go on to test adaptive hypotheses for 
sharing among adults. Identifying the general factors responsible for sharing in primates 
will help elucidate the evolution of this behavior in humans. 
 
Hypotheses and predictions 
 
Sharing with infants 
- Nutritional hypothesis: This hypothesis presumes that sharing provides infants 
with valuable extra nutrients, thus increasing growth rates and facilitating 
weaning (Brown et al. 2004). Hence infants should preferably beg for high 
quality food, which leads to the prediction that the quality of the diet favors 
sharing with infants. 
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- Informational hypothesis: Sharing provides infants with valuable information 
about the affordances of food items that are too difficult for them to process 
independently (Brown et al. 2004). Hence infants should beg for difficult-to-
process items, leading to the prediction that the difficulty of the diet favors 
sharing with infants. 
Sharing among adults (any dyad) 
- Derived-behavior hypothesis: We propose that similar to courtship-feeding 
among birds, sharing among adults is derived from sharing with infants. Hence, 
we predict that the presence of the latter trait influences the presence of the 
former. 
- Sharing-under-pressure (also: tolerated theft, harassment): Beggars are so 
persistent that the costs of defending food exceed the costs of relinquishing parts 
of it, hence owners allow beggars to take some food in order to be left alone to 
consume the remaining food (Blurton Jones 1984; Stevens and Stephens 2002). 
Note that while these two hypotheses explain why sharing among adults should 
occur at all, they make no prediction for the direction of transfers. In particular, several 
authors noted that the sharing-under-pressure hypothesis is not mutually exclusive with 
other hypotheses (Stevens and Gilby 2004; Gilby 2006; Jaeggi et al. 2010b), which 
makes it difficult to test in a comparative analysis. Here we assume that most sharing 
among primates is essentially “under pressure”, since food transfers are predominantly 
passive (Brown et al. 2004; Jaeggi et al. in press). In contrast, the following hypotheses 
explain why particular owner-recipient dyads should share. 
Sharing among adults (particular dyads) 
 
The evolution of food sharing among primates 23 
In general, all the following hypotheses invoke reciprocal exchange, or in 
proximate terms, high tolerance towards valuable relationship partners. Food is shared 
with specific partners (or more precisely: specific partners are allowed to take food) 
because this increases the probability that the partner will provide rather than withhold a 
valuable service in the future (e.g. agonistic support or mating), resulting in reciprocal 
exchange patterns. The necessity to allow others to take can thus be explained in terms 
of subordinate leverage (Lewis 2002). Depending on balance or bias of ownership, 
sharing will then be traded for itself or for other services. In most cases, ownership is 
biased towards dominants within sexes and towards males between the sexes, and 
sharing is thus often traded for other currencies. Proximately, food is shared with 
specific partners because reciprocating individuals form strong social bonds, one 
expression of which is the tolerant sharing of food. Thus, all the following hypotheses 
may be grouped under the header valuable-relationships hypothesis. 
- Mate choice (food-for-sex): Commonly known as the meat-for-sex hypothesis, it 
is often assumed that males “buy” immediate mating benefits with high value 
food. However, in the simplest form, females may take ubiquitous food in order 
to test a male’s tolerance, ending association with the male if he does not 
comply (van Noordwijk and van Schaik 2009). Even among the better known 
examples of chimpanzees or bonobos, sharing is predominantly passive, direct 
exchanges of food and matings (in the short term) are rare and males also 
commonly share with lactating females (reviewed by Gilby et al. in press). 
Hence sharing is better seen as an expression of long-term tolerance that might 
eventually relate to higher mating success. Thus the hypothesis can be 
formulated more generally: Whenever females can exert mate choice, males 
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should allow females to take food in order to increase their chances of mating 
with the female in the future (Gomes and Boesch 2009; van Noordwijk and van 
Schaik 2009). In more proximate terms, it could be said that in the presence of 
female choice, males and females may form social bonds, one expression of 
which is the sharing of food. Hence we predict that the opportunity for female 
choice favors sharing from males to females.  
- Coalition partners (food-for-support): Similar to the mate choice hypothesis, it 
can be said that food is “traded” for support. However, evidence for short-term 
exchange in this context is also largely lacking and sharing is better seen as an 
expression of long-term bonds among allies (Nishida et al. 1992; Watts and 
Mitani 2002; Mitani 2006). Hence this hypothesis can also be formulated more 
generally: Whenever individuals depend on support from others who can 
provide or withhold such support, owners should allow recipients to take food in 
order to increase the chances of support being provided in the future. Or, in more 
proximate terms, individuals should develop social bonds with potential allies, 
one expression of which is the sharing of food. This should hold true for both 
males and females. Hence we predict that the presence of coalitions favors 
sharing within the sexes. (Of course, among female primates, coalition partners 
are often matrilineal kin. But, not all females necessarily develop strong bonds 
with their kin (e.g. orangutans, who do not form coalitions), and others form 
bonds with non-kin (e.g. bonobos, who do form coalitions). Hence the prediction 
holds for kin and non-kin alike. In the end, the evolution of coalitions and food 
sharing among female primates) can be linked to the presence of contest 
competition.) 
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- Pair-bonds: Monogamous pairs develop strong bonds due to the shared demands 
of child care and protection from infanticide (Palombit 1999). These pair-bonds 
usually foster high tolerance among the mates, sometimes expressed in sharing 
(e.g. Fragaszy and Mason 1983; Wright 1984). In particular, lactating or 
pregnant females, with high nutritional demands, are often allowed to take food 
from their partners (e.g. Wolovich et al. 2008a; Wolovich et al. 2008b). This 
leads to the prediction that monogamy favors sharing from males to females. 
- Polyandry/Polygyny: A few studies also noted transfers among males or females 
of facultatively polyandrous (Saguinus fuscicollis: Goldizen 1989; Pithecia 
pithecia: Homburg 1997) or polygynous groups (Nomascus concolor: Fan and 
Jiang 2009) respectively. Presumably, the partners in these groups were siblings, 
supporting each other’s reproductive effort, which could explain the high 
tolerance displayed in sharing. Unfortunately these social organizations are too 
rare for this hypothesis to be tested with a comparative analysis. 
 
Methods 
 
Comparative data 
 
We reviewed the literature on sharing in primates and compiled an exhaustive 
up-to-date list of 168 references related to sharing (Table 1-1). Species were included in 
the analysis if either sharing had been reported or if no sharing had been reported 
despite considerable study effort (at least 10 behavioral studies on the species listed in 
ISI Web of Knowledge by end of 2009). Sharing with infants was quantified as either 
absent (0), present (1: mentioned occasionally) or common (2: more than one study 
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explicitly addressing sharing). Sharing among adults was quantified as present or absent 
and we specifically scored sharing between particular dyads, namely from males to 
females, among males and among females. Sharing from females to males was too rare 
to test. Thus, a total of 68 primate species could be included in the comparative sample 
(Table 1-1). 
 
Predictor variables 
 
The predictions derived from the hypotheses listed in the introduction were 
operationalized as follows:  
- Quality of diet: Continuous variable, based on the diet quality index as defined 
by Fish & Lockwood (2003):  
DQ = 0.33L + 0.67F + M 
where DQ is the index of diet quality, and L, F, and M are the percentages of 
time spent foraging for leaves and other vegetative plant parts, fruit (including 
gum and flowers), and meat (indeed, any animal matter), respectively. The 
possible range of DQ values is 0.33–1. The values were obtained directly from 
Fish & Lockwood (2003) or calculated from Rowe (1996). If numbers were 
unavailable for a species, the value of the sister species was used. 
Difficulty of diet: Ordinal variable, based on Gibson’s (1986) classification of 
non-extractive foragers (0), un-skilled/specialized extractive foragers (1) and 
skilled extractive foragers (2). In contrast to Gibson we classified Pongo as 
skilled extractive foragers since there is now good evidence for complex 
extractive foraging skills such as tool-use (van Schaik et al. 1996) and that skills 
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are acquired through prolonged periods of social and individual learning in both 
orangutan species (Forss 2009; Jaeggi et al. 2010a). 
- Opportunity for female choice: binary variable, are multiple males commonly 
present during foraging? If different types of foraging groups commonly occur 
in a species, e.g. monogamous pairs and multi-male single-female groups, the 
multi-male score is given. Source: Rowe (1996) 
- Coalitions: binary variable, do same-sex coalitions occur in this species? Source: 
Plavcan et al. (1995) 
- Monogamy: binary variable, is the species socially monogamous? If different 
types of social organization occur, the monogamy score is given. Source: Rowe 
(1996)
 Table 1-1: List of all the species included in the comparative analyses and the variables of interest 
Speciesa FS 
inf. 
FS ♂-
♂ 
FS ♀-
♀ 
FS ♂-
♀ 
Diet  
diff. 
DQI ♂-♂ 
coalitions 
♀-♀ 
coalitions 
Monog. ♀ 
choice 
Ref.b 
Alouatta palliata 1 0 0 0 0 0.43 0 0 0 1 1-4 
Aotus azarae 2 0 0 1 0 0.65 0 0 1 0 5-7 
Ateles geoffreyoi 1 0 0 0 0 0.61 1 0 0 1 8-10 
Callicebus moloch 1 0 0 1 0 0.59 0 0 1 0 11,12 
Callicebus torquatus 1 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 1 0 13 
Callimico goeldii 2 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 14-17 
Callithrix argentata 2 0 0 0 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 18-20 
Callithrix jacchus 2 0 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 21-32 
Callithrix pygmaea 2 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 33,34 
Cebus albifrons 1 1 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 1 35 
Cebus apella 1 1 1 1 2 0.87 1 1 0 1 36-43 
Cebus capucinus 1 1 0 1 2 0.65 1 0 0 1 44-46 
Cebus olivaceus 0 0 0 0 2 0.87 0 0 0 1  
Cercocebus atys 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 1  
Cercocebus torquatus 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 1 0 1  
Cercopithecus campbelli 0 0 0 0 0 0.70 0 0 0 0  
Cercopithecus diana 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 0 0 0  
Cercopithecus mitis 0 0 0 0 0 0.68 0 0 0 0  
Chiropotes satanas 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 1  
Chlorocebus aethiops 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 1 0 1  
Colobus guereza 0 0 0 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 1  
Daubentonia madagascarensis 1 0 0 0 2 0.84 0 0 0 0 47-49  
Erythrocebus patas 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 0 0 0  
Eulemur fulvus 0 0 0 0 0 0.59 0 0 0 1  
Eulemur rufus 0 0 0 0 0 0.59 0 0 0 1  
Galago senegalensis 1 0 0 0 0 0.63 0 0 0 0 50,51 
Gorilla beringei 1 0 0 0 1 0.34 0 0 0 0 52 
Gorilla gorilla 1 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0 53 
Hylobates lar 1 0 0 0 0 0.71 0 0 1 0 54-59  
Indri indri 0 0 0 0 0 0.55 0 0 1 0  
Lemur catta 0 0 0 0 0 0.59 0 0 0 1  
Leontopithecus rosalia 2 0 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 60-70 
 
 Lophocebus albigena 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 1 0 1  
Macaca arctoides 1 0 0 0 1 0.68 0 0 0 1 71 
Macaca fascicularis 1 0 0 0 1 0.74 1 1 0 1 72,73 
Macaca fuscata 1 0 0 0 1 0.68 0 1 0 1 74,75 
Macaca mulatta 0 0 0 0 1 0.68 0 1 0 1  
Macaca nemestrina 0 0 0 0 1 0.62 0 1 0 1  
Macaca radiata 0 0 0 0 1 0.68 1 0 0 1  
Macaca silenus 0 0 0 0 1 0.68 0 0 0 1  
Macaca sylvanus 0 0 0 0 1 0.68 1 0 0 1  
Mandrillus sphinx 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 1  
Microcebus murinus 0 0 0 0 0 0.76 0 0 0 0  
Nasalis larvatus 0 0 0 0 0 0.53 0 0 0 1  
Nomascus concolor 1 0 1 0 0 0.43 0 0 1 0 76 
Nycticebus coucang 1 0 0 0 0 0.79 0 0 1 0 77 
Pan paniscus 2 1 1 1 2 0.61 0 1 0 1 78-87 
Pan troglodytes 2 1 1 1 2 0.61 1 1 0 1 88-136 
Papio anubis 1 0 0 1 1 0.66 1 0 0 1 137-139 
Papio cynocephalus 0 0 0 0 1 0.65 0 0 0 1  
Papio hamadryas 0 0 0 0 1 0.66 0 0 0 1  
Papio ursinus 0 0 0 0 1 0.63 0 0 0 1  
Piliocolobus badius 1 0 0 0 0 0.40 1 0 0 1 140 
Pithecia pithecia 1 1 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 141 
Pongo abelii 2 0 1 1 2 0.59 0 0 0 1 142-144  
Pongo pygmaeus 2 0 1 1 2 0.59 0 0 0 1  
Presbytis thomasi 0 0 0 0 0 0.55 0 0 0 0  
Propithecus verreauxi 0 0 0 0 0 0.56 0 0 0 1  
Pygathrix nemaeus 1 0 1 1 0 0.54 0 0 0 1 145 
Saguinus fuscicollis 2 1 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 146-148 
Saguinus mystax 2 0 0 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 149,150 
Saguinus nigricollis 2 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 151 
 
  
Saguinus oedipus 2 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 152-163  
Saimiri sciureus 0 0 0 0 1 0.94 0 1 0 1 164,165 
Semnopithecus entellus 1 0 0 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 1 166 
Symphalangus syndactilus 1 0 0 0 0 0.49 0 0 1 0 167 
Tarsius tarsier 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 0 0 1 0 168 
Theropithecus gelada 0 0 0 0 0 0.40 0 1 0 1  
aSpecies names follow Groves (2001) and Brandon-Jones et al. (2004) 
bRef. = References for food sharing information.  
FS = Food sharing, with infants (inf.) among adults (ad.), among males (♂-♂), among females (♀-♀) and from males to females (♂-♀) respectively. Diff. = difficulty, 
DQI = Diet quality index, Monog. = Monogamy, ♀ choice = Opportunity for female choice 
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(1978), Omedes (1981), Feistner & Price (1991); 21-32Epple (1967), Hearn & Lunn (1975), Chalmers & Lockehaydon (1984), Feistner & Price (1991), Vitale & 
Queyras (1997), Yamamoto & Box (1997), Westlund et al. (2000), Caldwell & Whiten (2003), Brown et al. (2005), de Lyra-Neves et al. (2007), Kasper et al. (2008), 
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Comparative analyses 
 
We used both maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches to test for 
correlated evolution of the traits of interest while controlling for phylogenetic 
dependence. The phylogeny of primates was based on Bininda-Emonds et al. (2007). 
An overview of all the tests and the support for the relevant hypotheses is given in Table 
1-3. First, we fitted regression models using phylogenetic generalized least squares 
(PGLS) for continuous traits and generalized estimating equations (GEE) for discrete 
traits (Paradis 2006), which are both based on restricted maximum likelihood. Models 
were fitted using the ape package (Paradis et al. 2009) in R 2.9.0 (R Development Core 
Team 2009) and we report parameter estimates and their P values. 
Second, for discrete traits we also used reversible-jump Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (RJ MCMC) to estimate parameters from a posterior distribution (Pagel and 
Meade 2006) using BayesTraits 1.0 (Pagel and Meade) with a burn-in of 50,000 and 
5,050,000 iterations in total. Prior settings were the same as in Pagel and Meade (2006). 
RJ MCMCs are used to model the evolution of two discrete traits assuming either 
dependent or independent evolution (the latter being the null hypothesis). Similar to a 
likelihood-ratio test, the two models are compared by their harmonic means, the 
Bayesian equivalent of the log-likelihood, by calculating the log Bayes factor (BF). 
Rather than testing the BF against a distribution, by convention, a BF >2 is taken as 
positive evidence for dependent evolution, BF >5 as strong positive evidence and BF 
>10 as very strong positive evidence (Pagel and Meade 2006). Furthermore, even in the 
dependent model, the chain can visit models with independent evolution in proportion 
to their posterior probabilities. Thus, if the proportion of independent models visited, 
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Pindependent, is small, the null hypothesis of independent evolution of the two traits can be 
rejected. We report both the BF and Pindependent for each model. 
In addition, RJ MCMC can be used to calculate the probabilities for trait 
changes, so-called “rate parameters” (Pagel and Meade 2006). If two traits can have the 
states (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) or (1,1), the rate parameters refer to the probability of transition 
between these states (Figure 1-1). Hence, one can test whether the evolution of one trait, 
e.g. “sharing among adults”, is more likely in the presence or the absence of the other 
trait, e.g. “sharing with infants”, by comparing q24 (transition from (0,1) to (1,1)) with 
q13 (i.e. the transition from (0,0) to (1,0)). If q24 is different from q13, there is evidence 
for correlated evolution of the two traits. For a graphical examination of this, one can 
plot the posterior distribution of rate parameters simulated by the RJ MCMC (cf. 
Appendix 1-1). Furthermore, one can use the estimated rate parameters to graphically 
indicate the likely evolutionary routes of state transitions in a flow chart by modifying 
the thickness of the arrows accordingly (cf. Figure 1-4). 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Redrawn from Pagel and Meade (2006, Figure 7): Transitions among the four possible 
combinations of states resulting from two binary variables. Subscripts identify the beginning and 
ending states of each transition, where the values 1, 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the state pairs (0,0), 
(0,1), (1,0), and (1,1). Thus, q12 describes the transition between state (0,0) and state (0,1) 
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Results 
 
General patterns 
 
 Of the 68 species in the sample, in 38 (55.9%) food was shared with infants. In 
no species food was shared among adults but not with infants. Of those 38 species in 
which food was shared with infants, in 17 (44.7%) food was also shared among adults. 
In particular, in 14 species males shared with females and males and females shared 
among themselves in seven species each. This distribution of sharing among adults in 
relation to the presence of sharing with infants and measures for valuable relationships 
is summarized in Table 1-2. Fisher’s exact probabilities indicate that these variables are 
significantly associated, except for monogamy. 
 
Table 1-2: Contingency Table showing the distribution of species across food sharing and valuable 
relationship categories and Fisher’s exact tests for the association of these variables  
Sharing w. inf. Female choice Monogamy ♂-♂ coalitions ♀-♀ coalitions  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 17 0 12 2 5 9 4 3 3 4 Sharing 
ad. 0 21 30 11 13 12 12 4 27 2 29 
Fisher’s exact P<0.001 P<0.05 P=0.51 P<0.05 P<0.05 
Note that the first column, sharing with infants (sharing w. inf.), refers to the whole sample (68 species) 
and any dyad sharing among adults (Sharing ad.) whereas the other columns refer to the restricted sample 
of those species already sharing with infants (38 species) and to particular dyads related to the respective 
measure of valuable relationships, i.e. sharing from males to females for female choice and monogamy, as 
well as sharing among males or females for male-male (♂-♂) and female-female (♀-♀) coalitions 
respectively 
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Sharing with infants 
 
The parameter estimates of the PGLS for sharing with infants are given in Table 
1-3. Neither diet quality nor diet difficulty had a significant influence on sharing with 
infants. However, diet quality had a negative influence on sharing suggesting that the 
nutritional hypothesis was not supported. Diet difficulty had a slight positive influence, 
thus hinting at a mild support of the informational hypothesis (Figure 1-2). 
 
  
a)            b) 
Figure 1-2: Food sharing with infants as a function of a) diet quality and b) diet difficulty. The 
plotted lines represent the estimated regression line from phylogenetic generalized least squares 
models. Error bars represent standard deviations 
 
Sharing among adults 
 
Species sharing among adults represented a strict subset of those species sharing 
with infants (Table 1-2). Thus, sharing with infants had a highly significant positive 
influence on sharing among adults (PGLS, see Table 1-3 for parameter estimates). 
Furthermore, the RJ MCMC provided very strong support for dependent evolution of 
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the two traits: the log Bayes factor, comparing the harmonic means of the dependent 
and the independent model, was very high and the chain never (!) visited independent 
evolution (see Table 1-3 for a summary of these results). The posterior distribution of 
rate parameters is given in Appendix 1-1 and also strongly indicated dependent 
evolution (compare e.g. q13 vs. q24 for probability for gain of sharing among adults in 
absence or presence of sharing with infants). 
Thus, sharing with infants can be seen as a necessary precondition for sharing 
among adults. Hence, in order to further test what factors explain sharing among 
specific dyads of adults, we reduced our data set to species already sharing with infants 
(N=38). 
From males to females Sharing from males to females was significantly positively 
predicted by the opportunity for female choice (GEE: F1,38=6.53, P<0.05, Table 1-3), 
but not by the presence of monogamy (GEE: F1,38=0.08, P=0.79, Table 1-3). Similarly, 
the RJ MCMC provided positive evidence for dependent evolution of sharing from 
males to females and the opportunity for female choice, but not for monogamy, even 
though the chain did not visit a significant number of independent models (Table 1-3). 
The posterior distributions of rate parameter also indicated dependent evolution 
(Appendix 1-1). Hence the female mate choice hypothesis for the evolution of sharing 
from males to females was supported (Figure 1-3a) whereas the pair-bonds hypothesis 
was not supported. 
Among males The presence of male-male coalitions significantly explained sharing 
among males (GEE: F1,38=6.15, P<0.05, Table 1-3) and the RJ MCMC also provided 
strong support for dependent evolution (Table 1-3). The posterior distributions of rate 
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parameter also indicated dependent evolution (Appendix 1-1). Hence the valuable 
relationships hypothesis for male-male sharing was supported (Figure 1-3b). 
Among females Female-female coalitions significantly predicted sharing among 
females (GEE: F1,38=7.91, P<0.05, Table 1-3) and the RJ MCMC provided strong  
 
Table 1-3: Overview of the comparative analyses, the factors included in the models and the related 
hypotheses 
Food 
Sharing 
N Factors PGLS/GEEa RJ MCMCb Related 
Hypotheses 
Supported? 
Intercept 1.40    
Diet difficulty 0.10  Informational 
hypothesis 
(+) 
with 
infants 
68 
Diet quality -0.93  Nutritional 
hypothesis 
(-) 
Intercept -0.44    among 
adults  
(any dyad) 
68 
Sharing with 
infants 
0.77*** Pind.=0, 
BF=30.73 
Derived behavior +++ 
Intercept -1.87    
Female choice 1.96* Pind.=0.004, 
BF=3.56 
Female mate 
choice 
(“Food-for-sex”) 
+ 
Intercept 0.29    
from males 
to femalesc 
38 
Monogamy -0.58 Pind.=0.03, 
BF=1.11 
Pair-bonds - 
Intercept -2.20    among 
malesc 
38 
Male-male 
coalitions 
2.2* Pind.=0.001, 
BF=6.29 
Coalition 
partners  
(“Food-for-
support”) 
++ 
Intercept -1.98    among 
femalesc 
38 
Female-female 
coalitions 
2.39* Pind.=0.001, 
BF=5.63 
Coalition 
partners  
(“Food-for-
support”) 
++ 
aPGLS: Phylogenetic Generalized Least Squares. GEE: Generalized Estimating Equations. PGLS are 
used for continuous variables, GEE for discrete variables. Reported are the parameter estimates with 
significance 
bRJ MCMC: Reversible-jump Markov chain Monte Carlo. Reported are the proportion of models that 
visited independent evolution of the traits, indicated by the probability for independent evolution 
Pindependent, as well as the log Bayes-Factor (BF), which measures the fit of the dependent model relative to 
the independent model. By convention, a BF > 2 is taken as positive evidence for dependent evolution, >5 
indicates strong positive evidence and >10 very strong positive evidence 
cOnly species sharing with infants 
***: P<0.001, *: P<0.05 
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evidence for dependent evolution (Table 1-3). The posterior distributions of rate 
parameter also indicated dependent evolution (Appendix 1-1). Hence the valuable 
relationships hypothesis for female-female sharing was supported (Figure 1-3c). 
 
   
a)    b)    c) 
Figure 1-3: Mean (± SEM) species values for food sharing a) from males to females, b) among males 
and c) among females, in the absence (0) or presence (1) of a) the opportunity for female choice, b) 
male-male coalitions and c) female-female coalitions. The significance values (*: P<0.05) refer to the 
parameter estimates of the generalized estimating equations models (Table 1-3) 
 
 In sum, sharing with infants could not be fully explained, but was itself a 
necessary precondition for the evolution of sharing among adults, thus providing 
support to the derived-behavior hypothesis. Among particular dyads of adults, three 
measures of valuable relationships showed evidence for correlated evolution with 
sharing, thus supporting the valuable relationships hypothesis. This is summarized in 
Figure 1-4, which shows the probabilities for evolutionary gains of the trait “sharing 
among adults” in relation to the presence or absence of these other traits. It can be seen 
that sharing among adults is much more likely to evolve if sharing with infants is 
already present as a trait and that sharing among particular dyads of adults is more 
likely to evolve in the presence of valuable relationships and vice versa. 
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a)      b) 
Figure 1-4: Flow charts for the evolution of food sharing among adults (first trait) and a) food 
sharing with infants or b) valuable relationships (second traits). Thus, (0,0) refers to absence of 
both traits, (0,1) is only a) sharing with infants or b) valuable relationships, (1,0) only sharing 
among adults and (1,1) sharing among adults and a) sharing with infants or b) valuable 
relationships. The thickness of the arrows is proportional to the values of q and thus to the 
probability of the transition from one state to another. The q-values in b) are the means of the 
dyad-specific analyses, i.e. male-female, male-male and female-female sharing, and female choice, 
male-male coalitions and female-female coalitions respectively (see Appendix 1-1 for full details). 
By comparing the rate pair q24 and q13 it can be clearly seen that the evolution of sharing among 
adults is much more likely if a) sharing with infants or b) valuable relationships is already present 
as a trait. Note that a) is based on 68 species while b) is based on only 38 species, namely those in 
which sharing with infants was already present 
 
Discussion 
 
Valuable relationships are characterized by strong social tolerance and the 
reciprocal exchange of prosocial acts (Silk 2002; Silk 2006). Sharing of food among 
primates is predominantly passive (Brown et al. 2004; Jaeggi et al. in press) and thus in 
its most basic form, allowing another individual to take food is simply a display of such 
 
The evolution of food sharing among primates 39 
tolerance towards a valuable social partner (van Noordwijk and van Schaik 2009). Since 
owners are often dominant over beggars, including instances of sharing from males to 
females, this displayed tolerance can be seen as a result of subordinate leverage (Lewis 
2002). Repeated such interactions will lead to reciprocal patterns in which, depending 
on balance or bias of ownership, sharing will be traded for itself or for other currencies 
such as matings or agonistic support. Thus, we summarized hypotheses explaining 
sharing by reciprocity as the valuable relationships hypothesis and found strong support 
for it in this comparative study: the evolution of sharing and valuable relationships, as 
measured by the opportunity for female mate choice as well as male-male and female-
female coalitions, were clearly linked (Figures 1-3 & 1-4b).  
Sharing among adults only evolved in a subset of the species, namely those in 
which sharing with infants had already been established (Figure 1-4a). The latter can 
therefore be seen as derived behavior (Tinbergen 1952), which could be pressed into 
service in another context. Such constraints on the evolution of potentially adaptive 
behaviors may be quite common (Ryan 2009). Thus, some behaviors can only evolve 
when their precursor is already in place, even if all the conditions favoring its 
occurrence are met in principle. Hence, in some species of primates where valuable 
relationships occur, sharing among adults may remain absent because its precursor 
sharing with infants is lacking (Tables 1-1 & 1-2). In these species the high tolerance 
emerging from valuable relationships may be displayed by other behaviors such as 
grooming or play. 
Conversely, some species showed sharing within particular dyads in the absence 
of the respective measure for valuable relationships (Figure 1-3, Table 1-1 & 1-2). This 
could be explained by the evolution of high social tolerance for other reasons in these 
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species. For instance, sharing among males in the absence of male-male coalitions 
occurs among bonobos Pan paniscus, saddleback tamarins Saguinus fuscicollis and 
white-faced sakis Pithecia pithecia (Table 1-1). In bonobos, sharing among males is 
actually much rarer than in any other dyad (Kuroda 1984; Jaeggi et al. 2010b), as 
expected from the absence of coalitions, and does not seem to serve an adaptive 
function. In the other two species, sharing among males may be a consequence of 
polyandry (Saguinus fuscicollis: Goldizen 1989; Pithecia pithecia: Homburg 1997), as 
mentioned above. In the case of female-female sharing, the orangutans Pongo abelii and 
Pongo pygmaeus, douc langurs Pygathrix nemaeus and black crested gibbons Nomascus 
concolor are the exceptions. The latter may be due to polygyny (Fan and Jiang 2009), 
the former due to other forms of cooperation not commonly scored as coalitions (M. van 
Noordwijk et al. in prep.). 
Another possible constraint on the evolution of sharing (and valuable 
relationships) is the dominance structure of a group which may restrict both the owner’s 
ability to share selectively with valuable partners as well as the partners ability to 
selectively provide the service: Only in relatively egalitarian groups can services be 
exchanged reciprocally, whereas in despotic groups dominant individuals can acquire 
desired goods by force, thus destroying the market (Trivers 1971; Noë and 
Hammerstein 1994; Jaeggi et al. 2010b). Hence, a despotic dominance structure may 
reduce the number of species in which sharing with valuable partners could potentially 
evolve.  
This “despotism constraint” may explain why in some highly despotic species, 
such as yellow baboons Papio anubis, sharing among males is absent despite the 
presence of male-male coalitions. The most dominant males can usually acquire food by 
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force (Strum 1975; Strum 1981) but do not need to form coalitions (Noë and Sluijter 
1995), obviating the opportunity for an exchange of food for support (Trivers 1971). 
Similar arguments can be made for the despotism constraint on food-for-support among 
females or the female mate choice hypothesis. 
Finally, the attractiveness of the diet of a given species may also constrain the 
evolution of sharing (Moore 1984). However, species sharing among adults is not a 
subset of any diet category (Table 1-1) and thus diet attractiveness is probably not a 
strong precondition for sharing among adults. Seeing that sometimes relatively low-
quality and ubiquitous food is shared (Slocombe and Newton-Fisher 2005; van 
Noordwijk and van Schaik 2009) the social benefits of sharing may be achieved 
regardless of the food item at stake. This can also be seen in species that probably do 
not share food often in the wild but did evolve high social tolerance, which can lead to 
sharing given the right conditions in captivity (e.g. Berkson and Schusterman 1964; 
Kavanagh 1972; Schessler and Nash 1977; Zhang et al. 2008). Hence, we predict that 
any species that evolved valuable relationships should share food given the right 
conditions, and given that they also share with infants. If sharing among adults can be 
induced even in the absence of sharing with infants in the species, the behavioral 
constraint may only apply to natural conditions. 
For instance, many species of Asian colobines live in modular societies, where 
one-male units (OMU’s) are surrounded by other OMU’s and bachelor males (Yeager 
and Kirkpatrick 1998; Grueter and van Schaik 2009). This constant presence of other 
males, and hence the opportunity for female choice, led to high tolerance from males to 
females within a OMU as expressed by higher rates of male-female grooming, 
compared to non-modular species (Grueter 2009). Asian colobines thus present a good 
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taxon to further test the female mate choice hypothesis, with modular species predicted 
to share food more than non-modular ones. Other species living in modular societies, 
such as Geladas Theropithecus gelada or Hamadryas baboons Papio hamadryas may 
have evolved the same kind of within OMU cohesion that may be expressed in sharing 
under captive conditions. Furthermore, species with high levels of cooperation among 
males, such as Ateles geoffroyi (Aureli et al. 2006) or Cacajao calvus (Bowler and 
Bodmer 2009), should have evolved strong bonds among those males potentially 
expressed in sharing. Simple experiments using monopolizable food in captivity (de 
Waal 1989; Jaeggi et al. 2010b) could be used to test these hypotheses. 
We did not find significant support for either hypothesis explaining sharing with 
infants. This may be due to the relative crudeness of our diet quality and difficulty 
measurements, as is inevitable for comparative analyses, or it may reflect a strong 
phylogenetic effect on the traits. For instance, all callithrichids may share food 
extensively regardless of the current difficulty or quality of their diet because their 
ancestors evolved to give birth to fast-growing twins, the energetic demands of which a 
mother alone cannot cover (Brown et al. 2004). Nonetheless, in an analysis of the 
species values, without controlling for phylogeny, diet difficulty positively predicted 
sharing with infants with a statistical trend (results not shown). Hence, as indicated by 
Figure 1-2, we suggest mild support for the informational hypothesis, while the 
nutritional hypothesis was probably not supported.  
We also did not find support for the pair-bonds hypothesis, probably because 
sharing was too rare among monogamous species in the sample (5/17= 29%, Table 1-2). 
A sample with different groups of species, e.g. birds, might yield different results. The 
fact that the proportion of independent models visited by the chain of the RJ MCMC, 
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Pindependent, did support dependent evolution whereas the log Bayes factor and the 
posterior distributions of rate parameters did not, might suggest that Pindependent tends 
to be an underestimation of the probability for independent evolution and should thus 
not be used for hypothesis-testing or at least be taken with caution. 
In sum, we conclude that the necessity to form valuable relationships, within 
which prosocial acts may be exchanged reciprocally, led to the evolution of high social 
tolerance and subordinate leverage among primates. In some species where sharing with 
infants was already present, this behavior was derived to perform social functions 
among adults, or in other words, the high social tolerance within valuable relationships 
was now also expressed in sharing, leading to reciprocal sharing patterns. Possible 
constraints on the evolution of sharing include despotism and, probably to a lesser 
extent, the attractiveness of the diet. Humans, throughout most of their evolutionary 
history, thus probably fulfilled all preconditions for the evolution of extensive sharing 
among adults: relatively egalitarian societies, highly attractive diets, provisioning of 
infants, female mate choice, pair bonds and coalitions both among males and among 
females (Woodburn 1982; Harcourt and de Waal 1992; Boehm 1999; Pandit and van 
Schaik 2003; Gurven 2004; Gurven and Hill 2009). Constraints on sharing such as 
despotism and increased monopolizability of resources may have re-emerged in more 
recent stages of human history (Kaplan et al. 2009). 
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Chapter 2: Tolerant food sharing and reciprocity is precluded by 
despotism among bonobos but not chimpanzees 
 
Jaeggi AV, Stevens JMG & van Schaik CP (2010) American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology DOI 10.1002/ajpa.21288 
 
Tolerant food sharing among human foragers can largely be explained by 
reciprocity. In contrast, food sharing among chimpanzees and bonobos may not always 
reflect reciprocity, which could be explained by different dominance styles: in 
egalitarian societies reciprocity is expressed freely, while in more despotic groups 
dominants may hinder reciprocity. We tested the degree of reciprocity and the influence 
of dominance on food sharing among chimpanzees and bonobos in two captive groups. 
First, we found that chimpanzees shared more frequently, more tolerantly, and more 
actively than bonobos. Second, among chimpanzees, food received was the best 
predictor of food shared, indicating reciprocal exchange, whereas among bonobos 
transfers were mostly uni-directional. Third, chimpanzees had a shallower and less 
linear dominance hierarchy, indicating that they were less despotic than bonobos. This 
suggests that the tolerant and reciprocal sharing found in chimpanzees, but not bonobos, 
was made possible by the absence of despotism. To investigate this further we tested the 
relationship between despotism and reciprocity in grooming using data from an 
additional 5 groups and 5 different study periods on the main groups. The results show 
that (i) all chimpanzee groups were less despotic and groomed more reciprocally than 
bonobo groups, and (ii) there was a general negative correlation between despotism and 
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grooming reciprocity across species. This indicates that an egalitarian hierarchy may be 
more common in chimpanzees, at least in captivity, thus fostering reciprocal exchange. 
We conclude that a shallow dominance hierarchy was a necessary precondition for the 
evolution of human-like reciprocal food sharing. 
 
Introduction 
 
Extensive food sharing is universal among human foragers and has received 
considerable attention as a model for the evolution of altruistic behavior (Gurven 2004). 
Ultimately, food sharing among unrelated humans can be explained by tolerated 
scrounging (Blurton Jones 1984) and/or some form of direct or indirect reciprocity 
(Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987). The relative importance of the two models depends on 
the degree of control producers have over food distribution: if this control is high, 
reciprocal sharing patterns are more likely (Gurven 2004). Proximately, voluntary food 
sharing reflects high levels of prosociality which have probably co-evolved with 
reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Trivers 2006). Food sharing is also universal in Pan, having 
been reported from every major study site of both chimpanzees and bonobos (see Table 
2-1). How then is food sharing regulated among our closest living relatives? 
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Table 2-1: Reported food sharing among adults of well studied chimpanzee and bonobo populations 
with main references 
Species Study Site 
Bossou (only plant food)1 
Budongo2,3 
Gombe4-11 
Mahale12-18 
Ngogo19-21 
Chimpanzees 
Pan troglodytes 
Taï22-24 
Lomako25-27 
Lui Kotale28,29 
Bonobos  
Pan paniscus 
Wamba (only plant food)30,31 
1(Hockings et al. 2007); 2,3(Suzuki 1971; Reynolds 2005); 4-11(van Lawick-Goodall 1968; Teleki 1973; 
Wrangham 1975; Tutin 1979; Goodall 1986; Stanford 1999; Gilby 2006; Gilby et al. in press); 12-
18(Nishida 1970; Suzuki 1971; Nishida et al. 1979; Kawanaka 1982; Takahata et al. 1984; Nishida et al. 
1992; Hosaka et al. 2001); 19-21(Mitani and Watts 2001; Watts and Mitani 2002; Mitani 2006); 22-
24(Boesch and Boesch 1989; Boesch 1994; Gomes and Boesch 2009); 25-27(Hohmann and Fruth 1993; 
White 1994; Fruth and Hohmann 2002); 28,29(Hohmann and Fruth 2008; Surbeck and Hohmann 2008); 
30,31(Kano 1980; Kuroda 1984) 
 
As for human food sharing, two main hypotheses have been put forward to 
explain the function of food transfers among non-human primates: reciprocal exchange 
and sharing-under-pressure. Food represents a commodity that can be traded for itself or 
other commodities such as grooming, sex or support on a biological market (Noë and 
Hammerstein 1994). Such reciprocal exchange of food has been reported from a variety 
of different species including capuchin monkeys (de Waal 2000) and chimpanzees (de 
Waal 1989; de Waal 1997; Mitani and Watts 2001; Mitani 2006; Gomes and Boesch 
2009), but only limited support has been found in bonobos (Fruth and Hohmann 2002). 
Lack of reciprocity may be explained by transfers being forced rather than tolerated: as 
Noë and Hammerstein (1994, p.1) pointed out, “market forces cannot function if it is 
possible to appropriate desired commodities without the consent of the owner”. In this 
case, food transfers may be better described as sharing-under-pressure (Wrangham 
1975). This hypothesis, which was formalized in a model by Blurton Jones (1984) and 
later Stevens and Stephens (2002), proposes that food owners may relinquish (part of) 
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their food if the costs of defending it are higher than the benefits of consuming it. This 
model has been shown to explain food transfers among some groups of chimpanzees 
and bonobos, as transfers increased with increasing harassment (Fruth and Hohmann 
2002; Gilby 2006). However, as Stevens and Gilby (2004) and Gilby (2006) have 
pointed out, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Reciprocal sharing patterns 
may still emerge if food owners can retain control over food distribution, despite the 
costs inflicted by harassment, and selectively relinquish food to particular individuals, 
e.g. those who relinquished food to them in the past (see also Moore 1984). Thus the 
amount of reciprocal exchange possible is determined by the amount of control owners 
can exert over food distribution, which depends on the costs of defending food. Here we 
suggest that these costs, and thus the opportunity for reciprocal exchange, depend on the 
dominance structure of the population. When dominance hierarchy is steep, dominants 
can monopolise resources or commodities and there is no reciprocal exchange. In the 
words of Trivers (1971), “strong dominance hierarchies reduce the extent to which … 
the less dominant individual is capable of performing a benefit for the more dominant 
which the more dominant individual could not simply take at will” (p. 38, emphasis 
added). 
Proximately, the degree of prosociality in food sharing may be measured by the 
reactions of food owners to approaches and the way in which food is transferred (Jaeggi 
et al. in press). Thus, positive reactions to approaches and tolerant sharing would reflect 
more prosociality than negative reactions and forced transfers. Among chimpanzees, 
food transfers can vary from relatively active to mainly passive, reluctant or even 
aggressive (e.g. Teleki 1973; Boesch and Boesch 1989; Gilby 2006), but no formal 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain differences in sharing patterns between 
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populations. Similar differences probably exist among bonobos although data are 
scarcer and harder to compare because of different food types being shared (sugar cane 
(Kuroda 1984), large fruits (White 1994) and/or meat (Fruth and Hohmann 2002)). In 
the only study thus far directly comparing food sharing in the two species, de Waal 
(1992) found that chimpanzees shared more tolerantly, but he did not offer an ultimate 
explanation. Following Trivers (1971; 2006), we suggest that the psychological 
regulations of food sharing may ultimately depend on a history of reciprocity: only if 
food owners can expect to be reciprocated in some form should they voluntarily give 
away food. Conversely, more voluntary or active forms of sharing may induce more 
feelings of gratitude in the recipient, because they reflect genuine altruistic dispositions, 
and are thus reciprocated better (Trivers 1971). We therefore hypothesize that both the 
ultimate and the proximate mechanisms for sharing food will be influenced by the 
dominance structure of a group. The latter determines the costs of defending food and 
thus the amount of control owners have over food distribution, which in turn determines 
how much reciprocal exchange and tolerant sharing is possible. 
Dominance hierarchies in primate societies can be characterized as ranging from 
egalitarian to despotic (van Schaik 1989) which has been formalized in terms of 
linearity and steepness of the hierarchy (de Vries 1995; de Vries et al. 2006). The 
steepness of the hierarchy is measured by the relative ability of group members to win 
dyadic conflicts: the steeper the hierarchy, the more easily dominants win conflicts with 
subordinates. Thus, in a group with a steep hierarchy, the costs of defending food 
should be high, owners cannot retain control over food distribution and transfers will be 
forced by dominants, which are unlikely to reciprocate. On the other hand, in a group 
with a shallow hierarchy, the costs of defending food should be low, owners can retain 
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control over food distribution and selectively tolerate transfers by those individuals who 
reciprocate. Once reciprocity is established, owners may also share food more actively. 
Hierarchy steepness has also been shown to negatively influence reciprocity in 
grooming among captive bonobos (Stevens et al. 2005) and other primates (Schino and 
Aureli 2008), mostly because more grooming is directed up the hierarchy in despotic 
groups. This correlation has so far only been shown within species. To test whether a 
general relationship between despotism and reciprocity is consistent across the two 
species studied here, we compared hierarchy steepness and grooming reciprocity in 5 
groups of chimpanzees and 8 groups of bonobos. 
In sum, we predict that in egalitarian groups, food transfers will be tolerant and 
reciprocal while in despotic groups, transfers are forced and non-reciprocal. We tested 
these predictions by recording food interactions in one group of captive chimpanzees 
and bonobos respectively, and (i) describe general food sharing patterns, in particular 
the relative amount of forced and tolerated transfers, (ii) test what factors best explain 
the observed food transfers, in particular reciprocal exchange, and (iii) link the degree 
of tolerance and reciprocity to the degree of despotism. By studying these aspects in our 
two closest living relatives we hope to make inferences about the evolution of human 
food sharing and the proximate mechanisms linked to it.  
 
Methods 
 
Subjects and housing 
 
The chimpanzees lived at the Abenteuerland Walter Zoo in Gossau SG, 
Switzerland (indoor enclosures: 2x 150m2, outdoor enclosures: 2x 450m2). The group 
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consisted of 11 adults and 2 infants, a third infant was born in the course of the study 
and three of the 55 adult dyads were maternal relatives (see Appendix 2-1). None of the 
females had regular swellings during the study. The bonobos lived at the Dierenpark 
Planckendael, Belgium (indoor: 88m², outdoor: 3000m²). The group contained 6 adults 
and 3 infants. Three of the 15 adult dyads were maternal relatives (Appendix 2-1). All 
females were lactating and showed no regular swelling cycle. In both groups, only the 
adults (minimum age 7) were subjects of this study.  
 
Data collection 
 
The chimpanzees were observed from October 2007 until February 2008 (Table 
2-2). All occurrence observations on the whole group (Altmann 1974) took place 
between approximately 9a.m. and 4p.m. on average two days a week, totaling 82h of 
observation on all individuals. The bonobos were observed from 3rd of March to 5th of 
May 2008 on five to six days a week between approximately 9a.m. and 5p.m., totaling 
125h of observation on all individuals (Table 2-2). Observations on both groups 
included all occurrences of social interactions, i.e. all grooming bouts (in sec.), 
affiliative contact, dominance-, agonistic- and sexual interactions. In addition, proximity 
scans recording each individuals distance to each other individual were taken every 5 
minutes if the animals were not moving or feeding. The ethograms used were based on 
van Hooff (1973) for the chimpanzees and on Vervaecke et al. (2000) for the bonobos. 
Behaviors in both groups were recorded by AJ on paper or using live coding on InterAct 
8.4.1.  
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Table 2-2: Details on study period and observers for each group. Capital letters indicate the study 
site, lower case letters indicate distinct groups at the same site (only GD) and numerical suffixes 
indicate the same group studied at different times (see Appendix 2-1 for details and changes in 
composition) 
Species Study Group Study Period Observers/Reference** 
GD a1 Sep 2004 – Jan 2005 Peterhans (2006) 
GD a2 Jul – Oct 2006  Ziltener (2007) 
GD b Sep 2004 – Jan 2005 Peterhans (2006) 
GS 1 Feb – May 2007 Ziltener (2007) 
Chimpanzees 
GS 2* Oct 2007 – Feb 2008 this study 
A Feb – Apr 2001 Stevens et al. (2005) 
P 1 1992 – 1993 Vervaecke et al. (2000) 
P 2 Nov – Dec 1999 Stevens et al. (2005) 
P 3 Nov 2002 – Feb 2003 Stevens et al. (2005) 
P 4 Feb  - May 2006 Stevens et al. (2007a) 
P 5* Apr – May 2008 this study 
T Nov – Dec 2001, Feb 2002 Stevens et al. (2005) 
Bonobos 
W Aug – Sep 1999 Stevens et al. (2005) 
* main study groups; others are additional groups only used for hierarchy steepness and grooming 
reciprocity analyses (Figure 2-3) 
** Main observers were the first authors of the respective reference, except for Stevens et al. 2007, where 
the second author was the main observer. The methodology (ethogram, observation methods) was the 
same in all studies. Study sites: GD=Gänserndorf, GS=Gossau, A=Apenheul, P=Planckendael, 
T=Twycross, W=Wuppertal 
 
Food-sharing experiments 
 
Following de Waal (1989; 1997) we used monopolizable food sources to induce 
food interactions. We used paper shopping bags filled with part of the apes’ regular diet, 
mostly vegetables. In the chimpanzee group, food-sharing experiments were conducted 
once a day, around 1-2p.m (N=30). In the bonobo group, experiments were conducted 
once or twice a day, in the morning, around 9-10a.m (N=28) and/or in the early 
afternoon, around 1-2p.m (N=25). For both species, the paper bags were either put in 
the indoor enclosure before the apes were let in, or thrown to specific individuals in the 
outdoor enclosure. In addition, spontaneous food interactions during normal feedings 
were recorded. All experiments were video-taped and all food interactions were 
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subsequently coded by AJ with InterAct 8.4.1. To test for inter-observer comparability 
of our food transfer definitions, JS also coded a sequence including different types of 
transfers among the chimpanzees, resulting in substantial agreement (Κ=0.63). 
Food interactions. The food owner’s reaction to each approach was classified as 
either positive, i.e. conducive to food transfer (give food to approacher, drop food in 
approacher’s reach or hold food toward approacher), negative, i.e. impeding food 
transfer (protest vocally, hold on to food, hold away food, turn away, leave, flee, push 
away approacher’s hand, attack approacher), or neutral, i.e. neither conducive to nor 
impeding food transfer (ignore approacher, other behavior). We defined food transfers 
like van Noordwijk & van Schaik (2009) as transfers out of the owner’s hand. 
Following de Waal (1989; 1992) we distinguished between types of non-tolerated 
transfers and tolerated transfers (see Table 2-4 for operational definitions). Contrary to 
de Waal (1989; 1992) we did not observe co-feeding (due to the different food types) 
and did not include collect near in the analyses as this was never protested by food 
owners and ownership was thus not claimed. Food-getting success was defined as the 
proportion of approaches that led to food transfer. 
On average (±SD), individual chimpanzees were first owner 2.8 ±2.6 times 
(range 0-8) and bonobos 8.8 ±5.6 (2-17) times. 564 and 640 approaches respectively 
were recorded and each possible owner-approacher dyad interacted on average (±SD) 
6.3 ±13.2 (0-100) / 22 ±28.7 (0-121) times.  
 
Additional groups 
 
To compare general patterns of reciprocity and dominance across different 
groups of chimpanzees and bonobos we included data from an additional 5 groups (one 
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of which studied twice) and 5 different study periods on the main groups resulting in 5 
and 8 samples per species (see Appendix 2-1 and Table 2-2 for details on composition 
as well as observation periods and observers). To be included in this analysis, the data 
had to fulfill two criteria: (i) the hierarchy steepness estimate had to be significant, 
which was tested with a randomization test using 2000 repeats (de Vries et al. 2006) and 
(ii) the grooming matrix correlation coefficient for any group of n individuals had to be 
based on at least 2n(n-1) grooming bouts, thus allowing for each dyad to reciprocate at 
least once. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 
To test the influence of various factors on food transfers we used generalized 
linear mixed effects models (GLMM: Bolker et al. 2009), including the identities of 
owner and approacher as random factors. For an overview and definitions of fixed 
factors see Table 2-3 and below. GLMM’s were fitted with lme4 (Bates and Maechler 
2009) in R 2.9.0 (2009) with binomial error distribution. We first constructed a full 
model, including all possible factors and tested the overall significance of the full model 
against a null model, including only the intercept and the random factors (Johnson and 
Omland 2004). We then used the corrected Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICc: 
Hurvich and Tsai 1989) to select the most parsimonious model with the best fit to the 
data (Johnson and Omland 2004). Factors were excluded only if this improved the 
model fit by >2 AICc units. This approach avoids the danger of increased type II errors 
with repeated significance testing (Mundry and Nunn 2009). We used likelihood ratio 
tests to test whether a full model or a factor of interest explained a significant amount of 
the variance compared to the null model or a reduced model without the factor of 
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interest, respectively. Since likelihood ratio tests against a Chi-square distribution tend 
to overestimate effect size (Faraway 2006) we used parametric bootstrapping with 1000 
Monte Carlo simulations to generate a distribution of likelihood ratios (LR) from the 
fitted parameter estimates and tested the observed LR against this distribution (Faraway 
2006). In the case of borderline P values (0.05-0.1) we ran 10,000 simulations. Rowwise 
matrix correlations in MatMan (de Vries 1993) yielded very similar results, but since 
matrix correlations cannot handle multiple factors simultaneously we only report the 
results of the GLMM’s. 
Dependent variables. We used two different measurements of food getting 
success as dependent variables. Transfers given1: Proportion of approaches that led to 
food transfer, both tolerated and forced, for a given owner-approacher dyad. Tolerated 
transfers given: Proportion of approaches that led to tolerated food transfer for a given 
owner-approacher dyad. Both measurements were weighted by the total number of 
approaches per dyad. Reciprocal exchange is mainly expected for tolerated transfers but 
may also occur over all transfers, if forced transfers are rare. The more common forced 
transfers, the weaker the signal of reciprocity over all transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 „Given“ and “received” are only used to indicate the direction of transfers, from owner to approacher or 
vice versa, but do not imply intention or voluntariness 
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Table 2-3: Dependent variables included in the generalized linear mixed models to explain food 
transfers and hypotheses associated with them 
Dependent variable A shares with B 
because… 
Hypothesis Supported?5 
(Tolerated) Transfers 
received 
B shares with A Reciprocity (food for food) Chimpanzees yes, 
bonobos no 
Relationship quality1, 
affiliative relationship2 
A and B are friends Interchange (food for other 
services) / expression of tolerance 
Yes 
Political relationship2 A and B are allies Interchange (food for support) No 
David’s score difference B is “stronger”3 Sharing under pressure / 
harassment 
Yes 
Relatedness A and B are 
maternal relatives4 
Kin selection Chimpanzees yes, 
bonobos no 
Sex combination B is from the same / 
opposite sex 
Interchange (♂-♀: food for sex,  
♂-♂/♀-♀: food for support); 
sharing under pressure 
(chimpanzees: ♀-♂, bonobos: ♂-♀) 
No 
1Only chimpanzees 
2Only bonobos 
3i.e. on average more likely to win dyadic conflicts with A 
4i.e. mother-daughter and mother-son pairs, with most transfers going from mothers to (adult) offspring. 
The maternal brother pair among the bonobos never shared food. We did not include paternal relatives 
since there was no evidence that individuals preferentially associated, groomed, supported or shared food 
with paternal kin (unpublished analyses) 
5See Table 2-5 for effect sizes (parameter estimates) 
 
Independent variables. We tested the influence of several explanatory variables 
on food sharing (Table 2-3). (Tolerated) transfers received1: The proportion of 
approaches of the current owner to the current approacher that led to (tolerated) transfer 
when the latter was food owner. Relationship quality: Numerical. Following Fraser et 
al. (2008) we performed a principal components analysis (PCA) on the variables 
grooming given (proportion of scans approacher groomed owner), support given 
(agonistic support given by approacher to owner as proportion of all support given to 
others) and proximity (proportion of scans approacher and owner rested within arm’s 
reach, excluding grooming). A minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 was used to determine the 
number of components extracted from the PCA (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). For the 
chimpanzees, we thus extracted one component, explaining 50.4% of the variance. It 
had a high positive load of grooming, support and proximity and is thus largely 
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equivalent to Fraser et al. (2008)’s “relationship value” component. For the bonobos, 
two components were extracted, explaining 45.2% and 34.4% respectively. The first 
component had a high loading of grooming and proximity but negative loading of 
support, whereas the second one had a high loading of support, minor loading of 
proximity and negative loading of grooming. Thus we called the first component 
“affiliative relationship” and the second one “political relationship”. David’s score 
difference: Numerical factor indicating the relative ability of two individuals to win 
dyadic conflicts, calculated as normalized David’s score (de Vries et al. 2006) of the 
owner minus normalized David’s score of the approacher, i.e. the factor is positive for 
dominant food owners and negative for subordinate ones. We initially included formal 
ranks of owners and formal rank differences as factors, but found high collinearity in 
these factors and thus had to consider them redundant. Relatedness: Binary factor 
indicating whether owner and approacher are maternal relatives. Sex combination: 
Factor with 4 levels, female-female, male-male, female-male, male-female. 
Dominance style and reciprocity. Dominance hierarchies were calculated with 
MatMan 1.1 (de Vries et al. 1993; de Vries 1995) on the basis of pant-grunts for the 
chimpanzees (Noë et al. 1980) and fleeing upon aggression in dyadic conflicts for the 
bonobos (Vervaecke et al. 2000). The steepness of dominance hierarchies was 
calculated as the slope of a linear regression line through the ranked normalized David’s 
scores, based on the outcome of dyadic agonistic interactions (de Vries et al. 2006). 
While a shallow slope represents an egalitarian dominance hierarchy in which rank 
differences are small, a steep slope represents a despotic hierarchy with large rank 
differences (van Schaik 1989; de Vries et al. 2006; Stevens et al. 2007b). Following 
Stevens et al. (2005) we included only individuals over seven years of age, when they 
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become socially and sexually mature, and in captivity have been shown to reproduce 
(chimpanzees: Carlsen (2007); bonobos: Pereboom & Stevens (2008)). 
Grooming reciprocity was calculated using rowwise matrix correlations in 
MatMan1.1. (de Vries 1993; de Vries et al. 1993). The units of analysis were grooming 
bouts given and received. To compare mean hierarchy steepness and mean grooming 
reciprocity between the species we first calculated a mean for the repeatedly sampled 
groups (see Table 2-2) before calculating the mean among independent groups. To 
analyze the influence of hierarchy steepness on grooming reciprocity we used linear 
mixed effects models (Pinheiro and Bates 2000), fitted with nlme (Pinheiro et al. 2008) 
in R 2.9.0 (2009). Since we were interested in the general influence of dominance 
structure on reciprocity, hierarchy steepness, ranging from 0-1, was set as the only 
explanatory variable. Species (binary: chimpanzees/bonobos) and group identity were 
set as random factors. Other factors potentially influencing hierarchy steepness and 
reciprocity, namely total group size (numerical) and sex ratio (the proportion of males) 
were also included as random factors. 
 
Results 
 
General patterns of food sharing 
 
 In total we recorded 228 transfers among the chimpanzees and 73 transfers 
among the bonobos. Chimpanzees were on average food owner during 42.4min (± 43.5) 
whereas bonobos were food owner during 124min (± 78.3). Thus, chimpanzees on 
average transferred food almost ten times more frequently than bonobos (21.4 vs. 2.6 
transfers per hour of being food owner, t14=3.02, P<0.01).  
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Food acquisition. In both species, food owners never approached non-owners 
and never initiated food transfers, except for one instance among the chimpanzees 
(Table 2-4). Food was virtually only shared if non-owners approached food owners and 
actively tried to acquire food by begging or by taking. Peering at a food owner without 
begging or taking never led to transfer. 
Donor - recipient combinations. Among the chimpanzees, 67.2% of all transfers 
were from dominants to subordinates and 32.8% from subordinates to dominants. 
Furthermore, 90.4% were among non-kin and 9.6% among kin. Finally, 45.5% of all 
transfers were from males to females, 27% were among females, 16.9% from females to 
males, and 10.7% among males. Among the bonobos, 61.2% of all transfers were from 
subordinates to dominants and 38.2% from dominants to subordinates; 84.3% were 
among non-kin and 15.7% among kin; 41% of all transfers were among females, 41% 
from males to females, 16.7% from females to males and 1.2% among males. Whether 
dominance, kinship or specific sex combinations had an influence on success rates was 
evaluated in the models below. 
Reactions to food approaches. In both species reactions to approaches were 
mostly negative (chimpanzees: mean ±SD 49.5 ±31.5%; bonobos: 53.4 ±24.1%) or 
passive (47.9 ±29.9%; 45.9 ±24.6%). Positive reactions were rare (2.6 ±4.7%; 0.7 
±1.2%). In both species, low-ranking food owners showed significantly more negative 
reactions (Spearman correlation of negative reactions with rank: Chimpanzees: 
rho=0.62, N=10, P=0.05; Bonobos: rho=0.83, N=6, P<0.05).  
Food-getting success. Average food-getting success (±SD) was significantly 
higher for chimpanzees (33 ±9%) than for bonobos (19 ±11%, t15=2.97, P=0.01).  
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Socio-sexual behavior. Bonobo approachers presented sexually to the food 
owner 23 times (3.5% of approaches) which led to sexual interactions 12 times (1.9% of 
approaches). In two cases, food was transferred after sexual intercourse. Hence food 
getting success was not significantly different with or without sexual interactions 
(16.7% vs. 19%; Χ2=0.01, df=1, P=0.9). Chimpanzees never used socio-sexual behavior 
in food acquisition. 
Types of transfers. Contrary to bonobos, chimpanzees fairly often transferred 
food actively to approachers (Table 2-4). Active forms of transfers (active sharing and 
facilitated taking) were thus significantly more common among chimpanzees (mean 
±SD=13.1 ±13.7% vs. 0 ±0%; t14=2.3, P<0.05). Overall tolerated transfers were also 
significantly more common among chimpanzees (mean ±SD=71.8 ±32.7% vs. 36.4 
±26.3%, t14= 2.33, P<0.05, Figure 2-1). 
 
Table 2-4: Types of food transfers and their occurrence among chimpanzees and bonobos 
 Definition Chimpanzees Bonobos 
N  228 73 
Offering1 O3 initiates transfer without request by A4 0.9% 0% 
Active sharing1 O actively transfers food to A 5.7% 0% 
Facilitated taking1 O makes movements conducive to transfer but A 
takes the food 
18% 0% 
Relaxed claim1 O allows A to take food 61.4% 39.7% 
Forced claim2 A takes food despite resistance by O 13.2% 57.5% 
Stealing2 A snatches food by surprise, preventing 
resistance by O 
0.9% 2.7% 
1tolerated transfers 
2non-tolerated transfers 
3O=Owner 
4A=Approacher 
 
In sum, both species rarely responded positively to approachers and low-ranking 
food owners were more likely to respond negatively. Among chimpanzees most 
transfers were from dominants to subordinates while the opposite was true for the 
bonobos. Chimpanzee food owners allowed higher food-getting success and more 
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tolerated taking and also transferred food more actively than bonobos. The latter only 
rarely engaged in sexual interactions during sharing without any effect on success. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: The average percentage (±SEM) of tolerated food transfers for chimpanzees and 
bonobos as observed in this study and by de Waal (1992). In both studies, chimpanzees shared food 
more tolerantly than bonobos 
 
Mechanisms of food sharing 
 
Chimpanzees. For tolerated transfers given, the full model explained 
significantly more variance in the data than the null model (LR=37.16, df=7, P<0.001). 
The parameter estimates of the most parsimonious model are given in Table 2-5. 
Relatedness explained most of the variance in that model (LR=5.42, df=1, P<0.05), 
followed by tolerated transfers received (LR=3.78, df=1, P<0.05) and, to a lesser extent, 
David’s score difference (LR=8.36, df=1, P=0.09) and relationship value (LR=1.39, 
df=1, P=0.26), the former of which had a negative influence. This indicates that 
reciprocity explained most of the food transfers among non-kin. While closely affiliated 
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dyads also shared more, dominant food owners were less likely to tolerate food taking 
than subordinate ones. 
For all transfers given, the full model also explained significantly more variance 
than the null model (LR=25.95, df=7, P<0.01). The parameter estimates of the most 
parsimonious model are given in Table 2-5. Transfers received (LR=10.29, df=1, 
P<0.001) and relatedness (LR=8.31, df=1, P<0.01) best explained transfers given. This 
indicates that reciprocity and kin benefits best explain overall food transfers.  
 
Table 2-5: The parameter estimates for the most parsimonious GLMM explaining (tolerated) food 
transfers given by chimpanzees and bonobos. For both measurements of food sharing there is a 
reciprocal relationship among the chimpanzees but not the bonobos. NS P>0.1, ° P<0.1, * P<0.05, ** 
P<0.01, ***P<0.001 
Chimpanzees Bonobos Food sharing 
measure Factor β ±SE1 Factor β ±SE1 
Intercept -2.23 ±0.28*** Intercept -3.49 ±0.52*** 
Tolerated transfers 
received 
1.53 ±0.78* 
Relationship value 0.16 ±0.13NS 
Affiliative 
relationship 
0.71 ±0.28* 
Relatedness  1.49 ±0.63* 
Tolerated transfers 
given 
David’s score 
difference 
-0.51 ±0.15** 
David’s score 
difference 
-0.37 ±0.27 NS 
Intercept -1.89 ±0.31*** Intercept -1.41 ±0.43*** 
Transfers received 1.53 ±0.47** Transfers received -3.14 ±1** 
Affiliative 
relationship 
0.8 ±0.24*** 
All transfers given  
Relatedness 1.48 ±0.52** 
David’s score 
difference 
-0.4 ±0.23NS 
1Coefficients (±SE) of the factors retained in the most parsimonious model based on AICc.  
 
Bonobos. For tolerated transfers given, the full model did not explain 
significantly more variance than the null model (LR=14.75, df=8, P=0.34). The most 
parsimonious model (Table 2-5) only approached significance (LR=10.9, df=2, P=0.08) 
and included affiliative relationship (LR=4.57, df=1, P=0.23) and, with negative 
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influence, David’s score difference as factors (LR=1.76, df=1, P=0.19), none of which 
explained a significant amount of the variance. This indicates that bonobos tolerated 
transfers more by closely affiliated approachers but less by subordinate ones . 
For all transfers given, the full model explained significantly more variance than 
the null model (LR=30.47, df=8, P<0.01). Transfers received when not an owner was a 
significant factor in the full model (β ±SE=-4.04 ±1.09, P<0.001) and had a significant 
but negative influence on transfers given (LR=15.1, df=1, P<0.01). In the most 
parsimonious model (see Table 2-5), transfers given was strongly negatively influenced 
by transfers received (LR=11.55, df=1, P<0.01) and mildly positively influenced by 
affiliative relationship (LR=9.63, df=1, P=0.09). David’s score difference shows the 
main direction of transfers, to individuals likely to win conflicts, but did not explain a 
significant amount of the variance (LR=3.18, df=1, P=0.19). This indicates that food 
transfers among bonobos were unidirectional, from subordinates to dominants 
especially if they were closely affiliated. 
In sum, both measurements of food transfers given were significantly explained 
by food transfers received for the chimpanzees, thus indicating reciprocal exchange 
(Figure 2-2). Relatedness and relationship value also had positive influences on food 
transfers given. The fact that relationship value was only an important factor for 
tolerated transfers but not all transfers shows that owners may share with preferred 
individuals if they have a choice, which was restricted when transfers were forced. No 
model could significantly explain tolerated transfers given by bonobos, although 
affiliative relationship tended to influence it. Transfers received had a significant and 
negative effect on transfers among the bonobos, thus strongly indicating that transfers 
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were mainly unidirectional. Hence food sharing seemed to be reciprocal among 
chimpanzees but not among bonobos. 
  
a)      b) 
Figure 2-2: The relation between food transfers received (as the proportion of successful 
approaches) and food transfers given for a) chimpanzees (squares) and b) bonobos (triangles). 
There was a significant positive influence of food received on food given among the chimpanzees, 
indicating reciprocity, but a significant negative one among the bonobos, indicating mainly 
unidirectional transfers  
 
Dominance and reciprocity 
 
The chimpanzees in this study had a shallower and less linear dominance 
hierarchy than the bonobos (slope: chimpanzees 0.18; bonobos 0.54, linearity: 0.44; 0.6) 
and can thus be called more egalitarian. Across all sampled groups, chimpanzees had 
shallower hierarchy steepness (3 independent groups; mean ±SD = 0.16 ±0.02) than 
bonobos (4 independent groups; 0.73 ±0.07; t5=14.12, P<0.001) and higher grooming 
reciprocity coefficients (0.82 ±0.1 vs. 0.29 ±0.26; t5=3.3, P<0.05). In a linear mixed 
effects model including species and group identity as random factors, hierarchy 
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steepness had a significant negative influence on grooming reciprocity (AICc=12.16, 
β±SE=-0.81±0.19, t5=-4.24, P<0.01, Figure 2-3). Even after including group size and 
sex ratio as additional random factors, hierarchy steepness still tended to negatively 
influence grooming reciprocity (AICc=41.46, β±SE=-0.64±0.26, t3=-2.42, P=0.09), but 
the AICc of this model was significantly higher, indicating that these factors did not 
help explain more variance in the data. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: The influence of hierarchy steepness on grooming reciprocity among different groups of 
chimpanzees (squares) and bonobos (triangles). The full line is the predicted curve fitted with a 
linear mixed effect model, controlling for species and repeated measures of the same groups. The 
dotted lines represent the standard errors of the fitted curve. Hierarchy steepness had a significant 
negative influence on grooming reciprocity (P<0.01) 
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Discussion 
 
We hypothesized that both the ultimate and the proximate mechanisms for 
sharing food are influenced by the dominance structure of a group. In this study, 
individuals of neither species tended to encourage food transfers but most often ignored 
approaches or made movements impeding food transfer, especially if low-ranking. This 
indicates that low rankers had to avoid forced transfers more than high rankers, i.e. did 
not enjoy a “respect for possession” (Kummer and Cords 1991). Chimpanzees were 
significantly more successful in acquiring food from others than bonobos. Sexual 
interactions were only rarely observed among bonobos and did not alter food-getting 
success. Chimpanzees also shared food more actively and tolerantly while bonobos 
often forced transfers. Thus, chimpanzees were more prosocial (Table 2-4). 
 We predicted that reciprocal exchange was more likely if transfers are tolerated 
rather than forced. Among chimpanzees, forced transfers were rare and the results of 
both models strongly indicate that food transfers were reciprocated. Among bonobos, 
forced transfers were common and the overall model indicated that food transfers were 
unidirectional. If only tolerated transfers were considered, bonobos tended to share 
more with closely affiliated individuals, however, this model could not explain a 
significant amount of the variance in the data. Thus, chimpanzees reciprocated food 
transfers but bonobos did not (Figure 2-2). General relationship components included in 
the model never explained a significant amount of the variance, suggesting that food 
was, if at all, traded for itself rather than for grooming, support or shared proximity. 
Similarly, Gurven et al. (2000) found that meat received was the best predictor for meat 
given. However, other studies did find reciprocal exchange of food with other 
currencies (cf. Nishida et al. 1992; Mitani 2006; Gomes and Boesch 2009) and we also 
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found some interchange with grooming and support among the chimpanzees using 
matrix correlations (unpubl. analyses), hence these differences may partly be due to the 
choice of statistical method.  
 From our results, we cannot make inferences about the proximate regulations of 
reciprocal exchange. The observed patterns are consistent with symmetry-based, 
attitudinal- or calculated reciprocity (Brosnan and de Waal 2002). However, it is most 
parsimonious to assume symmetry-based reciprocity, especially since analyses on short-
term contingency of exchange (i.e. within hours, cf. de Waal 1997) were not significant 
in our study groups (Jaeggi et al. in prep.). Thus, over the whole study period, food 
exchanges were on average reciprocal within dyads, but giving was not necessarily 
contingent on receiving, since the latter may have happened before or after the former. 
We found differences in dominance style that were consistent with the observed 
patterns of food sharing and reciprocity. The chimpanzee group was more egalitarian 
and was thus expected to share more tolerantly and more reciprocally. The bonobos 
were more despotic, which can explain why transfers were mainly forced and 
unidirectional, from subordinates to dominants. In a comparison of several groups of 
chimpanzees and bonobos, the latter were more despotic and hierarchy steepness was a 
significant negative predictor of reciprocity in grooming (Figure 2-3), thus confirming 
the pattern found in food sharing. A model including other factors potentially 
influencing both grooming reciprocity and hierarchy steepness, namely total group size 
and sex ratio, explained less variance in the data. Thus hierarchy steepness seems to be 
a robust predictor of reciprocity in grooming across different populations of 
chimpanzees and bonobos; whether this effect also holds for patterns in food sharing 
remains to be tested. 
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While the food type most commonly shared among wild chimpanzees and 
hunter-gatherers is meat (Table 2-1; Gurven 2004), we used plant food (fruits or 
vegetables). Could this affect sharing patterns? Moore (1984) noted two characteristics 
of meat which make it prone to sharing: First, meat is easily carried and shielded and 
thus highly defendable. The same is true for the large fruits commonly shared by wild 
bonobos (Treculia africana and Anonidium mannii: White 1994; Fruth & Hohmann 
2002) and chimpanzees (Cultivated fruits: Hockings et al. 2007), the bundles of browse 
used by de Waal (1989; 1992; 1997) and the paper bags used in this study (as long as 
they were not torn, which happened only rarely). Second, meat is only infrequently 
available and of high quality, making it highly attractive. While this is again true to 
some extent for the large fruits cited above, it applies less to the food sources in this 
study since they consisted of parts of the apes’ daily diet. However, in both groups the 
individuals were always highly motivated to acquire food, despite the relatively low 
attractiveness. Furthermore, de Waal (1989; 1997) already showed that reciprocal 
sharing patterns may emerge from relatively low-quality food. Finally, bonobos in the 
wild also regularly hunt and share meat (Hohmann and Fruth 1993; Fruth and Hohmann 
2002; Hohmann and Fruth 2008; Surbeck and Hohmann 2008) with a frequency that 
may well have been underestimated in the past (Stanford 1998). Hence, even though 
meat may be shared more actively than large fruits within the same population (D. 
Watts, pers.comm.), there is no a priori reason to relate interspecies differences in 
sharing patterns or -psychology to resource type. 
It is noteworthy, that the three studies directly comparing chimpanzees and 
bonobos in similar competition situation, namely monopolizable food sources, did find 
conflicting results concerning tolerance (de Waal 1992; Hare et al. 2007; this study). 
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However, this could be due to the fact that tolerance was measured differently: Whereas 
Hare et al. (2007) measured the tendency to monopolize food, de Waal (1992) and our 
study measured the tendency to share food (once monopolized). Given this difference, 
direct comparison between these studies is difficult. However, a greater tendency both 
to monopolize and to share in chimpanzees would be consistent with evolutionary 
models emphasizing both the benefits of being food owner per se and of selective 
sharing (e.g. Moore 1984). In fact, if sharing has direct benefits, individuals are 
expected to seize every possible opportunity for sharing. This is consistent with the 
commonly observed scramble for ownership after hunts, followed by relatively peaceful 
sharing (e.g. Nishida et al. 1979; Nishida et al. 1992). Hence the two tendencies might 
even be psychologically linked. 
Our inter-specific analysis of hierarchy steepness and grooming reciprocity 
(Figure 2-3), along with intra-specific correlations (Stevens et al. 2005; Schino and 
Aureli 2008), suggests that hierarchy steepness could be a valuable predictor of 
reciprocity expected in other species or at least other populations of chimpanzees and 
bonobos. The fact that Schino and Aureli (2008) did not find an effect across species 
may be because their data set lacked relatively egalitarian species for comparison. This 
relation could easily be tested with data from other populations of chimpanzees and 
bonobos. 
Some studies on food sharing in chimpanzees or bonobos report reciprocal 
exchange (de Waal 1989; de Waal 1997; Mitani and Watts 2001; Mitani 2006) while 
others found more support for sharing-under-pressure (Fruth and Hohmann 2002; Gilby 
2006). In our study, reciprocal exchange was found among the chimpanzees but not 
among the bonobos, where sharing-under-pressure better explained food transfers. As 
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Stevens and Gilby (2004) and Gilby (2006) have pointed out, the two hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive. Rather, there may be a behavioral continuum between the 
possibility for reciprocal exchange, when the costs of defending food are low and 
owners can selectively share with particular individuals, and sharing-under-pressure, 
when the costs of defending food are high and transfers are mainly from subordinates to 
dominants (see also Moore 1984). The steepness of the dominance hierarchy may 
determine the position of groups on this continuum and could thus be helpful in 
predicting the patterns of food sharing in different populations. 
Similarly, at the proximate level, food transfers among chimpanzees and 
bonobos can range from highly tolerant and active to reluctant or forced (Teleki 1973; 
Kuroda 1984; Boesch and Boesch 1989; Nishida et al. 1992; Fruth and Hohmann 2002; 
Gilby 2006; Surbeck and Hohmann 2008). The amount of active sharing (active giving 
and facilitated taking) among the chimpanzees in this study was relatively high 
compared to other populations (this study: ~24%; Taï: ~7% (Boesch & Boesch 1989); 
Gombe: 1.2% (Teleki 1973); Yerkes: 0.5% (de Waal 1989)), suggesting higher degrees 
of prosociality. However, these differences could also be due to different food types and 
group compositions. Among wild bonobos, food sharing seems to be largely tolerant 
(Kuroda 1984; White 1994; Fruth and Hohmann 2002), but in captivity, food transfers 
were found to be more tolerant among chimpanzees than among bonobos (de Waal 
1992; this study). While general discrepancies between captivity and the wild, e.g. the 
lack of fission-fusion dynamics might explain some of these differences, our results 
suggest that they may also be related to the steepness of the dominance hierarchy in a 
given population (within a captivity or wild context). Pending formal attempts to 
explain differences in reciprocity or tolerance in food sharing within or between species 
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(Mitani 2009), more data on hierarchy steepness from other populations of chimpanzees 
and bonobos could provide a valuable test of our hypothesis. 
The fact that in this study bonobos were less tolerant and more despotic than 
chimpanzees may seem unexpected, given that although chimpanzees can be 
characterized as relatively egalitarian (Boehm 1999) bonobos have often been described 
as more tolerant and egalitarian (de Waal and Lanting 1997; Hare et al. 2007). 
However, this strict dichotomy has recently been questioned. First, Stanford (1998) 
suggested that reported behavioral differences may be due to the relative paucity of data 
on wild bonobos and the different research focus in the two species. Second, 
comparisons of various wild populations indicated that levels of sociality, which depend 
on food availability and the resulting feeding competition, may lie on a continuum for 
the two species rather than representing a dichotomy (Hohmann and Fruth 2002; Stumpf 
2007). Finally, various captive groups of bonobos were shown to exhibit high rates of 
(serious) aggression and consistently steep hierarchies, resulting in ‘semi-despotic’ 
societies (Stevens et al. 2008), which may be a response to increased contest 
competition under captive conditions (cf. Gore 1993). In general, it is difficult to 
maintain clear species differences as expressed levels of sociality, dominance 
relationships, aggression and playfulness in both species may well lie on a continuum 
dictated by the levels of feeding competition (van Schaik 1989; Stanford 1998; Stumpf 
2007) and space availability (Aureli and de Waal 1997; Sannen et al. 2004; Tacconi and 
Palagi 2009). 
Human foragers are characterized as relatively egalitarian (Woodburn 1982) and 
group-wide sharing of meat is universal, largely voluntary and often reciprocal (Gurven 
2004). In fact, all studies statistically testing reciprocal exchange found significant 
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evidence for it (Gurven 2004) and in a multivariate analysis similar to ours, Gurven et 
al. (2000) also found that food received was the best predictor of food given. Our results 
indicate that a relatively egalitarian hierarchy may have favored such reciprocal 
exchange due to increased control of owners over food distribution. During evolutionary 
(and ontogenetic) history, food owners should become more tolerant to requests by 
those likely to reciprocate. They may also start to share more actively, which could 
reflect genuine altruistic dispositions and thus induce greater feelings of gratitude in the 
recipient, resulting in even better reciprocation (Trivers 1971). 
 In sum, we suggested that a shallow dominance hierarchy allows food owners to 
selectively tolerate requests by those individuals who reciprocate. We found that 
chimpanzees were more egalitarian than bonobos and shared more tolerantly and 
reciprocally. A cross-species analysis of the influence of despotism on grooming 
reciprocity confirmed this pattern. We conclude that a relatively shallow dominance 
hierarchy was an important precondition for the evolution of extensive food sharing in 
humans and the prosocial predispositions related to it. 
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Chapter 3: Mechanisms of reciprocity in food sharing among 
chimpanzees and bonobos: Short-term contingency and the 
grooming effect 
 
Reciprocity can ultimately explain many instances of altruistic behavior among 
animals, yet its proximate regulation remains poorly understood. While there is ample 
evidence for a long-term statistical contingency between services given and received 
among non-human primates, evidence for a short-term behavioral contingency has been 
controversial. Here we tested for such short-term contingencies using data on food 
sharing, grooming and agonistic interactions in captive chimpanzees and bonobos. The 
only effect we found was that bonobos were more likely to be allowed to take food if 
they had groomed the food owner previously, regardless of whether they did so more or 
less than usual. We conclude that grooming selectively increased the food owners’ 
tolerance. This cognitively simple proximate mechanism may lead to contingent 
exchange, given the chance for reciprocation after grooming, and may explain some of 
the other results on short-term contingencies. No effect was found among the 
chimpanzees, probably because sharing tolerance was already at ceiling level due to 
higher levels of long-term tolerance. Furthermore, no evidence for punishment or 
retaliation was found as sharing generosity and aggression were not associated in any 
way and no evidence for indirect reciprocity as third parties did not groom generous 
individuals more. We conclude that long-term reciprocity is more important among 
chimpanzees and bonobos while calculative, tit-for-tat like exchanges only became 
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prominent in humans with the advent of trade and the resulting interactions between 
relative strangers. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Reciprocal altruism (henceforth: reciprocity) has been a major evolutionary 
explanation for many instances of human and animal cooperation (Trivers 1971; Trivers 
2006). Reciprocity requires a contingent behavioral strategy, namely that actors direct 
altruistic acts selectively to those that have directed altruistic acts to them in the past or 
are likely to do so in the future, thus profiting both partners. Many animal species, and 
in particular non-human primates have been shown to exhibit reciprocal patterns of 
exchange in various measured currencies such as food sharing, grooming and agonistic 
support (reviews and meta-analyses by Schino 2007; Schino and Aureli 2008; Schino 
and Aureli 2009; Jaeggi and van Schaik in review). However, while most evidence for 
reciprocity was based on a statistical contingency of services given and services 
received, it is disputed whether this reflects a behavioral contingency (Stevens and 
Hauser 2004; Clutton-Brock 2009). Hence, the proximate regulation of reciprocal 
exchange among animals remains less well understood (Brosnan and de Waal 2002; 
Schino and Aureli 2009). 
These differences between statistical and behavioral contingency of 
reciprocation have been formalized in terms of three different types of proximate 
regulations of reciprocity (Brosnan and de Waal 2002, p.259): “Symmetry-based 
reciprocity is cognitively the least complex form, based on symmetries inherent in 
dyadic relationships (e.g., mutual association, kinship). Attitudinal reciprocity, which is 
more cognitively complex, is based on the mirroring of social attitudes between 
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partners … Finally, calculated reciprocity, the most cognitively advanced form, is based 
on mental scorekeeping”. Symmetry-based reciprocity thus only requires some 
consistent pattern of association between specific individuals, leading to statistical 
reciprocity in the long term, and can probably explain many instances of animal 
reciprocity. The two other forms require a contingency of exchange over short time-
periods (e.g. de Waal 1997; de Waal 2000), the evidence for which is much more 
controversial (Table 3-1). Note that it is not quite clear whether or how attitudinal and 
calculated reciprocity lead to different predictions regarding observable contingencies, 
which is probably why most researchers speak only of calculated reciprocity. We will 
here use the term contingent reciprocity to refer to both types. 
Interestingly, the more naturalistic studies in Table 3-1 with higher ecological 
validity found mainly positive evidence for contingent reciprocity (Seyfarth and Cheney 
1984; Hemelrijk 1994; de Waal 1997; Koyama et al. 2006) whereas more artificial 
experiments with lower ecological validity found little evidence (Melis et al. 2008; 
Brosnan and Beran 2009; Brosnan et al. 2009; Pele et al. 2009; Yamamoto and Tanaka 
2009a; Yamamoto and Tanaka 2010). Thus it seems that the chances of a positive result 
are higher in naturalistic studies, which may result from a lack of direct interactions in 
more artificial experiments (Yamamoto and Tanaka 2010, see Discussion). On the other 
hand, while the underlying cognitive mechanisms are difficult to infer from naturalistic 
observations (e.g. Hemelrijk 1994), at least without invoking a great deal of 
anthropomorphic assumptions (e.g. Koyama et al. 2008; see Wright 2006; Barrett et al. 
2007 for simpler explanations), those artificial experiments that did find positive results 
may more safely infer cognitively advanced processes such as mental scorekeeping 
(Dufour et al. 2009).  
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Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the optimal type of reciprocity depends on the 
social partner. Both humans and non-human primates tend to form stable social 
relationships (friendships) within which services are exchanged reciprocally on a long-
term basis (Trivers 1971; Silk 2002). The affiliative emotions and trust that prevail in 
friendships buffer them against short-term fluctuations in cooperative tendencies or 
abilities of the partners, the probability of cheating is low and there is now need to 
constantly track the exchange of services. Thus, friendships are associated with 
symmetry-based reciprocity. On the other hand, socially distant partners may rely more 
on contingent reciprocity, because the probability of cheating is higher. Thus, exchange 
in socially distant relationships is less buffered by trust and recent interactions may 
weigh more heavily. Some evidence for such a stronger effect of recent interactions in 
more distant partners has been found by de Waal (1997). 
Reciprocity can not only be positive, through the exchange of services, but also 
negative, through the punishment of cheaters by “moralistic aggression” or 
“retalitation”, i.e. the withholding of future benefits (Trivers 1971; Clutton-Brock and 
Parker 1995; Stevens and Hauser 2004). Initially, de Waal (1989, p. 456) reported 
evidence for punishment and proposed that “aggression appears to be a functional 
aspect of the reciprocity system [of chimpanzees]”. However, his evidence was based on 
a negative correlation of food sharing generosity and aggressive rejections received 
when requesting food on other occasions by any other group member, averaged across a 
three month study period. Such a long-term correlation could also be due to hidden 
factors such as rank, which may influence both variables. In fact, the most generous 
individual in de Waal’s group was also the most dominant (the only male), and thus 
never received aggression. If he is removed the correlation becomes non-significant. On 
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the other hand, if punishment is triggered by indignation (Trivers 1971), it should occur, 
or at least be strongest immediately after a cheating event (such as a failure to share 
food) and should mainly be performed by those cheated upon (in contrast to “altruistic” 
punishment, which is performed by third parties but thus suffers from second order free-
riding problems and among humans is only common in large-scale societies (Marlowe 
et al. 2008). Hence altruistic punishment is not expected in animals). Such forms of 
punishment have been reported by Hauser and Marler (1993). Other solid evidence for 
punishment among non-human primates however remained scarce (reviewed by Stevens 
and Hauser 2004; Jensen in press). 
Finally, among humans, both positive reciprocity, i.e. the rewarding of 
cooperators, and negative reciprocity, i.e. the punishment of cheaters, can involve third 
parties. Thus, generalized or indirect reciprocity refers to the rewarding of cooperators 
by third parties (Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987) and altruistic punishment refers to the 
punishment of cheaters by third parties (Fehr and Gachter 2002). Many scholars have 
suggested that such third party mechanisms are a relatively recent feature of human 
cooperation, arising only with large-scale societies (Trivers 1971; Marlowe et al. 2008; 
Roberts 2008; Henrich et al. 2010), and accordingly no evidence has been found so far 
in non-human primates. 
Thus, in order to contribute to the debate about the proximate mechanisms 
underlying reciprocity in animals we used data resulting from naturalistic food sharing 
experiments in one captive group of bonobos and chimpanzees respectively to test for 
short-term contingencies and punishment. This study is important since it includes a 
previously untested species (Bonobos, see Table 3-1) and is of high ecological validity. 
Food sharing has been one of the main contexts in which questions regarding 
 
Mechanisms of reciprocity among chimpanzees and bonobos 77 
 
reciprocity have been investigated, both among non-human and human primates 
(reviewed by Brown et al. 2004; Gurven 2004). The study was designed after previous 
naturalistic food sharing studies with positive results (de Waal 1989; de Waal 1997) 
such that negative results in our study could not be explained by experimental design.  
Previous results from the same subjects showed that food sharing was reciprocal 
on a long-term basis among the chimpanzees but not the bonobos, and that exchanges 
for other services such as grooming and agonistic support at least partly explained 
sharing in both species (Jaeggi et al. 2010b). Furthermore, both grooming and agonistic 
support were reciprocal in the long-term among the chimpanzees but not the bonobos. 
Hence, we expected short-term effects to be more pronounced among the bonobos and 
less so among the chimpanzees since the latter seemed to rely more on symmetry-based 
reciprocity. 
Since no evidence for indirect reciprocity had been reported for non-human 
primates, we did not expect to find any in our study groups.  
.
 Table 3-1: Studies testing for contingent reciprocity among primates. All studies included some element of temporal contingency between services given and 
services received 
Species Ecological 
validitya 
Exchange type Contingent Reciprocity? Reference Author’s conclusion 
High Sharing food after being 
groomed 
Yes, but small effect size, larger 
for socially distant dyads 
(de Waal 1997) “we at present have evidence for the entire set of features expected if 
reciprocity were cognition-based: partner-specificity, selective protest, 
retaliation, turn-taking, and the effect of one service on another.” (p. 384) 
High Agonistic support after 
grooming, aggression 
after support/no support 
Yes, but only for aggressor (not 
victim) support 
(Koyama et al. 
2006) 
“We found evidence of a system of reward and punishment. … The findings 
are consistent with a mechanism of calculated interchange in chimpanzees.” (p. 
1293) 
Moderate Experiment 1: Cooperate 
with recruiter 
Weak effect (Melis et al. 
2008) 
Low Experiment 2: Turn-
taking in targeted 
helping 
Weak effect (Melis et al. 
2008) 
“models of immediate reciprocation and detailed accounts of recent exchanges 
(e. g. Tit for Tat) may not play a large role in guiding the social decisions of 
chimpanzees” (p. 951) 
Low Turn-taking in food 
delivery experiment 
With difficulty, not 
spontaneously 
(Yamamoto 
and Tanaka 
2009a) 
“These findings suggest that there is some difficulty in the occurrence of 
reciprocal cooperation in chimpanzees. Chimpanzees, differently from humans, 
might play a donor’s role only on the partner’s request, but not spontaneously.” 
(p. 242) 
Low Turn-taking in food 
delivery experiment 
No (Brosnan et al. 
2009) 
“We conclude that contingent reciprocity does not spontaneously arise in 
experimental settings, despite the fact that patterns of behavior in the wild 
indicate that individuals cooperate preferentially with reciprocating partners.” 
(p. 587) 
Low Bartering with tokens Only after extensive training 
and via experimenter 
(Brosnan and 
Beran 2009) 
“It appears that extensive barter may represent a relatively recent evolutionary 
development in the hominid lineage.” (p. 193) 
Low Token exchange No (Pele et al. 
2009) 
“The analyses showed no evidence for calculated reciprocity in interactions” 
(p.375) 
Chimpanzees 
Pan 
troglodytes 
Low Turn-taking in food 
delivery experiment 
No (Yamamoto 
and Tanaka 
2010) 
“We propose that the experimental set-up which prevented direct interactions 
between the participants might have influenced these results. In conclusion, the 
present study suggests that voluntary and/or strategic other-rewarding 
behaviour arose in humans after divergence from the common ancestor of 
humans and chimpanzees.” (p. 595) 
 
 High Sharing after 
grooming/aggression, 
aggression/grooming 
after sharing 
No (see results) this study see discussion 
Low Token exchange No (Pele et al. 
2009) 
“The analyses showed no evidence for calculated reciprocity in interactions” 
(p.375) 
Bonobos 
Pan paniscus 
High Sharing after 
grooming/aggression, 
aggression/grooming 
after sharing 
Some (see results) this study see discussion 
Gorillas 
Gorilla gorilla 
Low Token exchange No (Pele et al. 
2009) 
“The analyses showed no evidence for calculated reciprocity in interactions” 
(p.375) 
Low Token exchange Yes (Dufour et al. 
2009) 
“This study is the first experimental demonstration of the occurrence of direct 
transfers of goods based on calculated reciprocity in non-human-primates” (p. 
172) 
Orangutans 
Pongo abelii 
Low Token exchange No (Pele et al. 
2009) 
“The analyses showed no evidence for calculated reciprocity in interactions” 
(p.375) 
“Only once did we observe an episode … between a pair of orangutans that 
might have represented an instance of calculated reciprocity” (p. 381) 
Long-tailed 
macaques 
Macaca 
fascicularis 
High Agonistic support after 
being groomed 
Yes, but only for aggressor (not 
victim) support 
(Hemelrijk 
1994) 
“From a cognitive point of view, one would be inclined to assume that 
individuals who exchange acts must remember the identity of the groomer. 
This, however, is not proven by these experiment nor by those of Seyfarth & 
Cheney” (p. 481) 
Vervet 
monkeys 
Cercopithecus 
aethiops 
High Agonistic support after 
being groomed 
Yes, but only for aggressor (not 
victim) support 
(not actual support but response 
to play-back measured) 
(Seyfarth and 
Cheney 1984) 
“Vervets appear to be more willing to aid unrelated individuals if those 
individuals have behaved affinitively toward them in the recent past” (p. 541) 
Capuchin 
monkeys 
Cebus apella 
Moderate Turn-taking in food 
sharing paradigm 
Yes (de Waal 2000) “Instead of a symmetry-based reciprocity explanation, a mediating role of 
memory is suggested, and a mirroring of social attitude between partners.” (p. 
253) 
 
  
aHow naturalistic is the study? High ecological validity refers to naturalistic observations of a whole social group where nothing (Seyfarth & Cheney 1984; Koyama et 
al. 2007) or only a few factors were manipulated (e.g. monopolizable food provided: de Waal 1997; this study; grooming and aggression induced: Hemelrijk 1994). On 
the other hand, low ecological validity refers to highly artificial experimental set-ups (e.g. subjects spatially separated from recipient and rest of group, food delivery 
via apparatus rather than through direct interaction: Hauser et al. 2003, Brosnan et al. 2009, Dufour et al. 2009, Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009, 2010)
Moderate Sharing with cooperation 
partner 
Yes (de Waal and 
Berger 2000) 
“The increase in sharing following cooperation may rest on psychological 
mechanisms as complex as mental score-keeping of services and “gratitude”, or 
as simple as attitudinal reciprocity.” (p. 563) 
Cotton-top 
tamarins 
Saguinus 
oedipus 
Low Turn-taking in food 
delivery experiment 
Yes (Hauser et al. 
2003) 
“[Tamarins] give more food to those who give food back. Tamarins therefore 
have the psychological capacity for reciprocally mediated altruism.” (p. 2363) 
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Materials and methods 
 
 The subjects, housing, experimental procedures, food sharing definitions, 
observation methods and observation hours were the same as described in Jaeggi et al. 
(2010, main study groups). The number of experimental food sharing sessions was n=30 
for the chimpanzee group and n=53 for the bonobo group during which n=758 and 
n=659 approaches to food owners were recorded respectively. 
 
Variables 
 
In order to test for short-term contingencies, we related the food-getting success 
(FGS), i.e. the proportion of approaches leading to food transfer (de Waal 1989) for a 
particular owner-approacher dyad in a particular food sharing session to various 
measures of other services (Table 3-2). FGS was measured twice, once including only 
tolerated, i.e. un-resisted transfers (excluding forced transfers), and once including all 
transfers. Note that the difference between the two measures is much larger among the 
bonobos due to the high proportion of forced transfers (58%, Jaeggi et al. 2010). 
Differences in the influence of other factors on these two measures of FGS will allow us 
to infer whether an observed difference in FGS was due to an increased tolerance by the 
food owner (in which case only the FGS for tolerated transfers should be affected) or 
due to an increased assertiveness by the approacher (in which case both measures of 
FGS should be affected). We report detailed values only for FGS based on tolerated 
transfers unless there are qualitative differences. 
To test for positive reciprocity, we related food sharing to grooming. Following 
de Waal (1997), we scored grooming of the food owner by the approacher previous or 
 
Mechanisms of reciprocity among chimpanzees and bonobos 82 
 
subsequent to the sharing session as a simple binary variable (grooming yes/no). This 
variable may measure whether owners were affected by previously received grooming 
(e.g. through increased endorphin levels) and whether this would lead to partner-
specific tolerance, but not necessarily whether such an effect is due to some kind of 
score-keeping. To test more specifically for the latter, we also measured whether the 
approacher groomed the owner more or less than usual, by calculating a directional 
consistency index (DCI: van Hooff and Wensing 1987) of grooming for each owner-
approacher dyad: 
DCI = (a-o)/(a+o) 
where a is the number of grooming bouts from approacher to owner and o vice versa. 
Thus, the DCI could range from -1 (owner always groomed approacher) to +1 
(approacher always groomed owner). We then calculated the difference in DCI within 
one hour before/after a sharing session compared to the baseline DCI. Thus, this 
difference in DCI could range from -2 to +2 and measures whether an approacher 
groomed an owner more or less than usual. Hence, if owners respond to recently built 
up debt, sharing is expected to occur more for positive values, i.e. when the approacher 
groomed the owner more than usual. The least sharing is expected at -2 (usually only 
approacher ever grooms owner but today only owner groomed approacher) and the 
most sharing at +2 (vice versa). 
In order to test for negative reciprocity (punishment and retaliation), we tested 
the effect of previous aggression on FGS and the effect of FGS on subsequent 
aggression (Table 3-2). Furthermore, aggressive rejections and food-distribution rates 
were calculated as by de Waal (1989) and averages over the whole study period were 
correlated (see Appendix 3-1). 
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To test for the possibility of indirect reciprocity we measured the influence of 
second parties’ FGS on subsequent grooming by third parties, i.e. individuals not 
previously involved in the sharing interactions. Similar to the second party analyses, we 
measured grooming received as a binary variable grooming yes/no and also the 
difference in grooming. The latter was measured as the difference in grooming duration 
in seconds after sharing sessions compared to a control period on the next experimental 
day on which the former food owner was not owner. Note that this analysis could not be 
done for the bonobos because of the small group size and the consequent lack of third 
parties. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 
For analyses with specific dyads as the unit of sampling we used generalized 
linear mixed effects models (GLMM: Bolker et al. 2009), including both the identity of 
the owner and of the approacher as random factors. For the third party analyses only the 
identity of the owner was included as a random factor. GLMM’s were fitted with lme4 
(Bates and Maechler 2010) in R 2.11.0 (R Development Core Team 2010) with 
binomial error distribution if the response variable was a proportion or binary, and 
Gaussian error distribution for response variables with normally distributed residuals 
(only difference in DCI and difference in grooming by third parties). For models with 
strong over-dispersion (dispersion parameter >1.2), GLMM’s could not be applied 
because quasibinomial error distributions are as yet not well implemented in GLMM’s. 
Instead, the respective generalized linear model (GLM) was used, with quasibinomial 
error distribution and the former random factors included as fixed factors. For binomial 
GLMM’s, the amount of variance explained by fixed factors was tested with a 
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likelihood ratio test against a posterior distribution of likelihood ratios following 1,000 
Monte Carlo simulations (Faraway 2006). The parameter estimates β (± Standard errors 
SE), the likelihood ratio (LR), degrees of freedom (df) of the test and P value are 
reported. For Gaussian models, we used Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling with 
10,000 iterations in languageR (Baayen 2009) to calculate posterior means of parameter 
estimates as well as 95% confidence intervals (CI) and P values of these means. For 
GLM’s, the fixed factors were tested with F-tests which are reported together with the 
parameter estimates. One issue with negative results is the statistical power of the test 
and the resulting chance of accepting the null hypothesis even though it may be false. 
To address this we report the statistical power for each test. However, no power 
analyses are available for GLM(M)’s, hence we report the power of the respective 
general linear model. For analyses with individual means as unit of sampling we used 
two-tailed non-parametric tests with exact P values. 
 
Table 3-2: List of the variables, their definitions and whether a statistically significant association 
with food-getting success (FGS) was found 
Variable Definition Effect on/of FGS? 
Previous grooming Did the approacher groom the owner 
within 1h before the session, yes or no 
Chimpanzees no, 
bonobos yes  
(only voluntary transfers) 
Previous difference in DCI Did the approacher groom the owner 
more or less than usually within 1h 
before the session 
Chimpanzees no, 
bonobos yes  
(only voluntary transfers) 
Previous aggression Did the approacher aggress the owner 
within 1h before the session, yes or no 
Chimpanzees no, 
bonobos yes  
(all transfers) 
Subsequent grooming Did the approacher groom the owner 
within 1h after the start of a session, yes 
or no 
No  
Subsequent difference in DCI Did the approacher groom the owner 
more or less than usually within 1h after 
the start of a session 
No 
Subsequent aggression Did the approacher aggress the owner 
within 1h after the start of a session 
No 
 
 
Mechanisms of reciprocity among chimpanzees and bonobos 85 
 
Results 
 
Chimpanzees 
 
Positive reciprocity: Among the chimpanzees, food-getting success was not 
significantly increased by previous grooming by the approacher (mean with grooming 
(±SEM)= 0.29 (±0.07), mean without grooming= 0.23 (±0.02); GLMM: β ±SE = 0.41 
±0.33; LR=55.05, df=1, P=0.40, Power=0.16) nor by difference in DCI (GLMM: β ±SE 
= 0.02 ±0.23; LR=53.61, df=1, P=0.38, Power=1.0). In turn, FGS did not significantly 
affect subsequent grooming by approachers (mean before grooming (±SEM)= 0.29 
(±0.09), mean before no grooming= 0.23 (±0.02); GLMM: β ±SE = 0.36 ±0.54; 
LR=0.42, df=1, P=0.50, Power=0.74), nor deviation from DCI (GLMM: β (95%CI) = 
0.08 (-0.11 – 0.14), P=0.90, Power=0.78). Thus, no effects of grooming on food sharing 
and vice versa were found, even though the power of these models was relatively high. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence for indirect reciprocity as neither grooming 
per se (GLM: β ±SE = 0.01 ±0.02; F1,29=0.06, P=0.81, Power=0.17) nor difference in 
grooming (GLMM: β (95%CI) = -0.11 (-0.96 – 0.76), P=0.78, Power=0.41) by third 
parties to former food owners were contingent upon the previous FGS of second parties. 
Negative reciprocity: Aggression before a session did not decrease FGS (mean 
with aggression (±SEM)= 0.15 (±0.09), mean without aggression= 0.24 (±0.02); 
GLMM: β ±SE = -0.38 ±0.67; LR=16.74, df=1, P=0.74, Power=0.13) nor did FGS 
influence aggression after a sharing session (mean before aggression (±SEM)= 0.50 
(±0.50), mean before no aggression= 0.24 (±0.02); GLMM: β ±SE = 1.47 ±1.96; 
LR=0.85, df=1, P=0.53, Power=0.09). Thus, no effects of aggression on food sharing 
and vice versa were found, but the power of these models was very low, due to the 
rareness of aggression. 
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These results are summarized in Figure 3-1 a) – f). There were no qualitative 
differences between the two measures of FGS. 
 
Figure 3-1: Short-term contingencies of grooming, food sharing and aggression among the 
chimpanzees. The upper row shows the influence on food-getting success (only tolerated transfers) 
during a sharing session of previous a) grooming by the approacher, b) differences in grooming by 
the approacher, i.e. did the approacher groom the owner more or less than usual and c) aggression 
by the approacher, within one hour before a sharing session. Conversely, the lower row shows the 
influence of food-getting success during a sharing session on subsequent d) grooming by the 
approacher, e) differences in grooming by the approacher, i.e. did the approacher groom the owner 
more or less than usual and f) aggression by the approacher, within one hour after a sharing 
session. Boxplots show median lines and quartiles. The plotted lines are the ones estimated by a 
simple linear regression model. None of the effects were significant (see text). 
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Bonobos 
 
Positive reciprocity: Among the bonobos, food-getting success was significantly 
increased by previous grooming (mean with grooming (±SEM)= 0.21 (±0.12), mean 
without grooming= 0.06 (±0.06); GLM: β ±SE = 3.37 ±1.78; F1,59=5.30, P<0.05, 
Power=0.35) and increased with a statistical trend by differences in DCI of grooming 
(GLM: β ±SE = 2.10 ±1.06; F1,59=3.34, P=0.07, Power=0.76). However, these results 
were only found with FGS based on tolerated transfers, the results for FGS including 
forced transfers were not significant (Grooming yes/no: mean with grooming (±SEM)= 
0.25 (±0.13), mean without grooming= 0.26 (±0.06); Difference in DCI: GLM: β ±SE = 
1.04 ±1.00; F1,59= 0.27, P=0.61, Power=0.06; GLM: β ±SE = 0.92 ±0.74; F1,59= 2.38, 
P=0.13, Power=0.79). In turn, food-getting success did not influence subsequent 
grooming (mean before grooming (±SEM)= 0.11 (±0.04), mean before no grooming= 
0.06 (±0.02); GLMM: β ±SE = 0.72 ±0.58; LR=1.43, df=1, P=0.28, Power=0.29) nor 
deviation from DCI after a session (GLMM: β (95%CI) = -0.05 (-0.30 – 0.20), P=0.72, 
Power=0.21). Thus, some evidence for short-term contingency was found among the 
bonobos, but only for an effect of grooming on sharing (and probably not vice versa, 
although the power of these models was low) and only for tolerated transfers. 
Negative reciprocity: FGS of tolerated transfers was not significantly decreased 
by previous aggression (mean with aggression (±SEM)= 0.05 (±0.04), mean without 
aggression= 0.13 (±0.03); GLMM: β ±SE = -1.37 ±0.79; LR=55.35, df=1, P=0.81, 
Power=0.21), however, FGS including forced transfers was (mean with aggression 
(±SEM)= 0.13 (±0.06), mean without aggression= 0.30 (±0.04); GLM: β ±SE = -1.04 
±0.60; F1,135= 4.20, P<0.05, Power=0.43). In turn, FGS did not influence subsequent 
aggression (mean before aggression (±SEM)= 0.02 (±0.02), mean before no 
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aggression= 0.09 (±0.02); GLMM: β ±SE = -1.71 ±1.37; LR=2.24, df=1, P=0.20, 
Power=0.26). Thus, there was some evidence for retaliation as aggression decreased the 
chance of taking food by force, but no evidence for punishment (although power here 
again is low). These results are summarized in Figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2: Short-term contingencies of grooming, food sharing and aggression among the bonobos. 
The upper row shows the influence on food-getting success (only tolerated transfers) during a 
sharing session of previous a) grooming by the approacher, b) differences in grooming by the 
approacher, i.e. did the approacher groom the owner more or less than usual and c) aggression by 
the approacher, within one hour before a sharing session. The lower row shows the influence on 
food-getting success during a sharing session on subsequent d) grooming by the approacher, e) 
differences in grooming by the approacher, i.e. did the approacher groom the owner more or less 
than usual and f) aggression by the approacher, within one hour after a sharing session. Plots are 
the same as in Figure 3-1. Significant effects were found for a) and b). An effect for c) was only 
found for FGS including forced transfers. No significant effects were found for d)-f) but the effects 
do go into the expected direction and statistical power of the models was low 
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Discussion 
 
 The only evidence for short-term contingencies we found was that bonobos had 
higher food-getting success if they groomed the food owner previously, but only for 
tolerated food transfers. Since all food transfers among the bonobos were passive 
(Jaeggi et al. 2010), this indicates that previous grooming selectively increased the food 
owners tolerance towards the approacher thus leading to decreased resistance and a 
higher chance of being allowed to take food. There was no difference between the two 
variables of grooming (did the approacher groom the owner yes or no; did the 
approacher groom the owner more or less than usual), indicating that the effect was not 
driven by a calculation of exchanged services but only by the act of grooming per se. 
The fact that sharing did not lead to more subsequent grooming suggests that being 
allowed to take food does not increase the motivation to groom, possibly because the 
former service is passive while the latter is active. Hence the effect only works the other 
way around. Since grooming is well known to increase endorphin levels in the groomee 
(Dunbar 2010), a proximate mechanism for this effect is easily found. Thus, we define 
“grooming effect” as a short-term increase in tolerance towards the groomer, which can 
lead to contingent reciprocity, given the possibility of exchange after grooming. On a 
cognitive level, the grooming effect thus requires some memory in order to be partner 
specific (de Waal 1997), but no mental scorekeeping or calculation. The fact that no 
grooming effect could be observed in the chimpanzee group may indicate that sharing 
tolerance was already at ceiling level. Hence, grooming effects could not override long-
term tolerance due to symmetry-based reciprocity among the chimpanzees. 
 We suggest that almost all positive results of naturalistic studies testing short-
term contingencies can be explained by the grooming effect (Seyfarth and Cheney 1984; 
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Hemelrijk 1994; de Waal 1997; Koyama et al. 2006; Table 3-1). Unfortunately none of 
these studies tested the effect the other way around, i.e. whether another service leads to 
more subsequent grooming, which could have allowed further scrutiny of the proximate 
mechanism. Future naturalistic studies testing for short-term contingency in other 
services, e.g. support after food sharing might help separating the grooming effect from 
other possible mechanisms for short-term contingencies. The lack of possibility for 
grooming effects may be one reason why more artificial experimental studies with 
lower ecological validity hardly ever found a positive effect (Table 3-1). Some of the 
results of studies that did find contingent reciprocity in the absence of grooming can still 
be explained by cognitively relatively simple mechanisms such as attitudinal reciprocity 
(de Waal 2000; de Waal and Berger 2000; Hauser et al. 2003). Only one study thus may 
infer calculated reciprocity (Dufour et al. 2009), suggesting that while maybe not 
beyond the cognitive capacities of primates, such calculative types of exchange are 
probably absent in nature and the fact that they may be elicited in artificial experiments 
may show the species’ potential rather than its typical behavior (Noë 2006; Jaeggi et al. 
in press). 
While most animals, and in particular primates engage in long-term stable 
relationships within which services are exchanged in a symmetrical way (Brosnan and 
de Waal 2002; Silk 2002), more contingent forms of reciprocity may only be necessary 
when interacting with relative strangers, with whom the chances of re-interacting are 
low and the temptation to cheat are thus high. Thus, calculated exchanges probably 
represent the basis of trade in humans (Brosnan and Beran 2009) and may only have 
arisen, or at least become a prominent feature of human interactions, when people 
started to engage in trade. Hence, regular use of calculated reciprocity may not date 
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back much earlier than the first archeological evidence for long-distance trade of raw 
materials in the Pleistocene (Klein 1999). 
 There was no evidence for punishment or retaliation in either species. Although 
it could be argued that our statistical power was too low to detect such effects, the fact 
that aggression was very rare after sharing sessions already indicates that punishment is 
not a prominent feature of sharing interactions. Furthermore, the long-term analyses 
(Appendix 3-1) also do not indicate a role of aggression in maintaining sharing 
generosity, contrary to earlier claims (de Waal 1989). These results indicate that 
chimpanzees and bonobos in this study did not have strong expectations about sharing 
interactions and were not outraged when not being allowed to take food. In contrast, 
strong sharing norms exist in all human societies, although actual physical punishment 
may also be relatively rare (Gurven 2004). These stronger expectations with regard to 
food sharing can be explained by the high interdependence of foragers where each 
family may depend on food subsidies from others on a majority of days (Gurven and 
Hill 2009). However, it is possible that sharing expectations among primates are higher 
when individuals cooperated to produce a food source such as in hunting in the wild 
(Boesch and Boesch 1989) or cooperation experiments in captivity (de Waal and Berger 
2000). 
 We found no evidence that third parties groomed former food owners depending 
on their sharing generosity to others. (In fact, there was also no indication that third 
parties groomed former food owners more regardless of their sharing generosity, thus 
not confirming the hypothesis that owning food per se makes individuals socially more 
attractive (Moore 1984; see Appendix 3-2)). Hence, we conclude that third parties do 
not have expectations about the sharing generosity of others and indirect reciprocity is 
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unlikely to occur among chimpanzees in this context. Theoretical considerations and 
models indicate that direct reciprocity should prevail over indirect reciprocity as long as 
direct experience is cheap and chances of re-interacting are high (Nowak 2006). Thus, 
indirect reciprocity only becomes an important force in the evolution of cooperation 
when group sizes are large and the chances for direct reciprocity small (Roberts 2008), 
which is clearly not the case in zoo apes. During human evolution, indirect reciprocity 
possibly only arose as a response to increasing group size as well as the fission-fusion 
nature of foraging societies, which decreased the chances for direct experience with any 
potential cooperation partner (Alexander 1987; Kaplan et al. 2009). 
 In summary, we conclude that the observed short-term contingencies can be 
explained by a simple proximate mechanism, the grooming effect, which leads to 
selectively increased tolerance towards the former groomer, thus allowing more food 
transfers. The grooming effect, rather than calculated exchanges, may explain most of 
the short-term contingencies observed among non-human primates, although calculated 
exchanges are probably not beyond the cognitive capacities of (at least some) primates. 
Thus we conclude that long-term exchange is more common and more important among 
non-human primates while calculative types of exchange may only have arisen in 
humans with the need to engage in trade with relative strangers. Similarly, punishment 
and indirect reciprocity do not seem to be part of the food sharing reciprocity system of 
chimpanzees and bonobos and among humans are related to increased interdependence 
and group size of forager societies.
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Chapter 4: On the psychology of cooperation in humans and 
other primates: Combining the natural history and experimental 
evidence of prosociality 
 
Jaeggi AV, Burkart JM & van Schaik CP (in press) Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B – Biological Sciences  
 
In any given species, cooperation involves prosocial acts that usually return a 
fitness benefit to the actor. These acts are produced by a set of psychological rules, 
which will be similar in related species if they have a similar natural history of 
cooperation. Prosocial acts can be (i) reactive, i.e. in response to specific stimuli, or (ii) 
proactive, i.e. occur in the absence of such stimuli. We propose that reactive prosocial 
acts reflect sensitivity to (a) signs and signals of need and (b) the presence and size of 
an audience, as modified by (c) social distance to the partner or partners. We examine 
the evidence for these elements in humans and other animals, especially non-human 
primates, based on the natural history of cooperation, quantified in the context of food 
sharing, and various experimental paradigms. The comparison suggests that humans 
share with their closest living relatives reactive responses to signals of need, but differ 
in sensitivity to signs of need and cues of being watched, as well as in the presence of 
proactive prosociality. We discuss ultimate explanations for these derived features, in 
particular the adoption of cooperative breeding as well as concern for reputation and 
costly signalling during human evolution. 
 
 
The psychology of cooperation in humans and primates 94 
Introduction 
 
Cooperative and altruistic behaviours can be favoured by natural selection if 
they increase the inclusive fitness of the actor (see Brosnan and Bshary in press; 
Lehmann and Rousset in press). The conditions under which this is the case are now 
well known (ibid.). However, which proximate mechanisms make an actor engage in 
such behaviours is less well understood. Here we focus on the prosocial acts, i.e. acts of 
help or assistance to others (Silk 2007), which together constitute cooperative and 
altruistic behaviour as defined by Brosnan and Bshary (in press). We propose that these 
acts are regulated by a set of psychological rules (henceforth: rules) that on average 
produce fitness-increasing behaviour. For instance, the rule to adjust prosocial acts to 
the recipient’s need and preferentially directing them towards partners that reciprocated 
in the past is generally adaptive, because it maximises the return benefits through 
reciprocity (Trivers 1971), whatever exact cognitive or emotional mechanisms underlie 
it. 
The idea that behaviour is produced by a set of rules follows the tradition of 
classical ethologists, who attempted to identify the corresponding intrinsic motivations 
and responses to extrinsic stimuli (Tinbergen 1951). In Figure 4-1, the intrinsic 
motivation is indicated by the intercept b, whereas the tendency to respond to extrinsic 
stimuli is indicated by the slope of the response a. Because natural selection works by 
modifying these rules over time, it is parsimonious to assume that they are similar in 
closely related species due to homology (de Waal 1991). Specifically, this view implies 
that humans and great apes are likely to have a similar psychology underlying prosocial 
acts. However, the psychology may change when one taxon evolves a different style of 
cooperation from that of its sister group, as we will argue for humans and great apes, 
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which could lead to convergent evolution with other taxa that evolved similar patterns 
of cooperation. Thus, the goal of this paper is to examine the psychological rules 
underlying prosocial behaviour in humans, based on natural history and experimental 
evidence, and to compare them with those of other primates, and in particular our 
closest living relatives, the great apes. The potential endocrinological correlates of these 
rules are discussed elsewhere (Soares et al. in press). We identify features in which 
humans generally differ from other animals and discuss hypotheses explaining the 
evolution of these features. (For the purpose of this chapter we ignore the large 
intraspecific variation documented in humans with respect to cooperative and anti-social 
behaviour (Gaechter et al. in press).) 
 
The natural history of cooperation 
 
Human foragers, whose ecology and social organisation are probably closest to 
the conditions under which our psychology evolved (Tooby and Cosmides 2005), 
systematically and frequently engage in various forms of cooperation. Thus, common 
prosocial acts include voluntary food sharing both with kin and non-kin, allo-maternal 
child care, division of labour, care for the sick, injured and elderly, information 
donation (teaching), cooperative hunting, collective warfare, etc. (Gurven 2004; Kaplan 
and Gurven 2005; Marlowe 2007; Gurven and Hill 2009; Hrdy 2009; Kaplan et al. 
2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010). Prosocial acts occur within family units, including 
pair-bonded partners and their offspring, and also among family units within local 
groups. Their pervasiveness suggests that they return high fitness benefits to actors. 
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Figure 4-1: Prosocial behaviour as a function of extrinsic stimulus strength and intrinsic prosocial 
motivation. In humans, these stimuli can be perceived need of the recipient and/or the perceived 
presence and size of an audience. Social distance to the partner further modifies the prosocial 
response, i.e. at a given point xi, kin, reciprocating partners or in-group members will generally 
elicit a higher prosocial response. Thus, prosocial behaviour in response to these stimuli may be 
called reactive. Eventually, the response will reach ceiling levels, as indicated by the dashed curve. If 
the intrinsic motivation b is greater than zero, prosocial behaviour may occur even in the absence of 
such stimuli and can thus be called proactive. However, since in practice it may be impossible to 
exclude all extrinsic stimuli, experiments trying to do so may measure prosociality at 0’ rather than 
0 and proactive thus refers to either a high intrinsic motivation or a high sensitivity to the 
remaining stimuli, as indicated by the dashed lines leading to 0. Ultimately, natural selection can 
work by changing the sensitivity to stimuli, a, and/or the intrinsic motivation, b, depending on the 
average certainty of return benefits to the actor. Humans have probably acquired a greater 
intrinsic prosocial motivation, as well as a higher response to extrinsic stimuli since their divergence 
from great apes 
 
Among great apes, cooperation is less common and prosocial acts are less 
pervasive (Melis and Semmann in press). Food sharing is generally reluctant and rarely 
active, even among kin (Figure 4-2, discussed in detail below), there is little evidence 
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for teaching (reviewed by Humle et al. 2009; Jaeggi et al. 2010a) and allo-maternal 
child care is virtually absent, as is care for the disabled beyond grooming (Hrdy 2009; 
van Schaik and Burkart 2010). Among chimpanzees, the most common forms of 
cooperation involve closely bonded males, such as in mutual support in conflicts (Watts 
2002; Gilby et al. 2009), cooperative hunting (Boesch and Boesch 1989; Boesch 1994; 
Watts and Mitani 2002) and inter-community warfare (Manson and Wrangham 1991). 
This indicates that prosocial acts among great apes on average yield lower fitness 
benefits to actors, with the possible exception of chimpanzee males, who seem to profit 
more from cooperation. Probably this is due to the relatively low average relatedness of 
chimpanzees and the resulting reliance on direct reciprocity for many aspects of 
cooperation (Langergraber et al. 2007; Langergraber et al. 2009), as well as the absence 
of strong pair-bonds.  
Species other than great apes show more parallels with humans with respect to 
the natural history of cooperation. In particular, voluntary food sharing, teaching, allo-
maternal care and care for the injured are more common in cooperative breeders such as 
callitrichid monkeys or social carnivores (Kühme 1965; Brotherton et al. 2001; Clutton-
Brock et al. 2001; MacDonald and Sillero-Zubiri 2004; Thornton and Raihani 2008; 
Hrdy 2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010). This indicates that cooperative breeders 
enjoy higher return benefits from prosocial acts and are more prone to engage in them. 
Could this similarity with humans reflect convergent evolution? 
Humans can also be called cooperative breeders, since they show high levels of 
infant care by older siblings, husbands, and grandmothers (reviewed by van Schaik and 
Burkart 2010). In contrast, great ape females are independent breeders who receive no 
help in rearing their young (Hrdy 2009). While most great apes, and in particular 
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females with offspring, are relatively solitary in order to avoid feeding competition (van 
Schaik 1999; Stumpf 2007), cooperative breeders typically form family groups, 
including at least one bonded pair and multiple offspring, both dependent and 
independent (Clutton-Brock 2002; Chapais 2008). Within this expanded kin network, 
prosocial acts should be under more positive selection and the underlying psychology 
could change accordingly. Thus, the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis states that some 
convergent evolution between humans and other cooperative breeders explains the 
emergence of psychological and cognitive features in humans not shared by the other 
apes (Burkart et al. 2009; Hrdy 2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010). 
Humans may also differ from chimpanzees in two other important aspects of 
cooperation. Firstly, there is substantial interdependence among foragers, because the 
returns from individual foraging are smaller than the ones from cooperative foraging 
and hunting returns are large but so unpredictable that sharing became a survival 
necessity (Kaplan et al. 2009). Thus, a solitary human forager, in stark contrast to a 
solitary chimpanzee, is always worse off than a cooperative forager. Furthermore, the 
fission-fusion dynamics of foragers allow for considerable partner choice, thus 
restraining selfish tendencies due to the risk of losing valuable cooperation partners 
(ibid.). These two aspects combined caused the necessity to establish and maintain a 
cooperative reputation. Thus, non-cooperative individuals may face substantial costs 
imposed by the “moral community” (Boehm 1999) ranging from shunning over overt 
accusations to ostracism and violence (Boehm 1999; Gurven 2004; Marlowe 2009). 
These potentially high costs exerted by others on cheaters probably led to a hyper-
awareness of the risk of being detected, i.e. a conscience (Trivers 1971; DeScioli and 
Kurzban 2009), functioning to anticipate others’ reactions and thus avoid these costs. 
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Combined with large group sizes and the possibility to spread reputations through 
language as gossip in a fission-fusion society (Dunbar 2004), concern for reputation 
should thus have lead to an increased sensitivity to being watched by others. Secondly, 
individuals, and in particular men, may signal cooperative tendencies and their own 
qualities to large audiences in order to increase their chances of being chosen as 
cooperation partners or mates (Smith and Bliege Bird 2005). Thus, costly signalling 
theory also predicts sensitivity to the presence and size of an audience, in order to 
maximize the broadcasting efficiency of costly signals. 
Hence, some aspects of human cooperation are probably homologous with our 
closest relatives, in particular with regard to mutualism and direct reciprocity (hunting, 
warfare, agonistic support) whereas others are better explained by convergence with 
cooperative breeders, probably due to increased kin networks and strong pair-bonds, 
and yet others are probably uniquely derived, viz. concern for reputation and the 
broadcasting of prosocial acts to large audiences. These aspects of the natural history of 
cooperation are likely to affect the psychological rules regulating prosocial acts. 
 
Psychological rules underlying prosociality 
 
 As indicated in Figure 4-1, we propose that prosocial behaviour can be reactive, 
i.e. triggered by extrinsic stimuli (with a positive slope a); or proactive, i.e. in the 
absence of any obvious extrinsic stimuli, indicated by the intrinsic motivation b. Note 
that common definitions of altruism in other fields, such as in psychology (Batson 
1991) or philosophy (Kitcher 1998) mainly refer to proactive prosociality and may not 
consider prosocial behaviour in response to explicit stimuli altruistic. 
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 In general, the steepness of the response (a) will have been moulded by natural 
selection according to the average probability of return benefits to the actor. As both kin 
selection and reciprocity theory predict that prosocial acts should be adjusted to the 
recipient’s need in order to achieve the greatest potential benefit (Hamilton 1964; 
Trivers 1971), actors should be sensitive to signals or signs of need. Note that 
responding to signals of need usually requires no special abilities, because they are 
directed at the actor and have specifically evolved in a form that most successfully 
elicited the desired response (Zahavi 1987). However, the ability to correctly read signs 
of need (not directed to actor) may often depend on theory-of-mind capacities. Thus, 
actors with a well-developed theory of mind may be better at perceiving adequate 
situations for prosocial acts which should lead to a steeper slope a. Furthermore, the 
importance of maintaining a cooperative reputation and the opportunities for costly 
signalling predict that actors should be sensitive to the (perceived) presence and size of 
an audience (Trivers 1971; Smith and Bliege Bird 2005; DeScioli and Kurzban 2009; 
Earley in press). Hence, an increase in either perceived need and/or perceived signalling 
opportunities (along the x-axis of Figure 4-1) should lead to increased prosocial 
behaviour. Finally, the social distance to the recipient should function as a modifier of 
the prosocial response. Thus, all other things being equal (same x-value), close kin and 
reciprocating partners (friends) should elicit a higher prosocial response, because the 
average return benefit to the actor is greater. 
 
Identifying psychological rules 
 
 In humans, the presence of prosocial behaviour in response to specific stimuli 
can be shown with so-called “titration experiments”, by keeping all other stimuli 
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constant and only changing the one of interest. For instance, dictator games, in which a 
dictator can allocate any amount of received money to a potential recipient, can be 
played under varying conditions, e.g. including subtle cues of being watched (Haley and 
Fessler 2005; Rigdon et al. 2009). The increase in contribution when a dictator feels 
observed allows us to conclude that they are sensitive to having an audience, even 
though this sensitivity may be entirely subconscious. 
A prosocial act in the absence of extrinsic stimuli may be called proactive 
prosociality (b in Figure 4-1). This is more controversial, since the notion that all 
extrinsic stimuli can be excluded in controlled experiments can be questioned (e.g. 
Trivers 2006; Bardsley 2008). Thus, it may be safer to assume that experiments take 
place at 0’ rather than 0 (see Figure 4-1), where extrinsic stimuli have been excluded or 
controlled for as much as possible, but some residual stimuli may remain. Hence there 
may be a grey area where prosocial acts can be either provoked by a high intrinsic 
motivation and/or a very strong response to subtle stimuli (high a in Figure 4-1). In 
particular, in the case of an audience, the awareness of the risk of detection may be so 
strong that actors respond prosocially to subtle cues of being watched or just the idea of 
being watched. In this view, conscience thus functions to anticipate reactions by a 
potential audience (Trivers 1971; DeScioli and Kurzban 2009). Similarly, in the case of 
need, actors could respond to just the slightest signs of need in a potential recipient if 
their theory of mind capacities are well developed, or they could respond to the idea of 
the recipient being in need. If this is the case, many humans may never actually reach 0 
level, i.e. no experimental setting can exclude all social influences and make actors 
decide out of purely selfish considerations (Trivers 2006). 
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Among animals, and in particular non-human primates, similar experimental 
approaches have been followed. Provisioning experiments were often designed to 
reflect economic games played with humans, and have mainly focused on proactive 
prosociality. A fundamental constraint on them is that they cannot be played 
anonymously, but nonetheless, if prosocial behaviour occurs in the absence of or 
regardless of any measurable stimuli from the recipients, the plausible conclusion would 
be to infer a high intrinsic motivation (b), or a very high sensitivity to residual stimuli 
(a). Other experiments investigated prosocial acts in response to signs or signals of 
need, such as so-called targeted helping experiments. Table 4-1 gives an overview over 
the types of experiments we discuss below, as well as their main findings. In all these 
experiments, one should be aware of the risk of false positives or false negatives due to 
possible confounding effects on the subjects’ behaviour. This risk is especially high in 
experiments with low ecological validity, since they may not be understood by the 
subjects in the same way as conceived by the experimenters. Hence, one should 
examine the pattern of results as a whole, without over-emphasising single studies, and 
validate them through consistency with the natural history. 
Another line of evidence we therefore examine is naturally occurring food 
sharing. Defined as the tolerated transfer of food from A (the owner) to B (the 
recipient), food sharing is a common form of prosocial behaviour among primates 
(Feistner and McGrew 1989; Brown et al. 2004; Rapaport and Brown 2008). However, 
food sharing is clearly not homogeneous among primates with respect to the underlying 
psychology. In most species transfers are mainly passive, even among kin, while in 
others food owners may actively promote transfers by “offering” (Feistner and McGrew 
1989), thus showing stronger prosocial dispositions. Here we present a quantification of 
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these ways in which food is transferred (Figure 4-2, see Appendix 4-1 for operational 
definitions), focussing on the best-studied taxa: great apes, capuchins and callitrichids 
(see Appendix 4-2 for complete list of species). In particular, we will discuss food 
offering, i.e. transfers initiated by the owner in the absence of begging, as reflecting 
proactive prosociality and active sharing upon begging as reflecting reactive 
prosociality, in response to signals of need. Tolerated taking or passive sharing, the 
most common form of food sharing among primates (Figure 4-2), is more ambiguous 
with regard to the underlying psychology since the lack of overt action could represent 
no prosocial response or an explicit absence of a negative response to the beggar. 
However, parsimony suggests that no overt action mostly reflects the absence of a 
psychological response. 
 
Evidence for psychological rules 
 
 This section summarizes empirical evidence for the proposed psychological 
rules underlying prosocial acts in humans and other primates. First, we examine reactive 
prosociality (1), in response to perceived need (a) or audience (b) and as modified by 
social distance to the recipient (c). Then we discuss the possibility of proactive 
prosociality (2), i.e. in the absence of extrinsic stimuli. In each subsection we first 
present the evidence on (i) humans and then (ii) on primates, as inferred from 
experimental evidence and food sharing. The primate evidence focuses on great apes as 
our closest living relatives, and in particular chimpanzees as the best studied species, 
but other species, in particular capuchin monkeys and callithrichid monkeys are 
mentioned throughout to illustrate parallels with humans. 
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Table 4-1: Summary of experimental outcomes measuring prosocial tendencies in primates 
Paradigm Chimpanzees Macaques Capuchins Callitrichids 
Provisioning 
games 
Negative1,2,3,4 
 
Positive10, 
negative11-13 
Positive14-16  Positive20-22 
Negative23,24 
Unilateral 
cooperation 
Tends to break 
down5,6 
 Reciprocal17,18 
 
Reciprocal25 
Sustained26 
Targeted 
helping 
Positive7-9 
 
 Positive19 
 
 
1,2,3,4(Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006; Vonk et al. 2008; Yamamoto and Tanaka 2010), 5,6(reviewed by 
Snowdon and Cronin 2007; Warneken and Tomasello 2009), 7-9(Warneken and Tomasello 2006; 
Warneken et al. 2007; Yamamoto et al. 2009), 10(but no control for simpler explanations: Massen et al. 
2010), 11-13(Mason and Hollis 1962; Colman et al. 1969; Schaub 1996), 14-16(de Waal et al. 2008; 
Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Takimoto et al. 2010), 17,18(de Waal and Berger 2000; Hattori et al. 
2005), 19(Barnes et al. 2008), 20-22(Hauser et al. 2003; Burkart et al. 2007; Cronin et al., in rev.), 
23,24(Cronin et al. 2009; Stevens 2010), 25(Hauser et al. 2003), 26(Cronin and Snowdon 2008) 
 
Reactive prosociality 
 
a) Need 
 (i) Humans routinely respond with prosocial acts to the need of the recipient as 
signalled by the latter, e.g. through an outstretched hand in a begging gesture and/or 
vocalizations, and start doing so at young ages (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Brownell 
et al. 2009). This is illustrated by the frequent reactive food sharing of young children 
(Figure 4-2). The underlying motivation is probably empathy or sympathy (Trivers 
1971; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Silk 2007; de Waal and Suchak in press). 
Furthermore, even in the absence of explicit signals of need (in the form of a directed 
solicitation), an actor can respond to signs of need. For instance, if an individual is 
trying to reach an object, an actor may respond by retrieving and handing over the 
object (Warneken and Tomasello 2006). Note that the correct interpretation of such 
signs of need depends on specific theory of mind capacities particularly well developed 
in humans (Burkart et al. 2009), which may explain why in children helping is elicited 
faster and in a broader range of contexts than in chimpanzees (Warneken and Tomasello 
2006; Warneken et al. 2007). 
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(ii) Among great apes, and in particular chimpanzees, signals of need can be 
seen in solicitation of grooming (Pika and Mitani 2006), of agonistic support (de Waal 
1982), or of food. Begging for food may sometimes elicit reactive sharing, but most 
often there is no overt response and food is shared passively (if at all), suggesting a low 
sensitivity to need (Figure 4-2). Indeed, reactive sharing may often serve to get rid of 
the beggar, even the actor’s own offspring, by giving scraps while withholding more 
valuable food (Kuroda 1984; Bard 1992; Ueno and Matsuzawa 2004), thus reflecting 
selfishness rather than prosociality. However, among adults, and in particular 
chimpanzee males, reactive sharing is somewhat more common (Figure 4-2) and may 
sometimes include large quantities of meat (Boesch and Boesch 1989; D. Watts 
pers.comm.), suggesting higher sharing motivation.  
Great apes, especially chimpanzees, are known to have relatively well-
developed theory of mind capacities (Call and Tomasello 2008) and could thus be 
expected to read and respond to recipient need. Yet, crucially, signs of need, such as 
approaching and peering at a food owner without begging hardly ever leads to sharing 
(Kuroda 1984; Jaeggi et al. 2008; Jaeggi et al. 2010b), suggesting that explicit signals 
are required for a prosocial response. 
We now turn to the experimental evidence. Begging did not induce food 
donation in provisioning games among chimpanzees (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 
2006), which may reflect low sensitivity to these signals if they are not made in 
immediate proximity. However, helping behaviour in response to explicit signals of 
need has been reported for chimpanzees (Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Warneken et 
al. 2007; Yamamoto et al. 2009) and capuchin monkeys (Barnes et al. 2008) in targeted 
helping experiments (Table 4-1). Crucially, signs of need such as struggling to solve a 
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task (Yamamoto et al. 2009) or reaching for an object without calling the subjects name 
(Warneken et al. 2007) mostly did not induce helping in chimpanzees, unless they were 
well enculturated by humans (Warneken and Tomasello 2006).  
Cooperative breeders, such as callitrichids and social carnivores may use signals 
of need in the form of specific begging calls which usually increase begging success 
(Kühme 1965; Feistner and McGrew 1989; Mech et al. 1999; Manser and Avey 2000; 
Brown et al. 2004). There is also good experimental evidence that the response to these 
vocalizations are adjusted to the beggar’s skill level (Thornton and McAuliffe 2006; 
Humle and Snowdon 2008a). Signs of need (reaching) also did not induce a prosocial 
response in callithrichids (Burkart et al. 2007; Cronin et al. 2009). Thus, cooperative 
breeders generally show reactive prosociality to signals of need, but not to signs of 
need. 
Taken together, the most striking result is not the response to signals of need, 
but rather its often reluctant nature or even absence in many species, in particular in the 
food-sharing context (Figure 4-2, Appendix 4-2), as well as the unresponsiveness to 
signs of need. These findings and the fact that, at least among chimpanzees, theory of 
mind capacities are better developed in competitive rather than cooperative situations 
(Hare and Tomasello 2004) suggest that in this species prosocial responses to signals 
and signs of need have not been under the same positive selection as in humans, i.e. that 
the slope a in Figure 4-1 is shallower. 
b) Audience 
 (i) The (perceived) presence and size of an audience can increase prosocial 
behaviour among humans in natural situations (Smith and Bliege Bird 2005) as well as 
in various experiments, where subtle eye cues or actual audiences increased 
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contributions in dictator games (Marlowe 2004; Haley and Fessler 2005; Rigdon et al. 
2009), public goods games (Milinski et al. 2002; Bateson et al. 2006; Burnham and 
Hare 2007) and trust games (Fehr and Schneider 2010). This adjustment to a potential 
audience may be largely unconscious (cf. Bateson et al. 2006). Finally, the fact that 
some of the effects are entirely driven by men (e.g. Rigdon et al. 2009) may indicate 
costly signalling while the response to more explicit reputation incentives (e.g. Fehr and 
Schneider 2010) may indicate a general concern for reputation. 
(ii) Among animals, sensitivity to presence of an audience is expected when 
individuals have to maintain a cooperative reputation or advertise their own qualities in 
the face of considerable partner choice. While this has been nicely shown in fish 
(Bshary and Grutter 2006), only anecdotal observations suggest that chimpanzee males 
rising in rank may use food sharing to signal generosity to the whole group (de Waal 
1982). The number of beggars positively affects the amount of food shared among 
chimpanzees and bonobos (Fruth and Hohmann 2002; Gilby 2006), but this has been 
interpreted as reflecting increased harassment rather than signalling generosity. So far, 
no controlled experiments have been done to investigate the role of an audience on 
prosocial behaviour. 
A precondition for audience effects on cooperative behaviour is that the 
potential audience actually attends to interactions between others and uses this 
information to build reputations. There is much evidence that animals eavesdrop on 
others’ interactions (e.g. Bshary and Grutter 2006), but amongst primates eavesdropping 
mainly concerns dominance interactions (Bergman et al. 2003) or sexual behaviour 
(Crockford et al. 2007) rather than prosocial acts (see Earley in press). Recent 
experiments have shown that chimpanzees, but not capuchins (Brosnan and de Waal 
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2009), can learn to distinguish between a prosocial and a selfish human experimenter 
(Russell et al. 2008; Subiaul et al. 2008), suggesting that the audience can build 
prosocial reputations. However, as noted above, no experiments have tested whether 
actors respond to a greater number of observers with more prosociality. Furthermore, 
there is hardly any evidence that non-cooperative behaviour is punished by others 
(Jensen in press). Thus, more studies are clearly needed to investigate audience effects 
in nonhuman primates in the context of prosociality. 
c) Social distance 
 (i) In humans, all other things being equal, partners with whom the actor has a 
strong affiliative bond based on either kinship or friendship can elicit more prosocial 
acts than enemies or neutral persons (e.g. Birch and Billman 1986; Eisenberg and 
Mussen 1989; Majolo et al. 2006) and in-group members are favoured over out-group 
members (Goette et al. 2006; Fehr et al. 2008). There is also clear evidence that these 
prosocial acts are further influenced by the recent history of interactions, taking e.g. 
indebtedness into account (e.g. Eisenberg and Mussen 1989). The underlying emotions 
here are probably feelings of gratitude or guilt (Trivers 1971), which can thus have 
short-term effects on perceived social distance. 
(ii) Many animals have some way of recognizing or preferentially interacting 
with their close kin if they have the opportunity to do so (Chapais 2006; Silk 2006). 
Furthermore, unrelated individuals in many species of primates form long-term social 
bonds, called friendships (Silk 2002), characterized by reciprocal exchange of grooming 
and other social commodities such as coalitionary support or food sharing (Brown et al. 
2004; Schino 2007; Schino and Aureli 2008; Schino and Aureli 2009; Jaeggi and van 
Schaik in review). Hence, there is a clear preference among primates to direct prosocial 
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acts to kin or reciprocating partners (friends). The recent history of interactions, i.e. 
indebtedness, may also sometimes be taken into account (e.g. Hemelrijk 1994; de Waal 
1997; de Waal 2000). 
 Nonetheless, controlled experiments in which subjects were given a choice to act 
prosocially towards a relative, friend or a neutral partner were largely inconclusive. 
Chimpanzees did not provide more food to kin than to non-kin (Jensen et al. 2006; 
Yamamoto and Tanaka 2010) and neither did macaques (Schaub 1996). Only capuchin 
monkeys differentiated between kin, familiar and unfamiliar partners (de Waal et al. 
2008). Thus, even though natural observations clearly indicate partner specificity in 
prosociality, as predicted by kin selection or reciprocity, many provisioning experiments 
surprisingly indicated a complete absence of prosociality. This may again indicate that 
prosocial acts among many primates, even to relatives or friends, need to be elicited by 
immediate and salient stimuli, such as continuous begging (cf. Yamamoto and Tanaka 
2009b), which was not possible in these experiments. This notion is supported by the 
fact that among most primates virtually all food sharing, even with infants, is in 
response to begging (Figure 4-2, Appendix 4-2). 
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Figure 4-2: Percentages of all tolerated food transfers among different primate species in which the 
owner shared proactively (offering) or reactively (active giving or facilitated taking upon begging). 
The remaining transfers were passive (tolerated taking). See Appendix 4-1 for operational 
definitions and Appendix 4-2 for a full reference list including additional species. Bars represent 
means of different studies, i.e. the percentage of each type of transfer from each study, or 
independent study group is counted as one data point. The numbers above the bars indicate the 
number of independent data points contributing to these means. Inf.= sharing with infants, ad.= 
sharing among adults 
 
Proactive prosociality 
 
(i) Proactive sharing or helping occurs in experiments with human children 
(Birch and Billman 1986; Rao and Stewart 1999; Warneken and Tomasello 2006), but it 
is difficult to exclude possible signs or signals of need in these paradigms. In one-shot 
dictator games in which anonymity and large social distance are ensured as much as 
possible and the need of the recipient is unknown, the average contributions are always 
above zero (although many players actually do give zero), indicating that at least a 
subset of individuals is prosocial in the absence of any stimuli (see Camerer 2003, Table 
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2.3 for a compilation of various studies). These experiments thus led to the conclusion 
that humans are at least occasionally motivated by other-regarding preferences 
(Camerer 2003). 
(ii) Among non-human primates, proactive prosociality can be seen in food 
offering, i.e. when food owners initiate sharing in the absence of begging or other signs 
of interest by the recipient (Feistner and McGrew 1989). Offering has been reported 
occasionally for a number of species (see Figure 4-2, Appendix 4-2 for species not in 
the figure). However, regular offering is only seen among callitrichids, where parents 
and helpers give specific food calls to invite transfers to the infants (Figure 4-2). This 
indicates a strong motivation to share and suppression of own feeding motivations 
among callitrichids, which is further supported by the facts that preferred food is more 
likely to be offered (Feistner and Chamove 1986; Ferrari 1987), animals offer more 
when infants are out of sight (e.g. Ferrari 1987; contrary to capuchins: de Waal et al. 
2008), and they offer food to other adults (Rapaport 2001) or even to infants of different 
species (Feistner and Price 1999). This strong sharing motivation among callitrichids is 
in line with the high motivation to carry infants (Hrdy 2009), despite the substantial cost 
associated with it (Schradin and Anzenberger 2001). Non-primate cooperative breeders 
may show similarly high motivations to help and share (Kühme 1965; Clutton-Brock et 
al. 2001). 
Since proactive prosociality has been claimed for humans mainly on the basis of 
non-zero contributions in dictator games (Camerer 2003), similar games have been 
designed to test primates (see provisioning games in Table 4-1). In chimpanzees, four 
studies did not find any evidence for proactive prosociality, even in mother-offspring 
dyads (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006; Vonk et al. 2008; Yamamoto and Tanaka 
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2010). In macaques there was also hardly any evidence for prosociality in provisioning 
games (Mason and Hollis 1962; Colman et al. 1969; Schaub 1996). (A recent study did 
report provisioning from dominants to subordinates (Massen et al. 2010). However, it 
did not find sharing in the opposite direction, and the experimental set-up did not rule 
out the simpler explanation that dominants prefer to sit close to subordinates (e.g. so as 
to induce being groomed), whereas the latter avoid the former (to avoid aggression). 
Furthermore, generous behaviour by dominants is in stark contrast to the natural history 
of this despotic species, where most grooming is directed up the hierarchy (Schino & 
Aureli 2008) and food sharing is virtually absent (Jaeggi & van Schaik in review). 
Hence the null model of no proactive prosociality is not convincingly rejected). In 
capuchin monkeys, mainly positive evidence has been reported (de Waal et al. 2008; 
Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Takimoto et al. 2010). In callitrichids, some 
studies report positive evidence for common marmosets (Burkart et al. 2007) and 
cotton-top tamarins (Hauser et al. 2003; Cronin et al. in rev.), but others do not (Cronin 
et al. 2009; Stevens 2010). Because the positive evidence is less easily explained away 
and here is consistent with the natural history, the preliminary conclusion that 
callitrichids show proactive prosociality seems warranted. 
A high intrinsic motivation to act prosocially may also be expressed in so-called 
unilateral cooperation games (Table 4-1), in which only one of two individuals is 
rewarded for a task solved by both. In these games, cooperation tends to break down 
among chimpanzees (reviewed by Warneken and Tomasello 2009). Among capuchins, 
unilateral cooperation works if the role of recipient is alternated (de Waal and Berger 
2000; Hattori et al. 2005), allowing for immediate reciprocation. Among tamarins, in 
contrast, it is sustained over long periods without alteration of rewards or signals of 
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need (Cronin and Snowdon 2008). Thus, a high intrinsic prosocial motivation 
apparently allows them to keep cooperation going in the absence of immediate rewards. 
 
Discussion 
 
Methodological issues 
 
 Before drawing conclusions from the evidence reviewed above it is important to 
eliminate potential confounding effects. In particular, we discuss the possibilities that 
primates may be more prosocial in non-food vs. food tasks and that rearing and housing 
conditions may affect levels of prosociality. 
Firstly, it has been suggested that prosociality is more pronounced in non-food 
contexts (e.g. de Waal et al. 2008; Warneken and Tomasello 2009; Yamamoto and 
Tanaka 2009b) perhaps due to an obsession with food and the associated lack of 
inhibitory control in provisioning experiments. The evidence for non-food prosociality 
among chimpanzees includes targeted helping (Table 4-1) as well as other contexts such 
as adoption of orphans (Boesch et al. 2010). However, in these contexts prosociality is 
also mainly reactive, thus not contradicting the main findings here. Furthermore, tool 
sharing by great ape mothers, a non-food context, seems to be equally reactive as food 
sharing, happening virtually only upon request by the infant (Hirata and Celli 2003b; 
Lonsdorf 2006; C. Sanz et al. in prep.; cf. Figure 4-2). Hence, the psychological 
regulation of prosociality seems similar in food or non-food contexts. 
 Secondly, rearing and housing conditions may affect subjects’ performance in 
experiments (Boesch 2007). For instance, the degree of enculturation, through hand-
rearing or daily interactions with animal keepers is likely to affect subjects’ psychology. 
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In particular, since many prosociality paradigms reflect typical human interactions, 
sometimes with little ecological validity for the primates, enculturated individuals are 
more likely to grasp the idea of the paradigm. For instance, the subjects of Warneken et 
al. (2007) were housed in the chimpanzee sanctuary of Ngamba Island, where the 
chimpanzees receive their daily food in bowls which they have to actively hand to the 
keepers. This may well have influenced their performance in a very similar experiment 
in which they had to retrieve an object and hand it to a human experimenter (ibid.). This 
is not to say that the experimental results are flawed, but they may reflect the species’ 
potential rather than species-typical behaviour. Thus, if enculturated chimpanzees can 
learn to be more prosocial, the conditions under which this is the case may help explain 
how our own species came to evolve in this direction, but it need not necessarily inform 
us about chimpanzee-typical prosociality.  
 
Reconstructing the evolution of human prosociality 
 
Despite these uncertainties, some general conclusions about similarities and 
differences in the psychological regulation of prosociality in the best-studied species 
can be drawn. These are summarized in Table 4-2. We infer the presence of three 
components with different evolutionary histories: one shared with other apes, especially 
chimpanzees, a second acquired due to the adoption of cooperative breeding and 
probably shared with other cooperative breeders, and a third one acquired uniquely due 
to living in large, fission-fusion societies with high interdependence amongst 
individuals. 
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Table 4-2: Summary of the main findings regarding the proximate regulation of prosocial acts in 
the best studied species 
Rule Humans Chimpanzees Capuchins Callitrichids Evoluationary 
status 
Needa ++ 
(signs and 
signals)e 
+ 
(signals) 
+ 
(signals) 
+ 
(signals) 
homologous 
Audienceb ++ (-) (-) (-) uniquely derived 
Social distancec ++ + ++ + homologous 
Proactived ++ -- + ++ convergence 
a-c Do actors adjust prosociality to a the perceived need of the recipient, b the perceived presence and size 
of an audience, or c the social distance to the recipient? 
d Do prosocial acts occur in the absence of obvious extrinsic stimuli, thus reflecting a high intrinsic 
prosocial motivation? 
e Signs of need by the recipient, such as reaching for an object or struggling with a task, are not directed at 
the actor and probably require some theory of mind capacities to be correctly read; signals of need, such 
as begging or calling, on the other hand are explicitly directed at the actor 
++ regular in experimental and natural context; + regular in at least one context; -- absent in both 
contexts; (-) possibly absent but no controlled experiments (cf. Table 4-1, Figure 4-2, text) 
 
Humans are both regularly proactively prosocial, thus reflecting a high intrinsic 
prosocial motivation, and highly responsive to extrinsic stimuli. Chimpanzees, in 
contrast, are hardly ever proactively prosocial and their reactive prosociality generally 
depends on salient and immediate signals of need such as continuous solicitations (cf. 
Yamamoto and Tanaka 2009b). This agrees with the notion that chimpanzee 
cooperation among adults mainly rests on direct reciprocity, which is clearly indicated 
by the presence of long-term social bonds (friendships, Silk 2002) within which favours 
are exchanged symmetrically (e.g. Watts 2002; Mitani 2006) and by the low average 
relatedness within these cooperative relationships (Langergraber et al. 2007; 
Langergraber et al. 2009). Hence chimpanzees are a good example for both the scope 
and limits of cooperation based on direct reciprocity: The establishment of long-term 
friendships and the corresponding attachment allows chimpanzees to engage in various 
forms of cooperation such as cooperative hunting (Boesch and Boesch 1989; Boesch 
1994), agonistic support (e.g. Watts 2002; Mitani 2006) and collective warfare (Manson 
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and Wrangham 1991). Thus, prosocial acts are particularly common among males, who 
profit most from cooperation (Boesch and Boesch 1989; Nishida et al. 1992; Watts 
2002). On the other hand, cooperation is subject to opportunistic fluctuations (de Waal 
1982; Gilby et al. 2009) and in experiments has difficulty getting started (Brosnan and 
Beran 2009; Brosnan et al. 2009; Yamamoto and Tanaka 2009a) or tends to break down 
in the absence of immediate rewards (reviewed by Warneken and Tomasello 2009) or 
explicit solicitations (Yamamoto and Tanaka 2009b). These difficulties of experimental 
reciprocity may further indicate that reciprocity among chimpanzees (and indeed most 
animals) is mainly symmetry-based rather than calculated (Brosnan and de Waal 2002), 
i.e. prosocial acts are averaged out on a long-term basis mediated by affiliative emotions 
rather than exchanged contingently in a tit-for-tat manner requiring substantial cognitive 
effort (Stevens and Hauser 2004; see discussion by Brosnan et al. this volume). While it 
is parsimonious to assume that human ancestors shared these aspects of cooperation 
based on direct reciprocity with chimpanzees, humans seem to have acquired several 
derived features, some of which may have evolved convergently with other taxa. These 
derived features combined to make human cooperation more stable relative to 
chimpanzees. 
The regular proactive element of human prosociality almost certainly shared 
with callitrichids suggests that a high intrinsic prosocial motivation evolved 
convergently in cooperative breeders, probably because of the risk of neglect of 
unattended offspring (Hrdy 2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010), and the need for active 
provisioning to maintain fast growth levels (Brown et al. 2004; Gurven and Hill 2009). 
This proactive element could also explain why teaching is more common among 
cooperative breeders (Rapaport 2006a; Rapaport and Brown 2008; Burkart and van 
 
The psychology of cooperation in humans and primates 117 
Schaik 2010) whereas great apes often do not take advantage of low-cost opportunities 
to teach (Hirata and Celli 2003b; Lonsdorf 2006; C. Sanz et al. in prep.; Jaeggi et al. 
2010a). Furthermore, the adoption of cooperative breeding typically leads to the 
formation of family units, within which prosocial acts are dispensed more freely 
because they generally benefit close kin or pair-bonded partners (Chapais 2008; Hrdy 
2009; Burkart and van Schaik 2010). Thus a high intrinsic prosocial motivation would 
not be counter-selected if applied within the family. Finally, within human societies kin 
networks extend far beyond the family unit (Chapais 2008), and even when applied to 
non-relatives, a high prosocial motivation may be beneficial if it sends a costly signal or 
serves to maintain one’s good reputation (see below). 
Capuchin monkeys may on the face of it not fit this picture. One could argue that 
the more stable group composition relative to chimpanzees, as well as increased 
paternity concentration and female philopatry (Fragaszy et al. 2004) could have led to 
more stable reciprocal relationships and higher average relatedness, thus favouring 
prosocial motivations. However, the same is true for most macaques, probably without 
increasing prosociality. Another explanation could be that capuchins also evolved 
higher prosocial motivations, because they, like many New World Monkeys, engage in 
allo-maternal care, such as infant carrying and regular food sharing from males to 
infants (ibid.). At the moment, no other convincing hypotheses exist for the taxonomic 
distribution of the components of prosociality among primates. 
Finally, humans seem to have acquired a strong sensitivity to the (perceived) 
presence and size of an audience. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, the 
potentially high costs imposed on cheaters in a society of interdependent individuals 
(Boehm 1999; Gurven 2004; Kaplan et al. 2009; Marlowe 2009), which we have 
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internalized as “conscience”,  functioning to anticipate others’ reactions (Trivers 1971; 
DeScioli and Kurzban 2009), have lead to an increase in prosocial behaviour in the 
presence of subtle cues of being watched. Secondly, individuals (mainly men) may send 
costly signals in the presence of large audiences, thus advertising themselves as 
valuable cooperation partners or mates (Smith and Bliege Bird 2005). This new 
sensitivity to being watched and to the size of the audience may lead to strong reactive 
prosociality, in the presence of subtle extrinsic stimuli (0’), or even to proactive 
prosociality, if the conscience effectively internalized the possibility that extrinsic 
stimuli are present (0). Finally, the recent rise of anonymous market societies with their 
need for larger-scale cooperation may have further modified psychology (Henrich et al. 
2010). 
In conclusion, we note that humans differ from their closest living relatives, the 
great apes, in two key aspects of the psychological regulation of cooperation: Humans 
are proactive, i.e. they act prosocial in the absence of obvious extrinsic stimuli and more 
reactive, i.e. they respond stronger to extrinsic stimuli and to a wider range of such 
stimuli. Thus, the parameters a (response to extrinsic stimuli) and b (intrinsic 
motivation) in Figure 4-1 differ between humans and great apes, indicating that 
prosociality has been under stronger positive selection during human evolution. 
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Chapter 5: Psychological altruism in non-human animals? 
Preconditions, an operational definition and the empirical 
evidence 
 
Biological definitions of altruism (BA) are based on the consequences of actions 
as measured in costs and benefits to an actor’s fitness. In contrast, philosophical views 
of altruism stress the motives of actions and include recognition of another person’s 
desires and a genuine concern for those. However, since these proposed mental 
processes are often inaccessible, the empirical evidence for such psychological altruism 
(PA) remains controversial. We discuss the psychological preconditions for PA in 
animals, namely an understanding of the self and others as intentional agents, the ability 
to read others’ intentions or desires and a motivation to satisfy them. Based on 
differences in these preconditions and the corresponding levels of intentionality we 
propose to distinguish between PA sensu lato and sensu stricto (which are, however, 
indistinguishable by observation) as well as non-intentional forms of BA. We suggest 
that a behavior is indicative of PA if A is an intentional agent, and changes its behavior 
in order to satisfy B’s goals as perceived by A, and if other immediate reasons such as 
harassment can be excluded. Using this definition, we review the empirical evidence for 
PA in various species, in particular in the contexts of food sharing and targeted helping. 
The disposition for PA of different species is compared with regard to the intensity, 
pervasiveness, extent and empathetic skill involved. Finally, we briefly discuss how 
natural selection for BA may have shaped these dispositions and why and to what extent 
humans differ from other animals. 
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This article is structured into six sections (I.-VI.). The first introduces the 
concepts of biological and psychological altruism (BA and PA) and notes that PA 
differs in that it refers to the motives and BA to the consequences of behaviors. In the 
second section we briefly discuss the difficulties of assessing an agent’s “true” motives, 
which is why the presence of PA is so debated among humans. The third asks whether 
animals could have PA by identifying the necessary psychological requirements, 
namely some form of theory of mind and prosocial motivations, and by excluding other 
explanations for BA, in particular those that make PA so debated in humans. This 
section thus forms the core of the article and paves the way for the fourth section, which 
is concerned with how we could recognize PA in animals and presents an operational 
definition for doing so. In the fifth section we review empirical evidence to answer 
whether and to what extent animals do have PA as operationalized above. Finally, in the 
sixth section we briefly discuss why animals (including humans) should have PA, or in 
other words, under what conditions selection for BA should favor PA, thus linking the 
two again. Throughout the article we will mainly use the context of food sharing as a 
source of illustration but also discuss the evidence for other helping situations in part 
five. 
 
I. What is altruism? Biological vs. psychological definitions 
 
 Several biologists have claimed that by understanding the evolution of altruism 
one can explain the evolution of morality (Wilson 1975; Alexander 1987; de Waal 
2006). However, leaving aside the common objection of philosophers that morality is 
about more than just altruism (e.g. Peacock et al. 2005), the type of altruism that 
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biologists are typically concerned with is fundamentally different from philosophical 
(and indeed folk psychological) views of altruism, thus hampering any contribution of 
biologists to moral philosophy. In the following we briefly discuss these different 
views. 
 
Biological altruism (BA) 
 
Biologists defined altruism in terms of costs and benefits to Darwinian fitness, 
i.e. reproduction and survival (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971). Thus, BA is measured by 
the consequences of behavior. This approach has proven useful in explaining the 
evolution of altruism by ultimate mechanisms such as kin selection (Hamilton 1964) or 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), which aim to “take the altruism out of altruism” 
(ibid., p. 35), i.e. to show that behavior that is costly to the self but beneficial to another 
individual in the short term will still serve (genetic) self-interest in the long run. As we 
will argue in more detail below (Sections III. (iii), VI.), this long-term self interest is 
most probably not consciously represented by animals, and probably quite often also not 
by humans. 
Even though Trivers (1971) devoted a large section of his paper on reciprocal 
altruism to its psychological regulation (in humans), the topic has been far less studied 
by biologists. Since many scholars who studied altruism worked on relatively simple 
organisms such as eusocial insects (e.g. Hamilton 1964; Wilson 1975), it was often 
assumed that the behavior was hard-wired, i.e. genetically predisposed to be triggered 
by specific stimuli. The question of psychological regulation arose only in the study of 
more complex organisms such as non-human primates (de Waal 1996; de Waal 2006). 
Since primates share with humans many aspects of social behavior it has been proposed 
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that they can help us to understand the origins of altruism in humans (ibid.). How then 
is altruism defined by scholars of human behavior? 
 
Psychological altruism (PA) 
 
 Generally speaking, psychologists and philosophers are concerned with the 
motives and intentions of actions, not their consequences (e.g. Batson 1991). A very 
concise definition of PA has been provided by Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 201) as “the 
existence of ultimate2 desires concerning the well-being of others”. Or in the words of 
Kitcher (1998, p. 284), “we think of people as altruists when they adjust their 
preferences to their perceptions of the wants and needs of others”. These definitions are 
thus fundamentally different from BA. 
Motives are also at the core of most important schools of moral philosophy. 
Most famously, philosophers in the Hume-Smith tradition stress the importance of 
moral emotions such as sympathy (Smith 2002 [1759]; Hume 2003 [1739-1740]) while 
proponents of a new ethics of virtue invoke benevolence as a characteristic of human 
“natural goodness” (Foot 2001). Kant (1994 [1785]) highlighted duty and reason and 
postulated in his categorical imperative that another person was always to be treated as 
an end in itself and never as a means to achieving some other end. Even early 
consequentialists such as John Stuart Mill (1987 [1861]) recognized the importance of 
altruistic motives. In general, when giving justifications for actions in moral discourse, 
lay or academic, the motives of behavior often matter more than the consequences. 
Thus, the kind of altruism “that matters to morality” (Kitcher 1998, p. 284) is PA and 
                                                 
2 Ultimate here indicates that the desires represent ends in themselves rather than means to achieving 
some other end (like increasing one’s fitness). Thus, ultimate here is distinct from the biological meaning 
of the word. 
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not BA. Hence, if biologists wish to contribute to an understanding of altruism or 
morality as relevant to moral philosophers they should concern themselves with the 
motives underlying BA. 
 
II. PA among humans: Inaccessibility of motives and skepticism 
 
 Before we consider animal altruism we have to mention one fundamental 
problem underlying the debate about psychological altruism in humans, namely the 
difficulty of distinguishing acts that only appear altruistic (in a BA sense) but are 
actually motivated by self-interest, from those that are genuinely altruistic, i.e. PA. 
Since the motives of actions are not directly accessible to outsiders, we have to rely on 
self reports by the actor or must try to infer the actor’s motives from observation of his 
actions. Both these methods are flawed by inherent difficulties: First, an individual’s 
motives may not be consciously experienced, as seen when a posteriori reasons are 
given for judgments actually made intuitively (Haidt 2001; Haidt 2007), and can thus 
also not be reliably reported. Furthermore, people tend to overemphasize their altruistic 
motives (Ridley 1996) and/or to deceive themselves about their own motives (Trivers 
2010). Second, the problem with inferring motives from observation is that motives 
may “resist complete characterization in behavioural terms” (Peacock et al. 2005; p. 
189), rendering unambiguous inferences impossible. Both these problems continue to 
fuel skepticism about PA in humans. But let us assume for the moment that humans at 
least occasionally engage in actions motivated by PA. How could we best recognize this 
from pure observation of their actions? This of course is the only available method for 
the study of animal altruism. 
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III. Could animals have PA? Preconditions and behavioral cues 
 
 The task of inferring motives from behavior may actually be somewhat less 
hopeless among animals, because animals are less likely than humans to pursue hidden 
egoistic goals when performing BA due to cognitive limitations (Kitcher 1985; Stevens 
and Hauser 2004; see discussion in III. (iii)). Thus, the risk of classifying behavior as 
PA that only appears to be altruistic, but is actually motivated by self-regard, is lower. 
However, for animals another main question is whether their actions are guided by 
anything like motives in a human sense, i.e. whether they recognize themselves and 
others as intentional agents. 
For the purpose of discussing what preconditions animals must fulfill for their 
actions to be guided by motives and how PA can be inferred from observation of actions 
we will refer to an illustration of PA provided by Kitcher (1998, p. 284):  
“There is some divisible good that is valued by both A and B; when A is alone 
and comes across this good, then A prefers taking it all to any other available option; 
however, if A recognizes that B is present (and, I assume, that B also values the good), 
then A no longer prefers consuming the good entire but, instead, wants most to share the 
good with B. Moreover, this preference is generated by A’s perception of B’s valuation 
of the good, and it is not explained by A’s having some other independent end that 
would be advanced by sharing with B – A does not calculate that, in the long run, more 
good things will accrue from sharing with B.” 
 Now let us consider the relevant points in this illustration as emphasized by 
Kitcher (ibid.): 
 “First, A’s valuations differ between the solo situation and that in which B is 
present: it is not particularly unselfish for people to share things to which they attach no 
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value. Second, A’s preference when B is present is mediated by the perception of B’s 
wants: [psychological] altruism presupposes an empathetic ability to discern what others 
need or desire and to respond to it. Third, B’s satisfaction is perceived as an end in 
itself, not as a means to the achievement of some of A’s other goals.” 
 The first point (i) makes clear that A values the good when alone but changes his 
valuation in B’s presence, the second (ii) states an “empathetic ability” as the generator 
of the altruistic motive and the third (iii) excludes other motives. If animals fulfill these 
psychological preconditions and if we can find behaviors that reliably indicate them, 
then an extension of PA to animals may be warranted. 
(i) First, A’s valuation of the good when alone can easily be measured, 
especially if the good is food. The crucial point is that A changes his valuation in B’s 
presence. The only way to unequivocally identify a change in valuation is a change in 
behavior. For instance in a food sharing context, the fact that “A no longer prefers 
consuming the good entire” may be indicated when A stops or slows down his feeding 
in B’s presence, or even more so, if A actively makes food available B 3. Hence, 
following Caro and Hauser (1992) in their operational definition for teaching, we will 
use a change in behavior as an indicator for a change in intention. 
(ii) Second, this change in valuation, as indicated by a change in behavior, 
should be generated by an “empathetic ability”, i.e. an ability to discern the other’s 
needs or desires and to respond to them in an adequate way. Hence, some understanding 
of the other’s internal state, i.e. some form of a theory of mind  (ToM) is required, and it 
has to be coupled with a prosocial motivation, i.e. any internal mechanism that rewards 
                                                 
3 It may also be that A changes his valuation without changing his behavior, but there is no way for us to 
recognize that he/she did. For instance, if A does not actively make food available to B, but continues 
feeding in the same way and merely passively tolerates that B takes some food, there is no way of 
inferring whether A actually wanted B to have food. Thus, the operationalization is conservative in that it 
excludes potential cases of PA where there was no change in behavior despite a change in preference. 
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the self for other-regarding behavior and thus makes the actor respond to the other’s 
need. 
The evidence for or against ToM in non-human animals is still controversial (see 
e.g. Heyes 1998 and commentaries therein; Penn and Povinelli 2007). Arguably, the 
best evidence can be found in apes (Byrne 1995; Call and Tomasello 2008), although 
their ToM might be somewhat different from ours: For instance, Call and Tomasello 
(2008) concluded in a recent review that chimpanzees do understand others in terms of a 
perception-goal psychology, but do not possess a human-like belief-desire psychology4. 
Hence chimpanzees are probably the best candidates for having motives broadly 
resembling our own. Other animals have been far less systematically studied and the 
evidence is thus scarcer. We know from other great apes (Inoue-Nakamura 2001), 
dolphins (Reiss and Marino 2001), elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006), but also some birds 
(Prior et al. 2008) that they, like chimpanzees, can recognize themselves in a mirror, 
thus hinting at an understanding of the self (and presumably others) as intentional 
agents (Gallup and Platek 2002). We may thus assume that these species share a similar 
ToM with chimpanzees. No evidence for mirror self-recognition was found in monkeys 
(Heyes 1998; Heschl and Burkart 2006) but some species may have some recognition of 
others as intentional agents (e.g. Flombaum and Santos 2005; Burkart and Heschl 2007; 
Phillips et al. 2009). Finally, most other animals probably do not understand themselves 
and others as intentional agents and their behavior is assumed to be relatively hard-
wired in terms of stimulus-response mechanisms. 
These differences in ToM capacities correspond to differences in Dennett’s 
(1983) levels of intentionality: in level 0,  A simply responds to a stimulus, like birds do 
                                                 
4 There is as yet no standard experimental paradigm for testing belief-desire understanding in animals. An 
indication for it would be a rapid, adequate response in a novel situation, but the evidence for this remains 
largely anecdotal (Byrne 1995; Call & Tomasello 2008). 
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when feeding their chicks in response to their open beaks. Hence, there is no intention 
underlying A’s behavior. In level 1, A responds to B’s behavior, for instance begging or 
reaching for the food. Hence, A makes food available with the intention of satisfying B’s 
behavioral goal. Finally, in level 2, A responds to B’s internal state, e.g. by recognizing 
that B is hungry and desires food and hence provides food with the intention of 
satisfying this desire. The problem is that in practice, level 1 and 2 are often 
indistinguishable by observation (Byrne 1995)5. However, given that 2nd order 
intentionality requires a belief-desire psychology for which there is little empirical 
evidence in animals it is more parsimonious to assume 1st order intentionality in an 
equivocal case. 
Many may argue that only 2nd order intentionality, coupled with a full-blown 
belief-desire ToM can correspond to human PA. However, very young children already 
act out of empathic concern after they pass the age of mirror self-recognition, at roughly 
18 months, but long before they develop a full-blown ToM, at around four years 
(Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Bischof-Köhler 1991; Koski and Sterck 2009). Hence, it 
appears that agents who can recognize themselves in the mirror (and thus presumably 
have a conception of themselves and others as intentional agents) and possess a 
perception-goal psychology and 1st order intentionality may have motives for their 
actions that are similarly relevant to PA as those with a belief-desire psychology and 2nd 
order intentionality. Thus, we propose to distinguish between PA sensu stricto, probably 
only present in adult humans and PA sensu lato, probably present in human children 
and some species with mirror self-recognition and a perception-goal ToM (Table 5-1). 
(In the following we will speak of a “well-developed ToM” to refer to either perception-
                                                 
5 For instance, making food available in response to begging could be due to recognition of B’s goal of 
acquiring food or B’s need for food as inferred from the begging. 
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goal- or belief-desire psychology and of a “full-blown ToM” to refer only to the latter). 
These two forms of PA have to be distinguished from BA that lacks intentionality, i.e. 
biologically altruistic acts by animals that have no understanding of themselves or 
others as intentional agents and the behavior of which is regulated by simple stimulus-
response mechanisms. 
 
Table 5-1: Different levels of proximate regulation for biologically altruistic acts (BA), only some of 
which may count as psychologically altruistic (PA). Note that having a higher level of theory of 
mind (ToM) or intentionality alone is only a necessary but not sufficient precondition for PA, since 
the recognition of another agent’s desires or goals is not per se coupled with a desire to fulfill those, 
i.e. some prosocial motivation 
Proximate regulation of BA Level of ToM Level of 
intentionality 
Present ina 
PA sensu stricto Belief-desire 
psychology 
2 Adult humans 
PA sensu lato Perception-goal 
psychology 
1 Human children, great apes, 
probably dolphins, elephants, 
corvid birds, possibly some 
monkeys 
Prosocial motivation without 
intention (hard-wired) 
Stimulus-
response 
0 Rest of animal kingdom 
  
 Note that Kitcher’s “empathetic ability” includes both the ability to discern the 
other’s need or desire as well as a motivation to respond to it. Hence, a well developed 
ToM alone is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for PA, since one can 
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perfectly well recognize another person’s desires without wanting to respond to them6. 
Thus, ToM has to be coupled with some prosocial motivation, which does not arise 
automatically from the recognition of the other’s intentions or desires (Burkart et al. 
2009). For instance, ToM among chimpanzees and birds is better developed in 
competitive rather than cooperative situations (Hare and Tomasello 2004; Clayton et al. 
2007), and thus most likely evolved in competitive contexts. On the other hand, 
prosocial motivation alone, though not necessarily accompanied by ToM, is better 
developed in other species, in particular those with a more cooperative natural history 
(Jaeggi et al. in press). 
(iii) To satisfy Kitcher’s third criterion for PA, other motives for BA have to be 
excluded, in particular those toward gaining indirect benefits to the actor. Those indirect 
benefits can be either immediate (avoidance of harassment or coercion) or delayed 
(through kin selection, reciprocity, reputation gain, etc.). Harassment can be observed 
and thus altruistic acts as an avoidance of harassment can largely be excluded7. Pursuit 
of delayed benefits cannot be measured. However, it is highly unlikely that animals 
consciously pursue such benefits by calculating their genetic gains and losses or the 
chances of future reciprocation due to obvious cognitive limitations (Kitcher 1985; 
Stevens and Hauser 2004). Rather, the corresponding behavior is more parsimoniously 
assumed to be emotionally regulated (Kitcher 1998; Wright 2006), following simple 
rules-of-thumb (Jaeggi et al. in press).  
For instance, consider a situation as discussed by Wright (2006) in which A 
grooms B one day and B then helps A in a conflict the next day. As Wright pointed out, 
                                                 
6 See for example discussions of psychopaths, moral skeptics, rational fools etc. throughout the 
philosophical literature. 
7 An exception may be acting altruistically in anticipation of harassment, in which case altruistic acts 
from low-ranking to high-ranking individuals might have to be excluded, even if there was no overt 
harassment. 
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this can be explained both in terms of cognitive or emotional regulation: We can 
suppose that A knew about the imminent challenge and hence wanted to ensure B’s 
support by grooming B. B, having been groomed wanted to keep his part of the bargain 
(or was also pursuing some long-term egoistic goal) and thus supported A.  Or, A felt 
insecurity because of recent challenges, and thus sought reassurance by grooming a 
valuable social partner B (it is well known that grooming reduces stress levels in both 
groomer and groomee). B, having been groomed, felt the bond with A strengthened and 
was thus more likely to support A. .Both explanations are possible in humans, but seeing 
that the former makes much stronger assumptions about the cognitive abilities of the 
actors (in terms of planning, memory, temporal discounting, etc., see Stevens and 
Hauser 2004), the latter is more parsimonious in non-human animals (Wright 2006). 
Furthermore, the respective brain areas indicate that emotional regulation is 
phylogenetically older (e.g. Panksepp 2004), and thus certainly preceded cognitive 
regulation in the primate lineage. Finally, several scholars have pointed out that 
altruistic behavior is biologically more successful if genuine, i.e. not serving 
consciously pursued goals, e.g. because this generates more trust, gratitude, etc., thus 
ensuring cooperation and maximizing the return-benefits from altruistic acts (e.g. 
Trivers 1971; Frank 1988; Kitcher 1998). Natural selection should thus have equipped 
agents with respective emotional dispositions rather than a full understanding of how 
those enhance their own fitness. Hence, if immediate reasons such as harassment or 
coercion can be ruled out, it is more parsimonious to assume that BA among animals is 
triggered by a prosocial motivation rather than by conscious pursuit of delayed benefits. 
Thus, A probably derives some internal satisfaction from aiding B and the act can thus 
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be seen as an end in itself. If A is an intentional agent, i.e. has a well-developed ToM 
(Table 5-1), we may infer PA. 
In summary, some animals may fulfill the requirements for PA, at least in the 
broad sense defined here (Table 5-1). The next section provides an operational 
definition for inferring PA from observation. 
 
IV. How to infer PA in animals: an operational definition 
 
 PA can be defined as adjusting one’s preferences to one’s perception of the 
wants and needs of others (Kitcher 1998). Following from the previous section, we 
propose that PA can be inferred by behavioral observation if the following criteria are 
fulfilled: 
- A changes or adjusts its behavior in the presence of B 
- A’s change in behavior aims at satisfying B’s goals as perceived by A 
- A does so on a voluntary basis, i.e. unforced by B 
The first point indicates that A changes its preferences or valuations, the second that this 
is intended to be beneficial for B, and the third that A does so voluntarily. For the first 
point, it may again be noted that a change in behavior is the only way to unequivocally 
infer a change in preferences or valuations, even if this could also be possible without a 
change in behavior. For the second point, the precondition is that A is an intentional 
agent, i.e. has some form of ToM, as known from other, independent contexts (Table 5-
1). For the third point, it is assumed that the act is not performed out of a rational 
calculation of the delayed benefits that could accrue to A, , which is, as discussed above, 
unlikely to be the case among animals. Rather, an emotional regulation is assumed, i.e. 
A derives emotional satisfaction from aiding B. 
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Note that this definition is somewhat similar to Caro & Hauser’s (1992) 
operational definition for teaching in non-human animals, in particular with regard to 
inferring intentions from behavior. They distinguished three types of teaching, only one 
of which (“active teaching”) required the intention to teach, while the other two 
(“opportunity teaching” and “coaching”) were merely consistent with the function of 
teaching. However, since PA is about intentions and not just function (which would be 
BA), the intention of the actor has to be an inherent part of the definition. Thus, just like 
active teaching was defined by the teacher’s adjustment of behavior to the perceived 
skill-level of the pupil (Caro and Hauser 1992), PA has to be defined by the adjustment 
of behavior to the perceived goals and intentions of the recipient8. Hence the inherent 
importance of ToM. 
 
V. Do animals have PA and to what extent? The empirical evidence 
 
If the preconditions discussed in III are fulfilled, the operational definition may 
apply to all animal interactions that represent BA, i.e. those in which one individual 
incurs a cost and another benefits. The two main contexts which we discuss here are 
food sharing and targeted helping, because these most evidently represent BA Since the 
available literature is heavily biased towards non-human primates we mainly discuss 
this taxonomic group. We start by applying the operational definition to a food-sharing 
context, which is similar to the situation described by Kitcher (1998). 
Food sharing, defined as the un-resisted transfer of food from A to B, is quite 
frequent among primates (Feistner and McGrew 1989; Brown et al. 2004), including 
                                                 
8 PA sensu stricto would require an adjustment of behavior to the perceived needs and desires of the 
recipient, but as noted above, this is indistinguishable from PA sensu lato by observation. 
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humans (Gurven 2004), and has often been used as a model for the evolution of “moral 
building blocks” such as reciprocal obligations (de Waal 1989; de Waal 2006). 
However, little attention has been paid to the underlying psychology, as inferred from 
the ways in which food is actually transferred from A to B (Jaeggi et al. in press). The 
operational definition of PA is fulfilled only when A changes its behavior, unforced by 
B, in order to make food available for B. PA can thus be seen in active forms of sharing 
(Figure 5-1). A’s failure to actively transfer food indicates a lack of PA (but see footnote 
4), e.g. through passive forms of sharing, and of course even more so by resisting 
transfers and not sharing at all. The most crucial element is that A performs some active 
behavior, thus indicating a change in preferences. Ignoring B clearly does not so, even 
when B is then allowed to take some food and the consequence of the interaction thus 
also represents BA.  
Observations show that the vast majority of food sharing instances among 
primates is of the latter kind (Figure 5-1), even among kin (transfer to infants). Note the 
large differences to human children in similar experiments. In fact, even instances of 
active sharing may reflect the intention to get rid of the beggar, even the own infant, by 
giving bad food parts while withholding good food (e.g. Bard 1992; Ueno and 
Matsuzawa 2004). Thus, PA is not commonly expressed in primate food sharing, at 
least not in those species that possess the necessary “empathetic ability”, i.e. a well 
developed ToM to fulfill the criteria for PA sensu lato9. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Note that some species that do share food more regularly, thus expressing stronger prosocial motivation, 
e.g. Callitrichids (Figure 1), may not require a ToM component to do so because it can always be 
assumed that others are food-motivated and the ToM load of the situation is thus so low that the behavior 
can be hard-wired. Food sharing among callitrichids then does not represent PA because they lack ToM, 
as evidenced by a lack of mirror self-recognition (Heschl & Burkart 2006). 
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Figure 5-1: The proportion of un-resisted food transfers that were active, and thus may count as 
PA, in some of the best studies primate species. The numbers above the bars indicate the number of 
studies contributing to the means represented by the bars. Figure adapted from Jaeggi et al. (in 
press). inf. = transfers to infants, ad. = transfers among adults.  
 
Furthermore, there are numerous instances where food owners fail to express PA 
by not taking others’ goals into account, despite minimal costs. Consider the following 
situation from our own observations on bonobos10: A holds a large bundle of browse, 
such as the ones used by de Waal (1989), and allows B to feed from the same bundle 
(the situations thus representing BA). If A was a psychological altruist, he/she should 
take B’s position around the bundle into account, knowing that B wants to co-feed (and 
wanting B to be able to do so). However, food owners often turn their bundles about as 
they feed, forcing co-feeders to continuously adjust their position. Furthermore, if A is 
done feeding but the bundle still contains edible leaves and B is still co-feeding, A 
                                                 
10 Unpublished observations, for details on subjects see Jaeggi et al. (2010). 
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should hand over the bundle to B or at least make it easy for B to take the bundle. No 
substantial costs are involved with this action, and A can easily confer further benefits to 
B. However, in all instances we witnessed, food owners simply dropped their bundles 
when done feeding, making no effort whatsoever to facilitate B’s further feeding. Since 
they often sat high up in the enclosure, the former co-feeders had to climb down several 
meters to retrieve the bundle. In some cases this even led to scrambles or fights over 
ownership of the now deserted bundle. Surely, a psychological altruist would act 
differently. In fact, an actor trying to maximize long-term self-interest should also hand 
over the bundle rather than drop it, in order to increase delayed benefits through 
reciprocity or inclusive fitness. Thus, these observations also speak against a conscious 
representation of such egoistic goals.  
Another context in which PA may be expressed is so-called targeted or 
instrumental helping. Defined as “helping that takes the specific needs of others into 
account” (de Waal 2003) it refers to situations in which an individual encounters some 
difficulty and another individual helps it to solve this difficulty by providing adequate 
help, e.g. by handing an object to an individual reaching for it, or opening a door for an 
individual trying to pass. Importantly, the “ToM-load” in targeted helping situations, 
can be considerably higher than in food sharing situations: Under naturalistic 
conditions, animals tend to be always food-motivated and it is thus not necessary to 
assess whether there is a desire for food or not in any new situation. Rather, the 
motivational state of food interest can be permanently built-in in a representation of 
con-specifics, either hardwired or by experience. Inferring the goals and intentions of 
others in targeted helping situations, however, is often not straight-forward and may 
require more sophisticated ToM capacities as well as an understanding of the relevant 
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physical constraints in the specific situation. Hence, BA in novel targeted helping 
situations cannot be hard-wired but requires the combination of prosocial motivation 
and ToM. Not surprisingly then, targeted helping is more common in species with well 
developed ToM such as great apes.  
Targeted helping has been observed anecdotally (de Waal 2006) but has also 
been investigated experimentally with positive results for chimpanzees (Warneken and 
Tomasello 2006; Warneken et al. 2007; Yamamoto et al. 2009), bonobos (Hare and 
Kwetuenda 2010) and capuchin monkeys (Barnes et al. 2008). Thus, PA is expressed 
regularly in such paradigms. The most convincing evidence comes from the study on 
bonobos, in which subjects were alone in a cage with a large amount of food, which 
they would eat entirely when alone. However, when another individual was present in 
an adjacent cage, which the subject could open, most subjects stopped feeding quickly 
and opened the door to the adjacent cage, letting the other individual in to feed (Hare 
and Kwetuenda 2010). Thus, the subjects clearly changed their preferences in the 
presence of the other individual and acted in a way that satisfied the goals of the other 
individual as perceived by the subject. Note the differences to the bonobos observed by 
Jaeggi et al. (2010b). 
Interestingly, in direct comparisons of human children and chimpanzees with 
varying degrees of enculturation, i.e. contact with humans, there seemed to be 
differences in PA (Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Warneken et al. 2007). In particular, 
the more enculturated the chimpanzees were, the higher their prosocial motivation 
seemed to be, probably because helping had been systematically rewarded by humans. 
For instance, human-raised chimpanzees spontaneously helped a human experimenter 
just like human children, suggesting that their prosocial motivation was similar 
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(Warneken and Tomasello 2006). In another comparison, sanctuary-housed 
chimpanzees responded slower than human children with helping and often only after 
solicitation by the experimenter, suggesting that their prosocial motivation may be 
lower (Warneken et al. 2007). Thus, chimpanzees may show PA in targeted helping 
situations, but do so more when they are well enculturated by humans (raising their 
prosocial motivation), and otherwise mainly upon request. 
Overall, animals thus vary extensively in the four dimensions of PA defined by 
Kitcher (1998): intensity, pervasiveness, extent and empathetic skill. Empathetic skill, 
refers to the ability to identify the psychological dispositions of the recipient and is 
probably best developed in great apes with their perception-goal psychology (Call and 
Tomasello 2008) and possibly some other species (see Table 5-1, III. (ii)). The intensity 
of altruism, i.e. the degree of the altruist’s movement away from his own (initial) 
desires is generally quite low among primates since most altruistic acts are of very low 
cost11. However, intensity may be higher in more cooperative species such as 
callitrichids who share food even more when it is preferred (Feistner and Chamove 
1986) but may on the other hand lack an understanding of their own and others’ 
intentions and desires and thus the ToM component of PA. Thus, callitrichids may give 
food calls to invite others to take food, indicating high prosocial motivation, but may 
experience conflict with their own desire to feed when others actually come to take food 
(own obs.). The extent of altruism is defined as the number of potential recipients, 
which for most animals is restricted to close kin and long-term bonded partners with 
whom there is a history of reciprocal interactions (cf. Burkart et al. 2009, Figure 1). 
Some argue that the same has been true for humans during the greater part of their 
                                                 
11 For instance, food is shared mainly after the owner is satiated and usually includes small scraps of food. 
Likewise, agonistic support is usually directed against subordinates where the risk of defeat or injury is 
minimal and grooming does not require much effort other than the time investment. 
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evolutionary history (Burnham and Johnson 2005), while others claim that it is precisely 
an increase in the extent of altruism that made modern societies possible (Kitcher 1998; 
Henrich et al. 2010). Finally, pervasiveness describes the range of contexts in which 
altruism is expressed and among primates typically includes allo-grooming, agonistic 
support, allo-maternal care and food sharing, all of which may not occur in every 
species though.  
Thus, in summary, many animals may show prosocial behavior, but only some 
species do so coupled with a ToM component, i.e. an “empathetic ability” such that the 
behavior could potentially qualify as PA. However, ToM in most non-human animals is 
better expressed in competitive rather than cooperative contexts and thus probably 
evolved in the former (Hare and Tomasello 2004; Clayton et al. 2007). Unless it is 
coupled with prosocial motivation, ToM does not necessarily lead to PA. Among 
chimpanzees in particular, enculturated individuals may show more PA than naturally 
raised individuals, presumably because their prosocial motivation is higher due to the 
frequent rewarding of such behavior by humans. .Hence, given the rareness of PA 
among non-human animals, either because of a lack of ToM or a lack of prosocial 
motivation, the question of the next section is how natural selection could have led to 
PA. 
 
VI. Conclusions: Why PA? 
 
 If BA does not need to be fine-tuned to the recipients desires, e.g. because these 
can be assumed to be constant (need for food, shelter, grooming, predator avoidance 
etc.), then such behavior can be regulated without ToM. Only in contexts where the 
intentions of the recipient are not obvious there needs to be a coupling of prosocial 
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motivation and a ToM component, such as in targeted helping situations, thus leading to 
PA. However, those animals that do possess the cognitive preconditions for PA sensu 
lato, i.e. at least a perception-goal ToM, probably evolved these not in order to be 
altruistic but in order to compete better. Furthermore, no animals may be able to 
perform PA sensu stricto because they probably lack the necessary belief-desire 
psychology and 2nd order intentionality (Table 5-1). Hence, the interesting questions 
really are why humans evolved both a full-blown ToM and high prosocial motivations, 
combining both of them to perform PA (sensu stricto), and, why humans evolved the 
cognitive capacities to perform BA out of egoistic calculations, something which 
animals are probably not capable of and which has lead to the wide-spread skepticism 
about the genuineness of human PA. 
 The first question, why humans coupled a well-developed ToM with high 
prosocial motivation has been addressed by Burkart et al. (2009) who argued that the 
ToM components stem from the last common ancestor with chimpanzees (who evolved 
it in competitive contexts), while the high prosocial motivation is a derived feature 
shared with other highly cooperative species, but not with other apes. Thus, this 
coupling of ToM with high prosocial motivation led to its application in cooperative 
contexts and thus the systematic occurrence of targeted helping, i.e. PA (ibid., Figure 4). 
The evolution of a belief-desire ToM from a presumed perception-goal ToM in the last 
common ancestor with chimpanzees may also be explained by its application in more 
cooperative contexts (teaching, collective action, etc.) leading to the advent of shared 
intentionality, which facilitated further development of ToM (Tomasello and Carpenter 
2007; Burkart et al. 2009). 
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 However, a belief-desire psychology and 2nd order intentionality not only 
increased the capacity for PA but also for tactical deception (Byrne 1995), which leads 
us to the second question, why humans evolved the capacity for conscious regulation of 
altruistic acts. Since altruistic acts and the exchange thereof are much more frequent 
among humans than among chimpanzees (Jaeggi et al. in press), it is likely that there 
has been considerable selective pressure to evolve ever more sophisticated 
psychological mechanisms regulating altruistic acts, including deception and subtle 
cheating by mimicking genuine altruism (Trivers 1971). Thus, it is possible that “fake” 
altruism, not backed-up by genuine emotions, could be strategically used to pursue 
egoistic goals once the cognitive preconditions for doing so had been acquired. 
However, since the evolutionary arm’s race between altruists and cheaters also led to 
well-developed detection mechanisms and countermeasures against subtle cheaters 
(ibid.), repeated successful use of strategic altruism is probably quite rare. Rather, 
“fake” altruists will soon face mistrust by others and eventually find themselves without 
any cooperation partners. Thus, we again emphasize that an emotional regulation of BA, 
i.e. PA, is functionally more successful because it ensures cooperation by building trust 
(Trivers 1971; Frank 1988) and genuine psychological altruists thus fare better in the 
long run. In other words, (most) humans are probably no rational fools (sensu Gauthier 
1986), because the moral contract was made not by conscious agreement but by an 
emotional commitment to cooperation, i.e. PA, set in place by natural selection. 
In summary, there are many instances of biologically altruistic behavior, only a 
few of which may represent psychological altruism in a philosophical sense, i.e. 
including an understanding of the intentions and goals of others as well as a genuine 
desire to advance these. This is partly due to the fact that few animal species possess the 
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necessary cognitive or motivational preconditions, possibly because the former evolved 
in more competitive contexts and are thus rarely coupled with the latter. Humans 
probably coupled the two components due to the adoption of a more cooperative 
lifestyle compared to the last common ancestor with other apes. Thus, if psychological 
altruism is taken as an important component of morality (Kitcher 1998; Sober and 
Wilson 1998), the interesting question for moral philosophers could be not whether 
humans do have psychological altruism or not, but under what conditions it was favored 
by natural selection, an understanding of which may help to advance its expression in 
modern societies. 
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Appendix 1-1: Following Pagel and Meade (2006), we plotted the posterior distributions of rate 
coefficients, i.e. estimated probabilities (q) for evolutionary transitions between states (see Figure 1-
1). Rate pairs, i.e. the probabilities of gains or losses of one trait in the presence or absence of the 
other trait are arranged vertically. Differences between rate pairs provide evidence for correlated 
evolution, e.g. pairs q13 and q24, which correspond to gains of food sharing with and without another 
trait of interest. The plots represent a) sharing among adults, sharing with infants, b) sharing from 
males to females, opportunity for female choice, c) sharing from males to females, monogamy, d) 
sharing among males, male-male coalitions, e) sharing among females, female-female coalitions. 
The written values are the mean ±SD values of q as well as the percentage of models that estimated 
q to zero (“zero bin”) 
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Appendix 2-1: Details on the composition of all (main and additional) study groups, individuals are 
ranked according to age, arrows indicate offspring 
Species Group Name Date of Birth1 Sex Included in2 
BL 1958 f GS 1 & 2 
Æ FA3 02/08/2000 f GS 1 & 2 
    
NI 1976 f GS 1 & 2 
Æ DI 26/6/1992 m GS 1 & 2 
    
CE 02/07/1976 m GS 1 & 2 
    
BR 1981 f GS 1 & 2 
    
CH 15/03/1984 f GS 1 & 2 
Æ TZ 02/08/1992 f GS 1 & 2 
    
DA 01/12/1984 m GS 1 & 2 
    
BA 24/08/1996 f GS 1 & 2 
    
EL 19/03/1999 f GS 1 & 2 
Gossau 
    
SU 1974 f GD a1 & 2 
    
LI 1981 f GD a1 & 2 
    
AN 1982 m GD a1 & 2 
    
BO 1982 f GD a1 & 2 
    
HE 1982 f GD a1 & 2 
Æ AL 25/11/1996 m GD a1 & 2 
    
SC 1982 f GD a1 & 2 
Æ DA 10/04/1998 m GD a2 
Æ XA 26/02/1999 f GD a2 
    
MO 1983 m GD a1 & 2 
Gänserndorf a 
    
GO 1974 m GD b 
    
IS 1978 m GD b 
    
MA 1978 m GD b 
    
JO 1981 m GD b 
    
BL 1983 m GD b 
    
JA 1983 m GD b 
Chimpanzees 
Gänserndorf b 
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MI 1985 m GD b 
    
MB 1980 m A 
    
MW 1985 m A 
    
ML 1985 f A 
    
JI 15/07/1985 f A 
    
RO 1990 f A 
    
ZU 1990 f A 
    
HA 1990 m A 
    
LO 19/05/1992 f A 
Apenheul 
    
DE 1970 m P 1 & 2 
    
DZ 1971 f P 1 & 2 
Æ LU 26/08/1994 m P 1 
    
HE 1978 f P 1 – 5 
    
HO 1978 f P 1 – 5 
Æ RE 24/11/1990 m P 2 – 5 
Æ VI 23/07/1994 m P 3 - 4 
Æ ZA 16/04/1998 m P 4 - 5 
    
KO 1980 f P 2 
    
KI 28/02/1983 m P 1 – 5 
    
DJ 27/03/1995 f P 3 – 5 
Planckendael 
    
DT 21/10/1977 f T 
Æ KC 19/04/1989 f T 
Æ KE 02/01/1994 m T 
    
KA 07/06/1980 m T 
    
BY 01/02/1990 f T 
    
JS 02/08/1990 m T 
Twycross 
    
MT 22/12/1963 m W 
    
LL 24/04/1980 f W 
Æ BD 17/09/1991 m W 
    
LM 21/07/1980 m W 
Bonobos 
Wuppertal 
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BG 11/08/1989 m W 
    
EJ 14/07/1990 f W 
1dd/mm/yyyy, only estimated year is given if exact date is unknown 
2Indicates in which study groups the individual was included (see Table 2-2) 
3Arrows indicate offspring 
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a)      b) 
Appendix 3-1: The relationship between an individual’s food distribution rate (transfers to 
others/h) and the amount of aggressive rejections received when approaching other food possessors 
for a) the chimpanzees and b) the bonobos. Averages over the whole study period were taken. The 
amounts of aggressive rejections were similar to the one reported by de Waal (1989) as was the food 
distribution rate of the chimpanzees. The food distribution rate of the bonobos was significantly 
lower (Wilcoxon: W = 195, P < 0.001). In contrast to de Waal (1989), neither group showed a 
negative correlation between food distribution rate and received aggressive rejections 
(Chimpanzees: Spearman’s rho=0.51, N=9, P=0.16, Bonobos: rho= 0.2, N=6, P=0.7), hence no 
evidence for punishment was found 
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Appendix 3-2: The difference between grooming received (in seconds) by third parties after sharing 
sessions during which an individual was food owner compared to the closest sharing session during 
which it was not food owner, split by the sex of the food owner. There was no evidence that 
individuals were groomed more on days on which they were food owners (Wilcoxon: W=1208, 
P=0.79), thus not supporting the hypothesis that owning food per se makes individuals socially 
more attractive (Moore 1984) 
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Appendix 4-1: Operational definitions of the food transfer types used 
Term Other terms Operational definition  References 
Proactive sharing 
(offering) 
 A initiates food transfer by calling B 
and may adopt a special “offering 
posture”, or by approaching B, who 
was not begging, and allowing B to 
take food 
(Brown and Mack 
1978; Feistner and 
McGrew 1989; 
Gursky 2000; 
Wolovich et al. 2006) 
Reactive sharing 
(active giving and 
facilitated taking 
upon begging) 
Active sharing, 
active passive 
sharing 
A facilitates or aids B’s attempts to 
take food by making movements 
conducive to food transfer (includes 
actively handing over food as well as 
making it easier for B to take) 
(Teleki 1973; Kuroda 
1984; Boesch and 
Boesch 1989) 
Passive sharing 
(tolerated taking) 
Relaxed claim A tolerates B’s attempts to take food 
and neither discourages nor 
encourages them 
(Teleki 1973; Boesch 
and Boesch 1989; de 
Waal 1989) 
 Appendix 4-2: Overview of all food sharing studies that presented detailed information on types of food transfers, allowing classification into proactive, 
reactive and passive sharing. The Table contains the species contributing to the means in Figure 4-1 (Callithrichids, capuchins, great apes and human 
children), as well as other primate species. Rows represent single studies or independent study groups and are ordered by species, in order of relatedness to 
humans 
Sharing with infants      
       
Group Species Environment Pro-active Re-active Passive Reference 
Great apes Pongo pygmaeus wild 0 2.21 97.79 (Jaeggi et al. 2008) 
Great apes Pongo pygmaeus free-ranging 0 16.19 83.81 (Bard 1992) 
Great apes Gorilla gorilla wild 0 0 100 (Nowell and Fletcher 2006) 
Great apes Pan paniscus wild 0 3.05 96.95 (Kuroda 1984) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes captive 0 4.55 95.45 (Hirata and Celli 2003a) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes captive 0 2.28 97.72 (Silk 1979) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (McGrew 1975) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Lonsdorf 2006) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Silk 1978) 
Gibbons Symphalangus syndactilus captive 0 0 100 (Fox 1972) 
Gibbons Hylobates lar wild 0 0 100 (Nettelbeck 1998) 
Gibbons Hylobates lar captive 0 0 100 (Schessler and Nash 1977) 
Gibbons Nomascus concolor wild 0 0 100 (Fan and Jiang 2009) 
Colobinae Procolobus badius temminckii wild 0 0 100 (Starin 2006) 
Cercopithecinae Papio anubis wild 0 0 100 (Strum 1975; Strum 1981) 
Capuchins Cebus capucinus wild 22.22 0 77.78 (Rose 1997) 
Capuchins Cebus apella captive 0 0 100 (Fragaszy et al. 1997) 
Capuchins Cebus apella captive 0 0 100 Furbush (cited in Fragaszy et al. 2004) 
Capuchins Cebus apella captive 0 1 99 (Westergaard et al. 1999) 
Callicebidae Callicebus torquatus wild 0 57.14 42.86 (Starin 1978) 
Pitheciidae Pithecia pithecia wild 0 0 100 (Homburg 1997) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia captive 62.34 0 37.67 (Brown and Mack 1978) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia captive 5.96 0 94.04 (Price and Feistner 1993) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia wild 11.76 0 88.24 (Ruiz-Miranda et al. 1999) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia free-ranging 24.97 0 75.03 (Ruiz-Miranda et al. 1999) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia wild 19.24 0 80.76 (Rapaport and Ruiz-Miranda 2006) 
 
 Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia wild 18.15 0 81.84 (Rapaport and Ruiz-Miranda 2006) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia wild 37.25 0 62.75 (Rapaport and Ruiz-Miranda 2006) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus rosalia wild 5.65 0 94.35 (Rapaport 2006b) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus chrysomelas captive 20 0 80 Moura & Langguth, unpubl. 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus chrysomelasa captive 5.80 0 94.20 (Feistner and Price 1999) 
Callitrichids Leontopithecus chrysopygus captive 5.3 0 94.7 (Feistner and Price 2000) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 48.65 0 51.35 (Feistner and Price 1999) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 37.4 0 62.6 (Feistner and Price 1990) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 35.4 0 64.6 (Feistner and Price 1990) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 29.8 0 30.6 (Feistner and Price 1990) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 9 0 91 (Feistner and Price 1990) 
Callitrichids Saguinus oedipus captive 0 0 100 (Roush and Snowdon 2001) 
Callitrichids Saguinus bicolor captive 1.5 0 98.5 (Price and Feistner 2001) 
Callitrichids Saguinus labiatus captive 0 0 100 (Caine et al. 1995) 
Callitrichids Saguinus mystax wild 0 0 100 (Heymann 1996) 
Callitrichids Callithrix jacchus captive 0 0 100 (Feistner and Price 1991) 
Callitrichids Callithrix geoffreoyi captive 0 0 100 (Feistner and Price 1991) 
Callitrichids Callithrix argentata captive 0 0 100 (Feistner and Price 1991) 
Tarsiidae Tarsius spectrum wild 27.78 0 72.22 (Gursky 2000) 
       
Sharing among adults      
       
Human children Homo sapiens pre-schools 16.86 64.17 18.97 (Birch and Billman 1986) 
Human children Homo sapiens pre-schools 27.08 41.35 31.57 (Rao and Stewart 1999) 
Great apes Pongo spp. wild 0 0 100 (van Noordwijk and van Schaik 2009) 
Great apes Pan paniscus wild 0.67 12.34 86.96 (Kuroda 1984) 
Great apes Pan paniscus wild 0 34 66 (Fruth and Hohmann 2002) 
Great apes Pan paniscus captive 0 0 100 (de Waal 1992) 
Great apes Pan paniscus captive 0 0 100 (Jaeggi et al. 2010b) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes captive 0 0 100 (de Waal 1997) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes captive 0 0.2 99.8 (de Waal 1989) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 1.34 98.65 (Teleki 1973) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Hockings et al. 2007) 
 
  
Great apes Pan troglodytes captive 1.02 27.55 71.43 (Jaeggi et al. 2010b) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 30.77 69.23 (Nishida 1970) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Takahata et al. 1984) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Kawanaka 1982) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Nakamura and Itoh 2001) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 7.63 92.37 (Boesch and Boesch 1989) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Nishida et al. 1979) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 22.22 33.33 44.44 (Reynolds 2005) 
Great apes Pan troglodytes wild 0 0 100 (Kuroda et al. 1996) 
Gibbons Hylobates lar captive 0 0 100 (Berkson and Schusterman 1964) 
Gibbons Nomascus concolor wild 0 0 100 (Fan and Jiang 2009) 
Callitrichids Saguinus nigricollis wild 0 0 100 (Izawa 1978) 
Colobinae Procolobus badius temminckii wild 0 0 100 (Starin 2006) 
Colobinae Rhinopithecus roxellana captive 0 0 100 (Zhang et al. 2008) 
Cercopithecinae Papio anubis wild 0 0 100 (Strum 1975; Strum 1981) 
Capuchins Cebus apella captive 0 10.32 89.64 (de Waal et al. 1993) 
Capuchins Cebus capucinus wild 0 0 100 (Rose 1997) 
Aotidae Aotus azarai captive 4.65 0 95.35 (Wolovich et al. 2006) 
Callitrichids Callithrix flaviceps wild 0 0 100 (Ferrari 1992) 
Callitrichids Callithrix jacchus captive 0 0 100 (Kasper et al. 2008) 
Callitrichids Saguinus nigricollis wild 0 0 100 (Izawa 1978) 
asharing with infant of different species (Saguinus oedipus) 
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